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When do we cooperate and why? This question concerns one of the most per-
sistent divides between “theory and practice”, between predictions from game
theory and results from experimental studies. For about 15 years, theoretical
analyses predict completely-mixed “behavior” strategies, i.e. strategic random-
ization rendering “when” and “why” questions largely moot, while experimental
analyses seem to consistently identify pure strategies, suggesting long-run inter-
actions are deterministic. Reanalyzing 145,000 decisions from infinitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemma experiments, and using data-mining techniques giving pure
strategies the best possible chance, we conclude that subjects play semi-grim be-
havior strategies similar to those predicted by theory.
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1 Introduction
One of the most dynamic research fields over the last two decades has been behavioral
game theory: the econometric and theoretical analysis of laboratory games to align
observed behavior with game-theoretical concepts. How should we think of beliefs,
utilities and choice of subjects, and is it possible to explain their decisions as responses
to incentives? In some classes of games, most notably auctions, behavior seems to
be reasonably consistent with theory after accounting simply for risk aversion (Bajari
and Hortacsu, 2005) or biased beliefs (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). In generic normal-
form games involving dominated strategies behavior is captured after relaxing rational
expectations (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001); in games without dominated strategies be-
havior tends to reflect mainly logistic errors in choice (Weizsäcker, 2003; Brunner
et al., 2011); and in games involving the distribution of monetary benefits, interdepen-
dence of preferences seems to organize behavior (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness
and Rabin, 2002). Particular behavioral models tend to be disputed, but overall, there
has been substantial progress in aligning observed behavior and theoretical predictions
across many classes of games.
A class of games that arguably experienced less progress in aligning behavior and
predictions is the large class of repeated games. Repeated games are the main tool in
modeling long-run interactions, in particular to study cooperation and defection, and
have been a core object of game-theoretic analyses at least since the Folk Theorem for
repeated games with discounting (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). Part of an explana-
tion for the slow progress may be that theoretical predictions for repeated games tend to
be less specific than for other games. The main reason, however, seems to be indepen-
dent of that: Behavioral analyses of individual strategies in repeated games typically do
not assume subgame perfection, even though this normally represents an indisputable
assumption in theoretical and behavioral analyses of dynamic games (with the excep-
tion of Fudenberg and Levine, 1993). Relaxing subgame perfection is necessary to
justify the widespread intuition that human behavior is directly reciprocal, as captured
by tit-for-tat in repeated games. When taking tit-for-tat reciprocity as given, dropping
subgame perfection in behavioral analyses of repeated games seems inevitable, which
perhaps instills the belief that theoretical results maintaining subgame perfection can-
not inform such analyses.
This state of affairs raises a provocative question: Who is right? Theoretical anal-
yses studying subgame perfect equilibria, assuming subjects understand non-credible
threats and seek robustness to, for example, imperfect monitoring (following Kandori,
2002, and Ely and Välimäki, 2002), or behavioral analyses analyzing rather complex
deterministic choice rules such as tit-for-tat, “lenient grim”, or “tit-for-2-tats” (Fuden-
berg et al., 2012) that mostly violate subgame perfection but seek to build on psycho-
logical interpretations of behavior?
With this paper, we seek to tackle this question. Our basis for identification is
arguably the main prediction of theoretical analyses of repeated games from the last
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twenty years: Following Kandori (2002) and Ely and Välimäki (2002), a large body
of theoretical work analyzed robustness to imperfect (private) monitoring and con-
cluded that players seeking robustness are likely to play behavior strategies (see also
Ely et al., 2005, and Mailath and Samuelson, 2006). Private monitoring is imperfect if
opponents’ actions are not observable but players get imperfect private signals about
their opponents’ actions. This covers the case that players fail to perfectly observe
or remember their opponents’ actions, which seems both empirically and behaviorally
plausible. The main prediction of this literature is that subjects should play belief-free
equilibria (or weakly belief-free equilibria, Kandori, 2011), i.e. they should random-
ize each round to ensure the indifference of opponents at all points of time—which
implies that opponents do not need to be able to perfectly remember previous ac-
tions. This prediction diametrically opposes the assumption of deterministic choice
rules made in most recent behavioral analyses (the exception, Breitmoser, 2015, is dis-
cussed shortly) and thus provides a powerful foundation for answering the question(s)
raised above. The difficulty is that an enormous data set and specific econometric tools
are required to conclusively discriminate between behavior strategies, where subjects
strategically randomize, and pure strategies, where deviations simply are stochastic
mistakes—substantially more data and different tools than in the suggestive analysis
of Breitmoser (2015).
The data concern has been solved very recently by Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018),
who compiled a very large data set comprising 12 previous experiments (with 32 treat-
ments and around 150,000 decisions), but in their analysis they maintain the assump-
tion of deterministic choice rules. This data set finally allows us to tackle the questions
raised above. To conclusively do so, we use a technique that belongs to the realm of
data mining: We select models from wide ranges of one- and two-memory pure strate-
gies, as well as from a range of different “switching” rules to capture inconsistency at
the individual level. These ranges comprise up to 1044 models and represent exhaus-
tive mining for the best combination of pure strategies. Only the best such model will
be evaluated against the simple three-parametric “semi-grim” behavior strategy1 previ-
ously identified by Breitmoser (2015)—importantly without penalizing the best model
for the selection steps that preceded the evaluation stage. This approach, mining for
the best-possible model and then evaluating the model as if it had been hypothesized
ex-ante, is called data dredging and is frowned upon for obvious reasons. It drastically
biases p-values in favor of the mined model, but in our case this approach helps us to
ensure that we are giving pure strategies the best possible chance. Still, we find that not
even this exhaustively data-mined mixture improves on the simple hypothesis that sub-
jects play behavior strategies with a rather specific structure (semi-grim)—consistently
across experiments. Mostly, the mined model actually fits significantly worse.
We conclude that individual behavior is indeed best described by the memory-1
1Subjects randomize on actions every period, where randomization probabilities depend on actions in
the precious period (memory-1) and cooperation probabilities after unilateral defection are independent
of who defected.
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behavior strategies that we consistently observe on average across experiments. Fur-
ther, there is no evidence for heterogeneity aside from the usual 5–10% of noise play-
ers found in most experimental studies (i.e. subjects randomizing uniformly). In many
ways, this represents good news for future research, as it shows that behavior is simple
and robust, it confirms a central prediction, and implicitly the underlying assumptions,
of recent theoretical analyses, and it poses a puzzling question for future theoretical
and behavioral research: Why do subjects play the particular behavior strategies we
consistently observe across this vast set of experiments? There is no obvious answer to
this. In turn, our findings put a rather tight limitation on psychological interpretations
of behavior. Individual behavior in various states of the repeated game is random, im-
plying that causality between actions in one round and reactions in subsequent rounds
is stochastic. In the most psychologically interesting states, succeeding unilateral de-
fection, cooperation probabilities are around 30% and symmetric between cooperator
and defector, rendering any causal statement linking action and reaction very weak.
2 Background information
Definitions The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) involves two players choosing whether to
cooperate (c) or defect (d). In the normalized PD each player’s payoff is 1 if both co-
operate and 0 if both defect. If exactly one player cooperates, the cooperating player’s
payoff is−l (l > 0) and the defecting player’s payoff is 1+g (g> 0). This constituent
game is repeated infinitely often. Assuming players are risk neutral and discount fu-
ture payoffs exponentially (using factor δ < 1), this game is strategically equivalent to
an indefinitely repeated one that is terminated with probability 1−δ after each round.
We will refer to these games jointly as repeated prisoner’s dilemma (or, supergame).
Given g, l > 0, cooperation is dominated in the one-shot game but may be sustained
along the path of play in subgame-perfect equilibria of the repeated PD (depending on
δ).
A strategy σ in the repeated PD maps all finite histories to the probability of
cooperation in the next round. The strategy has memory-1 if it prescribes the same
cooperation probability for any two histories that do not differ in the actions chosen
in their respective last rounds. It has memory-2 if the same holds for the respec-
tive last two rounds. We distinguish between the round-1 action and the continua-
tion strategy, which prescribes behavior from round 2 on, and shall focus exclusively
on analyzing continuation strategies. Thus, a memory-1 strategy may be denoted
as σ = (σcc,σcd,σdc,σdd) corresponding to the four non-empty memory-1 histories
{cc,cd,dc,dd}. We will refer to these as states in the following. For example, σcd ,
denotes the probability of cooperation when a player’s most recent action is c and her
opponent’s most recent action is d. A strategy is a pure strategy if it prescribes de-
generate cooperation probabilities after all histories (σ ∈ {0,1}), and it is a behavior
strategy otherwise. A mixed strategy randomizes on the set of pure strategies prior
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to the start of the repeated game, in contrast to the behavior strategy that randomizes
during the repeated game.
The data We re-analyze the exact same set of experiments reviewed in Dal Bó and
Fréchette (2018). This set comprises most of the modern experiments on repeated
prisoner’s dilemmas, i.e. those published since Dal Bó (2005), and consists in total of
data from 12 experiments, 32 treatments, more than 1900 subjects, and almost 145,000
decisions. The set of experiments equates with the experiments listed in Table 1. A
brief review is in Appendix B, but for a detailed discussion, see Dal Bó and Fréchette
(2018). Thanks to its enormous size, the wide range of experiments covered (from
different experimenters in various universities and various countries), and its compre-
hensive character with respect to the recent list of experiments on the repeated PD,
this data set appears to be optimal for our purpose. In addition, by sticking exactly to
the list of experiments reviewed by Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018), we can rule out the
notion that data selection biases the results in favor of the hypotheses we intend to test.
Finally, our analysis of continuation strategies complements the analysis by Dal Bó
and Fréchette (2018), who focus largely on aggregate and first round cooperation rates
as a function of treatment.
Table 1 provides an overview of behavior across experiments. It reports the av-
erage cooperation rates across experiments in each of the memory-1 states and tests
for significance of difference. Besides clarifying average behavior, this allows us
to test whether the surprising observation of Breitmoser (2015) that average strate-
gies have a “semi-grim” pattern was specific to the four experiments he analyzed or
can be considered a general phenomenon. A behavior strategy is called semi-grim if
σcc>σcd ≈σdc>σdd , and indeed, this applies across most experiments, both for inex-
perienced subjects (the first half of sessions) and experienced subjects (second half of
sessions). The differences between inexperienced and experienced subjects are clearly
minor overall, the aggregate cooperation probabilities shift by at most five percentage
points, but since it is customary to distinguish experienced and inexperienced behavior,
we will consistently do so throughout this paper.
Our main hypothesis is that these semi-grim strategies reflect behavior not just on
average, but also individually, as opposed to reflecting the sum of a variety of deter-
ministic choice rules. The results of a very simple test of this hypothesis are reported in
the last four columns of Table 1. These columns list the number of subjects (per exper-
iment) that deviate significantly from randomizing 50-50 in the four memory-1 states.
We focus on subjects with at least five observations per state, which suffices to trigger
significance in two-sided Fisher tests if subjects play a pure strategy. The results are
fairly revealing: In state (c,d), i.e. after unilateral defection of the opponent, all stan-
dard pure strategies (except “always cooperate”) agree on the (pure) prediction that
one should defect. This state is unique with respect to the unanimity of the prediction.
For this state, however, we find the lowest number of subjects significantly deviating
from randomizing 50-50—only around a quarter of the subjects do so, putting a rather
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Table 1: Few subjects play pure strategies and assuming pure strategies yields a striking bias even in large mixture models
Actual cooperation rates Best-fitting rates assuming pure str. Number of subjects not randomizing 50-50
Experiment σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd σ˜cc σ˜cd σ˜dc σ˜dd (c,c) (c,d) (d,c) (d,d)
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 0.917 ≫ 0.45 ≈ 0.408 ≈ 0.336 0.818− 0.449 0.419 0.336 32/38 1/23 3/20 7/21
Blonski et al. (2011) 0.89 ≫ 0.279 ≈ 0.193 ≫ 0.034 0.891 0.18− 0.184 0.053 13/17 1/5 3/3 124/135
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 0.91 ≫ 0.286 ≈ 0.228 ≫ 0.08 0.882 0.158−− 0.18 0.121 12/18 6/23 8/21 32/36
Dal Bó (2005) 0.922 ≫ 0.212 < 0.342 ≫ 0.089 0.896 0.16− 0.346 0.108 13/13 0/3 2/2 42/54
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 0.951 ≫ 0.334 ≈ 0.331 ≫ 0.063 0.884− 0.196−− 0.318 0.108 94/106 28/117 51/128 218/253
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 0.94 ≫ 0.297 ≈ 0.335 ≫ 0.057 0.891 0.172−− 0.317 0.09 216/243 37/137 62/147 404/474
Dreber et al. (2008) 0.904 ≫ 0.217 ≈ 0.213 ≫ 0.036 0.915 0.081−− 0.199 0.084 15/25 3/19 12/18 45/48
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 0.904 ≫ 0.301 ≈ 0.33 ≫ 0.111 0.863 0.239− 0.342 0.15 43/57 4/25 10/24 61/82
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 0.943 ≫ 0.141 ≈ 0.266 ≈ 0.091 0.918 0.099 0.274 0.085 21/28 0/0 2/2 5/8
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 0.982 ≫ 0.4 ≈ 0.427 ≫ 0.066 0.946 0.295−− 0.404 0.06 38/43 1/6 5/11 20/25
Kagel and Schley (2013) 0.935 ≫ 0.263 ≈ 0.295 ≫ 0.051 0.906 0.149−− 0.294 0.086 71/81 20/71 32/60 98/111
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 0.945 ≫ 0.328 ≈ 0.371 ≫ 0.117 0.868− 0.201−− 0.377 0.125 37/44 10/36 12/34 41/52
Pooled 0.938 ≫ 0.304 ≈ 0.322 ≫ 0.065 0.888 0.189−− 0.311 0.1 605/713 111/465 202/470 1097/1299
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 0.958 ≫ 0.398 ≈ 0.517 ≈ 0.375 0.901− 0.367 0.544 0.325 33/37 0/12 1/12 5/9
Blonski et al. (2011) 0.923 ≫ 0.287 ≈ 0.231 ≫ 0.02 0.92 0.189− 0.221 0.04 26/32 10/25 11/16 172/178
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 0.947 ≫ 0.221 ≈ 0.297 ≫ 0.041 0.942 0.128− 0.315 0.067 13/15 8/17 9/12 31/35
Dal Bó (2005) 0.92 ≫ 0.242 < 0.388 ≫ 0.064 0.914 0.193 0.386 0.1 18/27 0/3 0/1 50/65
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 0.979 ≫ 0.376 ≈ 0.362 ≫ 0.041 0.957 0.235−− 0.364 0.073 132/137 34/89 62/100 196/215
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 0.976 ≫ 0.315 < 0.402 ≫ 0.035 0.947 0.187−− 0.408 0.061 340/365 52/162 77/146 448/497
Dreber et al. (2008) 0.917 ≫ 0.128 ≪ 0.39 ≫ 0.009 0.936 0.087 0.395 0.044 14/18 6/11 6/12 41/43
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 0.977 ≫ 0.367 ≈ 0.391 ≫ 0.082 0.923− 0.205−− 0.37 0.085 80/87 5/35 16/43 60/68
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 0.97 ≫ 0.233 ≈ 0.398 ≫ 0.069 0.93 0.072−− 0.391 0.074 33/37 1/6 2/10 20/25
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 0.971 ≫ 0.487 ≈ 0.412 ≫ 0.083 0.942 0.43− 0.378 0.091 41/44 2/8 4/10 14/17
Kagel and Schley (2013) 0.966 ≫ 0.262 ≈ 0.332 ≫ 0.025 0.947 0.175− 0.351 0.05 87/90 16/56 30/46 91/97
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 0.973 ≫ 0.482 ≈ 0.437 ≫ 0.078 0.919− 0.375−− 0.4 0.122 44/48 7/24 17/23 23/29
Pooled 0.971 ≫ 0.327 < 0.376 ≫ 0.039 0.941 0.209−− 0.376 0.064 861/937 141/448 235/431 1151/1278
Note: The “actual cooperation rates” are the relative frequencies estimated directly from the data. The relation signs encode bootstrapped p-values (resampling at the subject level with 10,000 repetitions)
where <,> indicate rejection of the Null of equality at p< .05 and≪,≫ indicating p< .002. Following Wright (1992), we accommodate for the multiplicity of comparisons within data sets by adjusting
p-values using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979). Note that all details here exactly replicate Breitmoser (2015). As a result, if a data set is considered in isolation, the .05-level indicated by “>,<”
is appropriate. If all 24 treatments are considered simultaneously, the corresponding Bonferroni correction requires to further reduce the threshold to .002 ≈ .05/24, which corresponds with “≫,≪”.
The “best-fitting rates assuming pure strategies” provide the cooperation probabilities explained assuming mixtures of pure strategies as usually analyzed in the literature (the five 1-memory and five
2-memory strategies usually considered). The “number of subjects not randomizing 50-50” indicates the number of subjects with cooperation rates in the various states differing significantly from 50-50
(in subject-level two-sided binomial tests), conditioning on subjects having moved at least five times in the respective state. The required level of significance is set at p= 0.0625 such that five observations
are sufficient to trigger statistical significance if the subject plays a pure strategy.
tight bound on the number of subjects potentially playing pure strategies.
The middle set of columns serves to illustrate the basic deficiency of deterministic
choice rules. Assume that subjects use deterministic choice rules. Given that the semi-
grim pattern results on average, there have to be subjects that systematically cooperate
after unilateral defection of opponents. They do not have to cooperate always, but fairly
often to make up for the general tendency toward defection in state (c,d) predicted by
the standard strategies. For example, Result 6 of Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018) states
that “always defect” (AD), Grim, and tit-for-tat (TFT) are the “three strategies [that]
account for most of the data”—which seems to directly contradict the observation that
σcd ≈ σdc unless around a third of the subjects systematically cooperate in state (c,d).
Now allow for arbitrary mixtures of the ten pure strategies that had been found to be
significant in previous analyses,2 and let the mixture weights be adapted independently
to each treatment of each experiment to optimally capture behavior. The middle set of
columns compares the cooperation probabilities predicted by these best fitting mixtures
(the econometric details follow in Section 3) with the actual cooperation probabilities
by experiment. The quintessence is the strong bias in state (c,d), where predicted
cooperation rates are substantially below the actual cooperation rates across experi-
ments. Subjects cooperate much more often after unilateral defection of opponents
than is compatible with the notion of pure strategies. The strategies predicting at least
occasional cooperation after (c,d), such as always-cooperate and tit-for-2-tats, simply
do not fit behavior of sufficiently many subjects to capture aggregate behavior. Based
on this, we will obtain the range of highly significant results suggesting that subjects
play behavior strategies reported below.
Related behavioral literature We keep the literature review short and focused due
to the availability of the excellent recent survey by Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018). The
modern experimental research on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma started with Dal Bó
(2005), who criticized earlier experiments for the implemented experimental designs
such as letting subjects play against computerized opponents. The first wave of exper-
iments following Dal Bó (2005) includes Dreber et al. (2008), Duffy and Ochs (2009),
Blonski et al. (2011) and Kagel and Schley (2013), and focuses on analyzing first-
round and total cooperation rates. A second wave comprising Dal Bó and Fréchette
(2011, 2015), Bruttel and Kamecke (2012), Camera et al. (2012), Fudenberg et al.
(2012), Sherstyuk et al. (2013), Breitmoser (2015), and Fréchette and Yuksel (2017)
analyzes the continuation strategies following round-1 that we also focus on. The gen-
eral theme in the reported results is that initial cooperation rates depend on the strategic
environment. More specifically, they show that subgame perfection of grim is neces-
sary but not sufficient for cooperation to emerge, and that subsequent cooperation of
2These are five memory-1 strategies and five memory-2 strategies: tit-for-tat (TFT), grim, win-stay-
lose-shift (WSLS), always defect (AD), always cooperate (AC), Grim2, tit-for-2-tats (TF2T), 2-tits-for-
tat (2TFT), win-stay-lose-shift-2, and “T2” (i.e. punish defection for two periods, otherwise cooperate).
The standard definitions are provided in Table 5 in the online appendix.
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subjects depend on their opponent’s actions, primarily on those in the previous round.
Many of the second-wave analyses classify the strategies of individual subjects into
varying pre-selected sets of pure strategies. These analyses typically conclude that the
majority of subjects plays either AD, TFT, or Grim (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2018, Re-
sult 6), with TFT being attributed population weights around 30% if the candidate set
includes only pure strategies.
Breitmoser (2015) points out the misalignment of this claim with cooperation
rates state-by-state. In a data set comprising four experiments he analyzes whether
semi-grim behavior strategies better capture behavior than mixtures of pure memory-
1 strategies, assuming each subject consistently plays a single memory-1 strategy
throughout the experiment.3 The results are suggestive, but obviously inconclusive,
as the data set might be fortunately selected, as behavior might be more complex than
memory-1 admits, and as subjects might switch strategies as the session progresses.
In this paper, we report the results of an analysis relaxing all three concerns to arrive
at arguably conclusive results. The data concern was addressed above. The case for
memory-2 strategies had been made by Fudenberg et al. (2012), who show that if we
assume subjects play pure strategies, then there must be subjects with memory-2, based
on evidence for 2TFT and "forgiving" Grim2 strategies. Similar ideas are expressed
in Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) and Bruttel and Kamecke (2012). In contrast to these
studies, we relax the assumption of pure strategies in the first place, noting that be-
havior strategies themselves generate behavior resembling memory 2 or 3. Recently,
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) evaluate a pre-selected set of 20 memory-1 and memory-
2/3 strategies and observe no evidence for memory-2/3 (in their random termination
treatment). This observation does not contradict the earlier statements, as it may result
due to the large set of candidate strategies considered in the first place, which amplifies
standard errors, in particular if a single treatment is considered. Our analysis resolves
such concerns using the data-mining techniques described in the next section.
3 Methodology and first results
Econometric approach Recall that a subject using a pure strategy acts equivalently
whenever a given state is reached and she uses the same pure strategy across all su-
pergames. A subject using a mixed strategy uses a pure strategy within supergames
but randomizes over pure strategies between supergames. A subject using a behavior
strategy systematically deviates from pure strategies even within supergames. These
definitions provide a basis for identification, given the set of pure strategies considered
in the behavioral literature, but identification is made difficult by the standard assump-
tion that choice is stochastic. Specifically, a single deviation from a given pure strategy,
over say 20 observations, is intuitively not considered sufficient evidence against pu-
3The only other study investigating a behavior strategy seems to be Fudenberg et al. (2012), who
include the strategy "generous TFT" which randomizes (only) after opponent’s defection.
8
rity of strategies. Otherwise, the case for behavior strategies would be trivial, but how
can this intuition be made formally precise—in a manner that allows us to distinguish
“noisy” pure, mixed, and behavior strategies?
The distinction is achieved efficiently using the Markov-switching models known
from empirical finance and empirical macroeconomics in conjunction with the robust
likelihood-ratio tests of Schennach and Wilhelm (2017). Markov-switching models
generalize the finite-mixture and random-switching models used in previous analyses
of repeated game strategies.4 They allow us to capture a potentially heterogeneous
group of agents (in our case, subjects potentially playing different strategies), where
each agent is characterized by a “state of mind” (the strategy to be played), and agents
may change their states of mind over the course of time, but both states and transitions
are latent and thus not directly observable. The identifying assumption is that state
transitions follow a Markov process, which substantially generalizes models assum-
ing these transition probabilities to be degenerate (finite mixture) or uniform (random
switching). Given this, estimation proceeds by maximum likelihood using an EM
algorithm. Model adequacy is evaluated using ICL-BIC (Biernacki et al., 2000), and
model differences are evaluated using the Schennach-Wilhelm test, which captures that
all models may be arbitrarily nested and misspecified. Finally, we allow for stochastic
choice in the form of trembles following Harless and Camerer (1994). All details are
reported in Appendix A.
Data mining pure and mixed strategies Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018) argue that the
five pure memory-1 strategies, namely AC, AD, TFT, Grim, and D-TFT, capture the
behavior of most subjects across conditions. We focus on these strategies initially. Yet,
as pure strategies have already shown to underestimate cooperation rates in state (c,d)
in Table 1, we widen the scope of pure strategies by introducing generalized versions
that allow for some randomization within supergames. Using the notation introduced
above, generalized AC and AD are defined as behavior strategies (θAC,θAC,θAC,θAC)
and (θAD,θAD,θAD,θAD) respectively, where θAC and θAD may be different. General-
ized TFT is defined as (1,0,θTFT ,0), generalized Grim as (1,θG,θG,θG), and gener-
alized WSLS as (1,0,0,θWSLS), with all θ∗ ∈ [0,1]. Given these definitions, we mine
the data as follows. We illustrate all steps by referring to Table 2, which provides the
results for memory-1 strategies.
First, we evaluate which mixture of pure or generalized pure strategies best cap-
tures behavior, independently for each treatment. That is, we determine for each treat-
ment, which combination of pure strategies fits best, which combination of generalized
4The approach of using mixture models in order to uncover decision rules in experimental data
has been established by Stahl and Wilson (1994) and El-Gamal and Grether (1995) and subsequently
used in many analyses of level-k reasoning and stochastic choice, see e.g. Houser and Winter (2004) and
Houser et al. (2004), to unravel individual decision rules. A special case of finite mixture modeling is the
Strategy Frequency Estimation Method (SFEM) employed by Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011), Fudenberg
et al. (2012), Rand et al. (2015), Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015), Fréchette and Yuksel (2017).
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pure strategies fits best, and which of the combinations fits best overall. For simplic-
ity, we assume the best combination always contains at least TFT, AD, and Grim, as
those were reported to capture players’ behavior in previous studies. This chooses the
best out of the eight most promising memory-1 mixtures, for each of the 32 treatments
independently. In total, we thus evaluate 832 models per level of experience. Finally,
we do all of this separately for three “switching models” designed to capture changes
between supergames: "No Switching" (pure strategy), "Random Switching" (mixed
strategy), and "Markov Switching" (where strategy choice between supergames fol-
lows a Markov process).
The results for each of the three switching models are reported in the first three
columns of Table 2. For sake of readability, we aggregate ICL-BICs by experiment.5
This initial analysis suggests that inexperienced subjects switch strategies randomly
between supergames, while experienced subjects then play constant strategies. As a
side note, we obtain strong evidence that subjects play the generalized pure strategies
rather than the actual pure ones (Table 11 in the appendix provides details). The differ-
ences in model fit are large, amounting to more than 1000 points on the log-likelihood
scale, suggesting that randomization within supergames is indeed a behavioral facet.
Second, given the best strategy combination at treatment level, we pick the best
switching model by experience level, column 4 (“Best Switching”) of Table 2, and
evaluate this model against the simple semi-grim model reported in the fifth column.
Note that we implicitly pick the best-fitting model from 3×832 models, which is cho-
sen after estimating 276 parameters per treatment, and evaluate it against the three-






3 ). In line with the data-
mining ideal, we do not account for the degrees of freedom used in the model selection
process, but solely account for the 3–10 parameters of the best-fitting model that is
finally used: Still, the simple behavior strategy fits (weakly) better than the mined
mixture of pure strategies. Below, we will verify if this observation holds similarly
after accounting for memory-2 behavior.
Third, we make a first robustness check to clarify if perhaps not all subjects stick
with memory-1 semi-grim strategies. We evaluate if some subjects simply randomize
uniformly after all histories of play in the sense of level-0. The results are reported in
the seventh column (“SG + Noise”). Allowing for noise players turns out to improve
goodness-of-fit significantly for both experience levels—in line with many results in
the literature (Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001), around
5-10 percent of the subjects are noise players. We conduct more such checks challeng-
ing memory-1 semi-grim below.
Fourth, we evaluate the full-blown model testing, independently treatment by
treatment, which mixture and switching model fits behavior best. Thus, we choose
the best-fitting model from 24 models for each treatment, amounting to the enormous
5Treatmentwise ICL-BICs are provided in the appendix, after Table 11. Each entry in the aggregated
table represents the sum of ICL-BICs of the best out of eight models for each respective treatment.
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Table 2: Best mixtures of pure or generalized strategies in relation to semi-grim (ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation
signs point toward better models)
Best mixture of pure or generalized strategies Best Mixture
No Random Markov Best Best Switching
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim SG + Noise By Treatment
Specification
# Models evaluated 832 832 832 3×832 1 1 2432 ≈ 1044
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 48 48 180 276 3 4 276
# Parameters accounted for 3–10 3–10 12-35 3–10 3 4 3–10
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53 646.53 ≈ 694.72 > 646.73 ≈ 645.31
Blonski et al. (2011) 677.42 ≫ 619.43 ≪ 821.29 619.43 ≫ 549.45 ≈ 558.66 < 614.47
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87 570.56 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 559.05 ≈ 570.56
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 365.35 ≈ 358.51 ≈ 361.22 ≈ 365.35
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3536.73 ≈ 3576.34 ≈ 3524.77 3576.34 ≈ 3533.99 > 3416.54 ≈ 3471.98
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5250.62 ≫ 5006.33 ≈ 5049.55 5006.33 ≈ 4991.74 ≈ 4935.93 ≈ 4965.57
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 463.01 ≈ 477.02 463.01 > 437.17 ≈ 435.65 ≈ 461.11
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79 1053.04 ≈ 1090.22 > 1017.89 ≈ 1047.59
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 175.59 161.75 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 164.51 ≈ 161.75
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55 308.6 ≈ 291.43 ≈ 288.89 ≈ 308.6
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94 1780.97 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1726.06 ≈ 1694.94
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65 907.14 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 868.89 ≈ 858.65
Pooled 15951.95 ≫ 15675.49 ≪ 16214.1 15675.49 > 15481.59 ≫ 15125.92 ≪ 15535.6
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 363.58 ≈ 368.23 ≈ 368.89 363.58 ≈ 389.24 > 353.94 ≈ 363.58
Blonski et al. (2011) 946.2 > 912.16 ≪ 1107.23 946.2 > 867.87 ≈ 868.31 ≈ 908.25
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 342.17 ≈ 358.12 ≈ 347.08 342.17 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 342.6 ≈ 342.17
Dal Bó (2005) 461.23 ≈ 445.57 < 469.98 461.23 > 424.44 ≈ 429.06 ≈ 442.59
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2737.11 < 2865.45 > 2721.88 2737.11 ≈ 2817.31 ≈ 2694.4 ≈ 2700.09
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5153.82 ≈ 5067.01 ≈ 5106.57 5153.82 ≈ 5043.81 > 4902.82 ≈ 4998.09
Dreber et al. (2008) 287.49 ≈ 281.99 ≈ 299.36 287.49 ≈ 264.94 ≈ 268.86 ≈ 283.38
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1381.01 ≈ 1416.71 ≈ 1392.49 1381.01 ≈ 1403.03 > 1308.8 ≈ 1381.01
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 309.63 ≈ 304.7 ≈ 308.78 309.63 ≈ 313.5 ≈ 278.74 < 304.7
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 373.44 ≈ 395.32 ≈ 376.62 373.44 ≈ 380.75 ≈ 358.86 ≈ 373.44
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1170.12 ≈ 1224.37 > 1143.67 1170.12 ≈ 1211.37 ≈ 1153.04 ≈ 1143.67
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 527.09 ≈ 590.16 ≈ 567.63 527.09 ≈ 586.72 ≈ 564.5 ≈ 527.09
Pooled 14269.01 ≈ 14448.15 < 14877.81 14269.01 ≈ 14159.8 ≫ 13669.82 ≪ 14108.4
Note: Relation signs encode p-values of Schennach-Wilhelm likelihood-ratio tests where <,> indicate rejection of the Null of equality at p< .05 and≪,≫
indicating p < .002, which implements the Bonferroni correction of 24 simultaneous tests per hypothesis. “No Switching” assumes that subjects chooses
a strategy prior to the first supergame and plays this strategy constantly for the entire half session. “Random Switching” assumes that subjects randomly
chooses a strategy prior to each supergame (by i.i.d. draws), and “Markov Switching” allows that these switches follow a Markov process.
selection of the best out of 2432 models across all experiments. Note that such analysis
without imposing consistency requirements across treatments does not yield econom-
ically useful estimates, but it provides an upper bound on the economic content of
pure and generalized pure strategies. The results are reported in the seventh column
(“Best Switching By Treatment”). In total, this exhaustively mined model still does
not fit better than simple semi-grim strategy. It fits slightly worse than semi-grim for
inexperienced subjects and slightly better for experienced ones, but all differences are
insignificant. Yet, it fits significantly worse than semi-grim after controlling for the
possibility that some subjects are pure noise players.
Result 1 (Memory-1). Assuming subjects have memory-1, the upper bound of behav-
ior that can be captured after mining for pure or generalized pure strategies is in-
distinguishable from behavior captured by semi-grim, and significantly lower than by
semi-grim accounting for noise players.
4 Relaxing memory-1 and homogeneity
Data mining the memory-2 specification Next we extend the set of pure strategies
to capture possible interdependence of actions with choices in t−2, again to evaluate
the best fitting specification against memory-1 semi-grim. We allow for two alternative
approaches of extending the set of memory-1 strategies to memory-2. One approach
follows Fudenberg et al. (2012), who introduced lenient and resilient variants of the
pure memory-1 strategies, e.g. , strategies that punish only after the second deviation
or that punish for two rounds instead of one, respectively. This approach is applica-
ble in particular to extend pure strategies, by providing a specific list of memory-2
generalizations. The other approach is parametric and is suitable in particular to ex-
tend generalized pure and behavior strategies from memory-1 to memory-2. It allows
the cooperation probabilities in one round to depend on the behavior of one or both
players in t−2. We allow for three different formulations here: cooperation probabil-
ities may be a function of the opponent’s choice in t− 2 (TFT-Scheme), a function of
whether both players cooperated in t − 2 or not (Grim-Scheme), or a function of the
entire choice profile in t−2 ( General scheme).
First, we mine for mixtures of pure strategies, based on the list of 10 strategies6
of Fudenberg et al. (2012). We keep this description short, as the pure strategies fit
similarly poorly as in the memory-1 case. For each treatment, we determine the most
adequate combination of strategies from a list of five combinations, thus providing
a selection of the best of 532 models overall. The resulting model still fits highly
significantly worse than the selection of generalized pure strategies with memory-1
defined above, see the two right-most columns of Table 3.
6These strategies are TFT, Grim, AD, Grim2, TF2T, T2, 2TFT, 2PTFT as defined in Fudenberg et al.
(2012) and also in Table 5 in the Online Appendix.
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Table 3: What is the memory length? Comparison of 1- and 2-memory Semi-Grim, pure and generalized strategies
(ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
Memory-2 Generalizations of Semi-Grim Best Mixtures of Generalized Pure Strategies Best Pure
M2“General” M2“Grim” M2“TFT” Semi-Grim M2“TFT” M2“Grim” M1 M1 & M2
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 432 432 432 532
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 12 6 6 3 48 48 32 32
# Parameters accounted for 12 6 6 3 9–15 9–15 6–10 3–8
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 692.5 ≈ 690.85 ≈ 686.2 ≈ 694.72 > 649.23 ≈ 646.7 ≈ 645.31 ≪ 791.38
Blonski et al. (2011) 714 ≫ 601.67 ≈ 601.95 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 760.49 ≈ 767.03 ≫ 713.8 ≈ 703.1
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 572.14 ≈ 566.75 ≈ 567.58 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 577.54 ≈ 581.45 ≈ 585.42 ≈ 588.55
Dal Bó (2005) 385.61 > 367.94 ≈ 366.48 ≈ 358.51 ≪ 405.84 ≈ 402.78 ≈ 407.86 ≈ 389.08
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3596.64 ≈ 3542.28 ≈ 3538.64 ≈ 3533.99 ≈ 3511.26 ≈ 3527.68 ≈ 3536.73 ≪ 3835.75
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5017.27 ≈ 4974.8 ≈ 4988.94 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5269.9 ≈ 5320.57 ≈ 5259.64 ≪ 5538.37
Dreber et al. (2008) 464.84 > 444.11 ≈ 444.71 ≈ 437.17 ≈ 477.33 ≈ 483.11 ≈ 478.09 ≈ 462.71
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1060.26 ≈ 1063.66 ≈ 1074.9 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1036.79 ≈ 1044.14 ≈ 1047.59 ≈ 1102.64
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 174.64 ≈ 167.06 ≈ 164.75 ≈ 161.45 ≪ 182.81 ≈ 188.15 ≈ 188.5 ≈ 181.98
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 301.76 ≈ 293.52 ≈ 294.4 ≈ 291.43 < 319.76 ≈ 322.36 ≈ 319.45 < 366.78
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1746.26 ≈ 1749.95 ≈ 1753.68 ≈ 1782.82 > 1634.47 ≈ 1665.36 < 1761.98 ≈ 1805.95
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 917.07 ≈ 907.95 ≈ 913.52 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 872.66 ≈ 873.21 ≈ 865.67 < 941.91
Pooled 16080.69 ≫ 15589.39 ≈ 15614.59 > 15481.59 ≪ 16083.49 ≈ 16207.37 ≈ 16077.95 ≪ 16858.86
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 396.32 ≈ 391.42 > 387.48 ≈ 389.24 ≈ 368.09 ≈ 365.6 ≈ 363.58 ≪ 484.41
Blonski et al. (2011) 1012.48 ≫ 919.29 ≈ 922.48 ≫ 867.87 < 1005.42 ≈ 1020.36 > 992.44 ≈ 1055.95
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 333.51 ≈ 337.12 ≈ 329.73 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 324.09 ≈ 336.35 ≈ 344.88 ≈ 316.38
Dal Bó (2005) 449.03 ≈ 434.38 ≈ 433.82 ≈ 424.44 < 451.34 < 471.65 ≈ 475.11 ≈ 463.54
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2854.52 ≈ 2801.46 ≈ 2800.71 ≈ 2817.31 ≈ 2664.52 ≈ 2690.03 ≈ 2737.11 < 2885.43
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5006.3 ≈ 5013.49 ≈ 5012.99 ≈ 5043.81 ≈ 5100.98 < 5202.24 ≈ 5164.78 ≪ 5577.55
Dreber et al. (2008) 272.94 ≈ 258.88 ≈ 253.47 ≈ 264.94 ≈ 287.55 ≈ 288.95 ≈ 295.06 ≈ 287.58
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1375.43 ≈ 1367.68 ≈ 1389.92 ≈ 1403.03 ≈ 1348.96 ≈ 1367.92 ≈ 1381.01 ≪ 1617.77
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 308.21 ≈ 304.2 ≈ 306.93 ≈ 313.5 ≈ 311.04 ≈ 311.99 ≈ 309.63 ≪ 356.11
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 384.37 ≈ 382.32 ≈ 378.59 ≈ 380.75 ≈ 364.71 ≈ 359.37 ≈ 373.44 < 447.19
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1204.38 ≈ 1202.61 ≈ 1197.19 ≈ 1211.37 > 1052.18 ≈ 1066.23 ≪ 1170.12 ≈ 1169.31
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 598.79 ≈ 590.65 ≈ 591.38 ≈ 586.72 > 510.29 ≈ 523.29 ≈ 527.09 ≈ 583.8
Pooled 14633.97 ≫ 14222.35 ≈ 14223.53 ≈ 14159.8 ≈ 14152.67 ≪ 14384.17 ≈ 14387.48 ≪ 15402.36
Note: The main body contains ICL-BICs aggregated at paper level. Relation signs and p-values are exactly as above, see Table 2. “M2” (“M1”) denotes strategies, whose
actions may depend on actions in t− 2 and t− 1 (t− 1 only). The supplements “General”, “TFT”, “Grim” indicate whether parameters of behavior strategies may depend
on: all four possible histories in t−2 (M2 “General”), whether the opponent cooperated in t−2 (M2 “TFT”), or whether there was joint cooperation in t−2 (M2 “Grim”).
Pure M2 strategies do not have such free parameters. Columns 1-3 contain one memory-2 version of semi-grim each. Column 4 is memory-1 semi-grim. Columns 5-7 are
memory-2 and memory-1 versions of generalized prototypical strategies. The last column contains the best fitting combinations of a set of pure memory-1 and memory-2
strategies from the literature (TFT, Grim, AD, Grim2, TF2T, T2, 2TFT, 2PTFT) for definitions see Table 5 in the Online Appendix.
Second, we evaluate extensions of the generalized pure strategies to memory-2,
using both the TFT-scheme and the Grim-scheme as defined above. That is, the strategy
parameters (θAC,θAD,θTFT ,θG,θWSLS) are allowed to be functions of the opponent’s
action in t − 2 (TFT-scheme) or of whether both players cooperated in t − 2 (Grim-
scheme). For each treatment, we determine the best of four combinations exactly as in
the memory-1 case, thus determining the best of 432 specifications overall. The results
are reported in three columns headlined “Best Mixtures of Generalized Pure Strate-
gies” in Table 3. In general, the TFT-scheme seems to fit better than the Grim-scheme,
and overall, allowing for memory-2 helps to better capture behavior only if subjects are
experienced. This suggests that behavior becomes more nuanced as subjects gain expe-
rience, but the resulting model does still not improve on the simple semi-grim strategy.
Note that this obtains despite the enormous number of free parameters used in the esti-
mation, 48 by treatment instead of 3—the pure and generalized pure strategies plainly
have the wrong structure, for the reasons outlined already in section 2.
Third, we proceed similarly for evaluating extensions of semi-grim toward memory-
2. That is, we compare the simple three-parametric memory-1 version with three gen-
eralizations to memory-2. As above, the TFT-scheme allows the cooperation prob-
abilities to be functions of the opponent’s action in t − 2, the Grim-scheme allows
them to be functions of whether both subjects cooperated in t − 2, and the General
scheme of all four possible states in t− 2 . The results are again clear-cut: None of
the memory-2 extensions improves on describing behavior by the simple memory-1
semi-grim strategy. Indeed, the finer the memory-2 ramifications, the worse the model
adequacy (after accounting for the additional degrees of freedom). These results are
additionally compatible with a result of Breitmoser (2015) who verified the Markov as-
sumption by testing whether subjects systematically deviate from memory-1 strategies
after particular histories in memory-2. Let us summarize this as follows.
Result 2. Model adequacy does not improve by equipping subjects with memory-2,
neither for (generalizations of) pure strategies nor for semi-grim.
As a corollary, Result 1 on memory-1 behavior appears to be a generally adequate
statement. In order to further verify its adequacy, we analyze if behavior of residual
subjects is better captured by non-trivial strategies than by the simple Noise strategy
from above. That is, are subject pools in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma significantly
heterogeneous beyond the existence of noise players? Data-mining exactly as above,
we evaluate a wide range of specifications to capture behavior of the residual players,
in order to obtain an upper bound of model adequacy for classes of specifications, and
evaluate the best possible combination of specifications across treatments against the
simple alternative that these residual players are noise players.
First, we evaluate the adequacy of pure or generalized pure strategies to comple-
ment semi-grim. Specifically, we evaluate finite-mixture models combining semi-grim
with each of the five pure memory-1 strategies (AD, AC, TFT, WSLS, and Grim) or
each of the four generalized pure strategies (generalized AD and generalized AC are
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Table 4: Heterogeneity beyond semi-grim: Is there are significant secondary subject type?
Mixtures of SG with pure/generalized pure Mixing Semi-Grim with
Best Pure Best Gen Pure or Gen SG + Noise SG SG-M2“Grim” SG-M2“TFT”
Specification
# Models evaluated 532 432 932 1 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 20 20 40 4 7 10 10
# Parameters accounted for 4 5 4–5 4 7 10 10
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 681.99 ≈ 649.86 ≈ 649.86 ≈ 646.73 ≈ 650.83 ≈ 651.47 ≈ 656.3
Blonski et al. (2011) 576.49 ≈ 600.48 ≫ 568.43 ≈ 558.66 ≪ 642.5 ≪ 711.05 ≈ 717.67
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 562.35 ≈ 559.64 ≈ 559.64 ≈ 559.05 ≈ 553.59 ≈ 555.66 ≈ 553.75
Dal Bó (2005) 367.32 ≈ 363.9 ≈ 363.9 ≈ 361.22 < 379.63 ≈ 388.26 ≈ 390.43
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3413.18 ≈ 3379.17 ≈ 3368.28 ≈ 3416.54 ≈ 3335.4 ≈ 3386.94 ≈ 3375.88
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 4950.44 ≈ 4920.88 ≈ 4905.86 ≈ 4935.93 ≈ 4958.73 ≈ 4990.23 ≈ 5005.61
Dreber et al. (2008) 432.72 ≈ 439.1 ≈ 432.72 ≈ 435.65 ≈ 438.35 ≈ 443.27 ≈ 441.52
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1074.22 > 1017.65 ≈ 1017.65 ≈ 1017.89 ≈ 1016.91 ≈ 1023.24 ≈ 1016.46
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 165.36 ≈ 167.94 ≈ 165.36 ≈ 164.51 < 179.6 ≈ 181.01 ≈ 181.57
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 292.47 ≈ 291.68 ≈ 291.68 ≈ 288.89 ≈ 287.31 < 308.85 ≈ 308.99
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1685.56 ≈ 1690.55 ≈ 1685.56 ≈ 1726.06 > 1677.99 ≈ 1655.61 ≈ 1639.86
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 887.79 ≈ 866.46 ≈ 866.46 ≈ 868.89 ≈ 868.11 ≈ 877.05 ≈ 877.26
Pooled 15272.25 ≈ 15166.16 ≈ 15078.27 ≈ 15125.92 ≈ 15244.28 ≪ 15537.4 ≈ 15530.04
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 392.87 > 357.21 ≈ 357.21 > 353.94 ≈ 358.14 ≈ 358.14 ≈ 359.37
Blonski et al. (2011) 861.53 ≈ 876.85 ≫ 855.06 ≈ 868.31 ≈ 906.87 ≪ 978.33 ≈ 982.05
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 336.68 > 323.04 ≈ 323.04 ≈ 342.6 ≈ 322.87 ≈ 314.07 ≈ 308.75
Dal Bó (2005) 431.34 ≈ 435.55 ≈ 431.34 ≈ 429.06 ≪ 455.9 ≪ 478.45 ≈ 467.72
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2597.41 ≈ 2543.05 ≈ 2537.58 ≪ 2694.4 > 2545.23 ≈ 2508.92 ≈ 2556.33
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 4946.41 ≈ 4884.99 ≈ 4868.35 ≈ 4902.82 ≈ 4879.57 ≈ 4882.52 ≈ 4958.15
Dreber et al. (2008) 262.93 ≈ 258.73 ≈ 256.77 ≈ 268.86 ≈ 268.1 ≈ 252.76 ≈ 254.09
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1379.73 > 1294.4 ≈ 1294.4 ≈ 1308.8 ≈ 1284.59 ≈ 1278.88 ≈ 1290.71
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 311.64 ≈ 283.31 ≈ 283.31 ≈ 278.74 ≈ 277.03 ≈ 278.37 ≈ 274.84
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 366.79 ≈ 364.37 ≈ 364.37 ≈ 358.86 ≈ 348.86 ≈ 351.64 ≈ 352.94
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1126.89 ≈ 1154.97 ≈ 1126.89 ≈ 1153.04 ≈ 1111.19 ≈ 1086.76 ≈ 1084.65
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 539.35 ≈ 565.48 ≈ 539.35 ≈ 564.5 ≈ 544.85 ≈ 543.88 ≈ 538.39
Pooled 13735.95 ≈ 13560.79 ≈ 13438.59 < 13669.82 ≈ 13558.53 ≈ 13677.46 ≈ 13792.73
Note: The main body contains ICL-BICs aggregated at paper level. The first three columns pick the best fitting combinations of SG with pure, generalized, and
generalized or pure memory-1 strategies. The last three columns combine memory-1 SG with a second memory-1 SG strategy and two different versions of a
memory-2 SG strategy respectively. As above, the relation signs encode p-values of Schennach-Wilhelm likelihood-ratio tests where <,> indicate rejection
of the Null of equality at p< .05 and≪,≫ indicating p< .002, which implements the Bonferroni correction of 24 simultaneous tests per hypothesis.
equivalent here). We then determine which of these models best captures behavior,
treatment by treatment, to identify upper bounds of model adequacy for augmenting
semi-grim with pure or generalized pure strategies. Table 4 presents the results. The
first column “Best Pure” refers to the best treatment-wise combinations of semi-grim
with pure strategies, “Best Gen” refers to combinations with generalized pure strate-
gies, and “Pure or Gen” refers to the best combination with pure or generalized pure
strategies. Doing so treatment by treatment, this yields a selection from 932 models.
Comparing aggregate ICL-BICs of the mined model to those containing noise play-
ers as complement to semi-grim indicates that there is little scope for improvement in
this direction. There is no significant difference in model fit if subjects are inexperi-
enced, and there is only one experiment for which the combination of semi-grim with
a (generalized) pure strategy performs significantly better than SG+Noise. For this one
experiment the best mixture is a combination of semi-grim with generalized AD/AC,
which is very similar to noise: It represents unconditional randomization between co-
operation and defection but allows average cooperation rates to deviate from 0.5 (at the
expense of a degree of freedom).
Second, we evaluate if a residual component is better captured using a memory-1
or memory-2 semi-grim (SG) strategy instead of noise. As memory-2 implementations
we evaluate the TFT- and Grim-schemes introduced above. The overall picture can be
summarized succinctly: Overall, none of these models improves on the null that the
residual players simply randomize fifty-fifty. The results are presented in the three
right-most columns of Table 4. The aggregate ICL-BICs of the two models combining
semi-grim with memory-2 semi-grim do not significantly differ from each other, both
perform slightly worse than the simpler model combining memory-1 SG with another
memory-1 SG (“SG+SG”), which in turn does not perform better than the SG+Noise
model. Since all of these semi-grim models contain uniform randomization (noise) as
special case, we conclude that the additional structure provided by these models does
not improve the goodness-of-fit sufficiently to warrant the free parameters used in the
process. Noise is an adequate description for the residual players.
Result 3. There is significant evidence for subject heterogeneity, but no single model of
behavior significantly improves on the hypothesis that the residual component besides
semi-grim subjects consists simply of “noise players” randomizing fifty-fifty.
5 Conclusion
Do we play pure, mixed, or behavior strategies in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma?
What is the memory length of these strategies and are subjects heterogeneous? Af-
ter data mining for the best-fitting mixtures of pure strategies and switching models,
which puts pure and mixed strategies at an enormous advantage, we still have to re-
ject the hypothesis that subjects play mixtures of deterministic strategies in favor of
the much simpler explanation that subjects actually play the strategies that we observe
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consistently on average. Even in our large data set, we find no evidence for the use of
memory-2 strategies nor for subject heterogeneity beyond the existence of noise play-
ers. That is, aggregating across 12 experiments and 145,000 decisions, subjects play
memory-1 behavior strategies highly consistently. These strategies depend to some ex-
tent on the treatment parameters, see Table 1, and understanding this interdependence
is thus established as the key to understanding cooperation in long-run relationships.
This suggests that subjects decide “just in time” whether to retaliate or be lenient.
From the position of an observer, this is best described as a random Markov process (a
memory-1 behavior strategy), as opposed to a complex set of deterministic rules. From
the position of the decision maker herself, any decision may appear to be perfectly
deterministic, but this discrepancy has been labeled the “illusion of conscious will”
(Wegner, 2004) as any decision is preceded by unconscious cerebral activity feeding
us thoughts (Libet, 1985). From a game-theoretic perspective, individual decisions are
not sufficiently consistent to organize them by means of deterministic rules, but an
illusion of conscious will would be reminiscent of purification in the sense of Harsanyi
(1973).
Our results clarify which statistics to analyze—memory-1 cooperation rates—in
experimental studies of long-run interactions and underscore the practical relevance of
the current theoretical literature on imperfect private monitoring, which actually pre-
dicts that players would play simple behavior strategies. The strategies observed in
our analysis are very specific instances of belief-free equilibria, however, played con-
sistently across a wide range of experiments and treatments, which is not an obvious
implication of the theory as it is currently developed. The hypothesis that equilibria are
additionally robust to utility perturbations (Breitmoser, 2015) may be worth investigat-
ing, but it should be noted that the cooperation probabilities exhibit semi-grim patterns
even if belief-free equilibria sustaining cooperation do not exist. Analogical reason-
ing in the sense of Samuelson (2001) may help explain these “anomalies”, but more
generally, the consistency of the semi-grim pattern in cooperation probabilities seems
to represent a non-trivial challenge for future research—despite the already impressive
body of theoretical work on repeated games.
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God does not play dice, but do we?
Appendix A: Markov-Switching Models
The Markov-switching model builds on the simpler and more restrictive finite mixture
model, which has been established in the experimental literature by Stahl and Wilson
(1994) and can be used to empirically identify a finite number K of strategies with pa-













with observations O, ρk denoting the relative frequency of strategy k, and pk(os|θk)
denoting the probability that player s chooses action os given he plays strategy k
7.
A way to model regime switches is to replace the implicit latent indicator variable
in finite mixture models (indicating the discrete types) with a hidden Markov chain
(Frühwirth-Schnatter, 2006). The central assumption characterizing the learning pro-
cess in Markov models is that the type of a player (or its strategy in our context) in the
next period can only depend on its type in this period. More precisely if kt is the type
in period t then: Pr(kt+1|kt ,kt−1,kt−2, ...,k1) = Pr(kt+1|kt), where the type is hidden
and cannot be observed directly.8 What we do observe is the action ot , which in turn
depends on the type kt in t only: Pr(ot |kt ,ot−1,kt−1, ...,k1,o1) = Pr(ot |kt) (c.f Bilmes
et al. (1998)). It implies that transitions between states are independent of time t.
This assumption might be quite restrictive. For example if we want to assume that the
probability of switching to a new strategy is more likely later in the game than at the
beginning. Nevertheless, we can use memory-2 or memory-3 strategies if we define the
state ω as a history of more than one past outcome and condition the strategy on this
history of outcomes. Moreover, it is possible to interact time dependent components
with switching probabilities.
Let Kt denote the state at time t ∈ 1,2, ...,T and σkk′ = Pr(Kt+1 = k
′|Kt = k)
define the transition probability from k to k′ which is independent from t, as pointed.
So σ is a (K×K) transition matrix containing transition probabilities for every pair of
states, where all entries are positive and each row sums up to 1. Moreover, the state-
paths are denoted by κ ∈ KT with Pr(κ) conditional on initial weights ρ and transition
7For the memory-1 case pk(os|θk) = ∏t(σωs,t (k))
os,t (1−σωs,t (k))




8Therefore also known as the Hidden Markov Model (HMM).
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probabilities σ. The probability of observing os,t conditional on subject s being type k







Pr(os,t |θ,κ(t), t) (2)
Due to the introduction of the transition matrix σ the number of parameters to be esti-
mated increases dramatically. Moreover, with a naive estimation approach we would
have to consider all possible state paths and be very time consuming. Therefore we
choose to apply a backward-forward algorithm to calculate posteriors for estimation
with the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm.
The idea of the EM-algorithm is to conduct two steps the E-step and the M-step
iteratively. This way we split up every optimization step into many steps which simpli-
fies complexity and consequently speeds up computations. In the E-step we evaluate
the conditional expectation of the log-likelihood given our data O and the current pa-
rameter vector and then maximize over a reduced set of free parameters in the M-Step.
The number of possible types k is pre-defined as well as the structure of their mixing
parameters θk.
In the E-step we need to compute for all subjects for all time periods the posterior
probability of component inclusion (being a specific type) and the probability to switch
between two types. An efficient way to calculate those posterior probabilities is to built
up on the backward-forward. First, we have the forward procedure, where we define
the (joint) probability of observing the partial sequence os1, ...,ost and ending up with
type k at time t:
αsk(t) = Pr(Os1 = os1, ...,Ost = ost ,Kt = k) (3)
Recursively, we can then define:









3. Pr(os) = ∑
k∈K
αsk(T )
Second, for the backward procedure we define the probability of ending in the partial
sequence ost+1, ...osT given that we have started at type k at time t.
βsk(t) = Pr(Ost+1 = ost+1, ...,OT = oT |Kt = k) (5)
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Again we can define βsk(t) efficiently (Bilmes et al., 1998)
1. βsk(T ) = 1 (6)




3. Pr(os) = ∑
k∈K
βsk(1)ρkPr(os1|θ,k)
We then take advantage of the fact that the unconditional probability Pr(os) can
be defined using αsk(t) or βsk(t) to calculate the posterior probabilities γsk and ζskk′ .
The former is the conditional probability of being type k at time t given observations
os:











Using γsk we can define the probability of having type k in t and type k
′ in t+1 condi-
tional on our observations as
ζskk′(t) = Pr(Kt = k,Kt+1 = k
′|os) =
Pr(Kt = k|os)Pr(ot+1,...,T ,Kt+1 = k
′|Kt = k
′)






(cf. Bilmes et al. (1998)).









to yield the updated θ+1 when assuming that θkt does not affect the likelihood of other
components k. If it does, we need to maximize ∑k′∈K LLkt(θ
′)→max
θ′
! and yield θ+1.9













The two steps are iterated until the distance between (θ,ρ,σ) and (θ+1,ρ+1,σ+1) gets
small.
Estimation proceeds by a maximum likelihood, as usual, but as is well-known, the
9θ may depend on t but does not have to.
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larger the number of parameters, the larger a model’s capacity to fit data—and implic-
itly, the larger its fallacy to overfit the data. This is conventionally captured by evaluat-
ing model adequacy based on information criteria such as BIC, which penalize for the
degrees of freedom in a theoretically adequate manner. Mixture and switching mod-
els additionally contain freedom in defining the components of the subject pool, i.e.
the number of subject types, which provides an additional source for overfitting aside
from the number of parameters used. Following (Biernacki et al., 2000), these con-
cerns are addressed using the information-classification likelihood Bayes-information
criterion (ICL-BIC), a criterion that penalizes both model complexity and the failure
of the mixture model to provide a classification in well-separated strategy clusters. We
address the observation that modeling mixtures of pure, mixed, and behavior strategies
induces sophisticated nesting structures, and the concern that indeed all models may
be misspecified by evaluating model differences using the novel Schennach-Wilhelm
likelihood ratio tests (Schennach and Wilhelm, 2017). Finally, we capture the intu-
ition that choice is stochastic by allowing for trembles in the sense of Selten (1975):
Each agent of a player picks any given action with probability no less than e > 0. This
approach follows (Breitmoser, 2015) and, in relation to the logistic-error approach
proposed by (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011), it has the advantage that it does not perturb
choice probabilities of subjects that originally randomize already.
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Appendix B: Information on the experiments re-analyzed
This section provides some background information on the experiments re-analyzed
in this paper. Table 5 summarizes and defines the strategies considered by previous
studies. Table 6 reviews focus and main results (in terms of identified strategies) of
these studies. Table 7 reviews the numbers of subjects and observations, average pa-
rameters, and average cooperation rates for all experiments, and Table 8 provides the
detailed overview by treatments.
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Table 5: Pure strategies considered in behavioral analyses
Strategy Abbreviation Description (σcc,σcd ,σdc,σdd)† References
Pure Strategies Non-responsive or Memory-1
Always Defect AD Always defects independent (0,0,0,0) DF11, DF15, FRD12,
of previous outcome FY17, STS13
Always Cooperate AC Always cooperates inde- (1,1,1,1) DF11, DF15, FRD12,
pendent of previous outcome FY17, STS13
Grim G Only cooperates after cc (1,0,0,0) AF09, DF11, DF15
was last outcome FRD12, FY17, STS13
Tit-for-Tat TFT Only plays C if opponent (1,0,1,0) AF09, DF11, DF15
did last period FRD12, FY17, STS13
Win-stay-Lose-Shift WSLS Plays same strategy if it (1,0,0,1) DF11, DF15, FRD12,
(aka Perfect TFT) was successful, otherwise shifts FY17
False cooperator C-to-AD Play c in first round – FRD12, FY17
then AD
Explorative TFT D-TFT Play d in first round then TFT – DF15, FRD12, FY17
Alternator DC-Alt Play d in first round – FRD12, FY17
then alternate c and d
Trigger-with-Reversion GwR Like Grim but revert (1,0,0,0) STS13
to cooperation after cc‡
Pure Strategies Memory-2/3
Trigger 2 periods T2 Player punishes defection for max. 2 (1,0,θ∗1, 0) DF11, FY17
periods, otherwise cooperates
Tit-for-2(3)-Tats TF2T Defects after 2 (1,θ2,1,θ2) FRD12, FY17
defections
2-Tits-for-2-Tats 2TF2T Defects twice after (1,θ3,θ3,θ3) FRD12, FY17
2 defections
2-Tits-for-1-Tats 2TFT Defects twice after (1,0,θ4,0) FRD12, FY17
each defections
Grim2(3/4) G2(3) After 2(3) defections (1,θ5,0,0) FRD12, FY17, STS13
will play D forever
Win-stay-Lose-Shift-2 WSLS2 cooperate after (dd,dd),(cc,cc), – FRD12
(dd,cc) otherwise defect
Explorative TF2(3)T D-TF2(3)T Play D in first round then – FRD12, FY17
TF2(3)T
Explorative Grim2(3) D-Grim2(3) Play D in first round then Grim2(3) – FRD12, FY17
Behavior Strategies
Semi-Grim∗∗ SG Similar to Grim but may (1,θSG,θSG,0) B15
cooperate after CD or DC.
Generous TFT GTFT Like TFT but cooperate (1,θGT ,1,θGT ) FRD12, B15
with prob α after CD or DD
† σ assigns cooperation probabilities after joint cooperation (cc), unilateral defection by opponent (cd), unilateral defection (dc), and joint
defection (dd).
‡ possible if players make mistakes.
∗ Vector assigning cooperation probabilities ∈ {0,1} depending on the state 2 periods ahead.
∗∗ θSG and θGT are mixing parameters ∈ (0,1).
References: AF09 (Aoyagi and Frechette, 2009), B15 (Breitmoser, 2015), DF11 (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011), DF15 (Dal Bó and Fréchette,
2015), FRD12 (Fudenberg et al., 2012), FY17 (Fréchette and Yuksel, 2017), STS13 (Sherstyuk et al., 2013)
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Table 6: Overview literature
Reference Focus Investigation of Strategies Strategies found
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) Imperfect public Mainly avg. coop. rates Threshold strat S0
monitoring in PD Mem-1, Mem-2, Threshold (same threshold
in state 1 & 0)
Blonski et al. (2011) New δ∗ with Avg. coop rates –
sucker’s payoff
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) Endgame effects Elicitation of pure strategies – ∗
discuss avg. coop. rates
Camera et al. (2012) Player’s strat using All possible pure mem-1 large share play
finite automata unconditional
Dal Bó (2005) Finitely vs infinitely Avg. cooperation rates –
repeated PD
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) Players’ strategies selected mem-1 strategies AC, AD, TFT
learning model SFEM
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) Players’ strategies SFEM, elicitation, pure Mem-1, AD, TFT, Grim
upd (2017) Mem-2 mainly preselected
Dreber et al. (2008) PD extended with Agg. cooperation behavior (AD, Grim, TFT)∗∗
punishment option
Duffy and Ochs (2009) Fixed matching of Round 1 and avg. coop. –
players in PD rates
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) De-coupling of expected Avg. coop. rates, SFEM Grim, TFT
length of game and Mem-1, Mem2/3 preselected
discount factor
Fudenberg et al. (2012) Effect of noise/ Avg. coop. rate, SFEM, AC, AD, Grim,
uncertainty on leniency 20 pure Mem-1, Mem-2(3) (D)-TFT, 2TFT, Grim2
Kagel and Schley (2013) Linear payoff Fist round coop. rates –
transformations
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) Payment schemes Avg. cooperation rates, share AD, TFT, GwR
of correctly predicted actions
by selected pure strats
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018) Determinants of Mainly first round coop –
cooperation (meta)
∗ Table 4 column "Strategy" in their study indicating SG in coefficients for cdt−1 & cdt−2.
∗∗ Reported by Fudenberg et al. (2012).
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Table 7: Overview of the data sets used in the analysis
Logistics Parameters Average cooperation rates
Experiment #Subj #Dec δ g l σˆ /0 σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 38 1650 0.9 0.333 0.111 0.465 0.917 ≫ 0.45 ≈ 0.408 ≈ 0.336
Blonski et al. (2011) 200 3040 0.756 1.345 2.602 0.295 0.89 ≫ 0.279 ≈ 0.193 ≫ 0.034
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 36 1920 0.8 1.167 0.833 0.481 0.91 ≫ 0.286 ≈ 0.228 ≫ 0.08
Dal Bó (2005) 102 1320 0.75 0.939 1.061 0.342 0.922 ≫ 0.212 < 0.342 ≫ 0.089
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 266 17772 0.622 1.062 1.072 0.31 0.951 ≫ 0.334 ≈ 0.331 ≫ 0.063
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 672 22112 0.743 1.579 1.341 0.451 0.94 ≫ 0.297 ≈ 0.335 ≫ 0.057
Dreber et al. (2008) 50 2064 0.75 1.488 1.488 0.488 0.904 ≫ 0.217 ≈ 0.213 ≫ 0.036
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 102 3128 0.9 1 1 0.53 0.904 ≫ 0.301 ≈ 0.33 ≫ 0.111
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 50 800 0.75 0.4 0.4 0.737 0.943 ≫ 0.141 ≈ 0.266 ≈ 0.091
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 48 1452 0.875 0.333 0.333 0.756 0.982 ≫ 0.4 ≈ 0.427 ≫ 0.066
Kagel and Schley (2013) 114 7600 0.75 1 0.5 0.573 0.935 ≫ 0.263 ≈ 0.295 ≫ 0.051
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 56 3052 0.75 1 0.25 0.56 0.945 ≫ 0.328 ≈ 0.371 ≫ 0.117
Pooled 1734 65910 0.728 1.207 1.083 0.389 0.938 ≫ 0.304 ≈ 0.322 ≫ 0.065
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 38 1400 0.9 0.333 0.111 0.424 0.958 ≫ 0.398 ≈ 0.517 ≈ 0.375
Blonski et al. (2011) 200 5460 0.766 1.282 2.554 0.279 0.923 ≫ 0.287 ≈ 0.231 ≫ 0.02
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 36 1632 0.8 1.167 0.833 0.447 0.947 ≫ 0.221 ≈ 0.297 ≫ 0.041
Dal Bó (2005) 102 1650 0.75 0.961 1.039 0.297 0.92 ≫ 0.242 < 0.388 ≫ 0.064
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 266 19270 0.62 1.122 1.103 0.355 0.979 ≫ 0.376 ≈ 0.362 ≫ 0.041
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 672 29480 0.766 1.666 1.386 0.469 0.976 ≫ 0.315 < 0.402 ≫ 0.035
Dreber et al. (2008) 50 1838 0.75 1.533 1.533 0.461 0.917 ≫ 0.128 ≪ 0.39 ≫ 0.009
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 102 6018 0.9 1 1 0.684 0.977 ≫ 0.367 ≈ 0.391 ≫ 0.082
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 50 1568 0.75 0.4 0.4 0.763 0.97 ≫ 0.233 ≈ 0.398 ≫ 0.069
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 48 1800 0.875 0.333 0.333 0.829 0.971 ≫ 0.487 ≈ 0.412 ≫ 0.083
Kagel and Schley (2013) 114 7172 0.75 1 0.5 0.704 0.966 ≫ 0.262 ≈ 0.332 ≫ 0.025
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 56 2604 0.75 1 0.25 0.646 0.973 ≫ 0.482 ≈ 0.437 ≫ 0.078
Pooled 1734 79892 0.744 1.271 1.172 0.404 0.971 ≫ 0.327 < 0.376 ≫ 0.039
Note: The “average cooperation rates” are the relative frequencies estimated directly from the data. The relation signs encode bootstrapped p-values (resampling at the subject
level with 10,000 repetitions) where <,> indicate rejection of the Null of equality at p < .05 and≪,≫ indicating p < .002. Following Wright (1992), we accommodate
for the multiplicity of comparisons within data sets by adjusting p-values using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979). Note that all details here exactly replicate
Breitmoser (2015). As a result, if a data set is considered in isolation, the .05-level indicated by “>,<” is appropriate. If all 24 treatments are considered simultaneously, the
corresponding Bonferroni correction requires to further reduce the threshold to .002≈ .05/24, which corresponds with “≫,≪”.
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Table 8: Table 7 by treatments – Overview of the data sets used in the analysis
(a) First halves per session
Logistics Parameters Average cooperation rates
Treatment #Subj #Dec δ g l σˆ /0 σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009)
AF09–34 38 1650 0.9 0.333 0.111 0.729 0.917 ≫ 0.45 ≈ 0.408 ≈ 0.336
Blonski et al. (2011)
BOS11–9 20 220 0.5 2 2 0.23 - 0.182 0.182 0.031
BOS11–14 20 340 0.75 0.5 3.5 0.16 - 0.188 0.062 0.029
BOS11–15 20 320 0.75 1 8 0.04 - 0.167 0 0.005
BOS11–16 20 400 0.75 0.75 1.25 0.56 0.915 ≫ 0.206 ≈ 0.206 > 0.073
BOS11–17 20 180 0.75 0.833 0.5 0.42 0.5 ≈ 0.235 ≈ 0.471 ≈ 0.125
BOS11–26 40 760 0.75 2 2 0.285 0.833 ≫ 0.235 ≈ 0.196 ≫ 0.03
BOS11–27 20 240 0.75 1 1 0.28 0.917 > 0.316 ≈ 0.211 > 0.056
BOS11–30 20 140 0.875 0.5 3.5 0.275 - 0 0 0.058
BOS11–31 20 440 0.875 2 2 0.437 0.968 ≫ 0.513 ≈ 0.154 > 0.023
BOS11–All 200 3040 0.756 1.345 2.602 0.295 0.89 ≫ 0.279 ≈ 0.193 ≫ 0.034
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012)
BK12–28 36 1920 0.8 1.167 0.833 0.481 0.91 ≫ 0.286 ≈ 0.228 ≫ 0.08
Dal Bó (2005)
D05–18 42 420 0.75 1.167 0.833 0.484 0.806 ≫ 0.239 ≈ 0.304 > 0.114
D05–19 60 900 0.75 0.833 1.167 0.443 0.958 ≫ 0.2 < 0.36 ≫ 0.074
D05–All 102 1320 0.75 0.939 1.061 0.342 0.922 ≫ 0.212 < 0.342 ≫ 0.089
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011)
DF11–6 44 2748 0.5 2.571 1.857 0.134 0.792 ≫ 0.32 ≈ 0.272 ≫ 0.036
DF11–7 50 3290 0.5 0.667 0.867 0.18 0.673 ≫ 0.299 ≈ 0.258 ≫ 0.061
DF11–8 46 3092 0.5 0.087 0.565 0.365 0.973 ≫ 0.421 > 0.263 ≫ 0.081
DF11–22 44 2842 0.75 2.571 1.857 0.248 0.891 ≫ 0.303 ≈ 0.355 ≫ 0.05
DF11–23 38 2656 0.75 0.667 0.867 0.511 0.965 ≫ 0.39 ≈ 0.386 ≫ 0.073
DF11–24 44 3144 0.75 0.087 0.565 0.74 0.961 ≫ 0.266 ≈ 0.399 ≫ 0.11
DF11–All 266 17772 0.622 1.062 1.072 0.31 0.951 ≫ 0.334 ≈ 0.331 ≫ 0.063
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015)
DF15–4 50 1438 0.5 2.571 1.857 0.137 0.562 > 0.164 < 0.327 ≫ 0.031
DF15–5 140 4094 0.5 0.087 0.565 0.58 0.921 ≫ 0.254 ≈ 0.241 ≫ 0.082
DF15–20 114 4054 0.75 2.571 1.857 0.25 0.912 ≫ 0.223 < 0.336 ≫ 0.052
DF15–21 164 4740 0.75 0.087 0.565 0.658 0.952 ≫ 0.388 ≈ 0.369 ≫ 0.083
DF15–33 168 6438 0.9 2.571 1.857 0.307 0.928 ≫ 0.297 ≈ 0.344 ≫ 0.054
DF15–35 36 1348 0.95 2.571 1.857 0.5 0.974 ≫ 0.324 ≈ 0.432 ≫ 0.05
DF15–All 672 22112 0.743 1.579 1.341 0.451 0.94 ≫ 0.297 ≈ 0.335 ≫ 0.057
Dreber et al. (2008)
DRFN08–10 28 1008 0.75 2 2 0.468 0.888 ≫ 0.188 ≈ 0.139 ≫ 0.02
DRFN08–11 22 1056 0.75 1 1 0.507 0.917 ≫ 0.245 ≈ 0.283 ≫ 0.051
DRFN08–All 50 2064 0.75 1.488 1.488 0.488 0.904 ≫ 0.217 ≈ 0.213 ≫ 0.036
Duffy and Ochs (2009)
DO09–32 102 3128 0.9 1 1 0.53 0.904 ≫ 0.301 ≈ 0.33 ≫ 0.111
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017)
FY17–25 50 800 0.75 0.4 0.4 0.737 0.943 ≫ 0.141 ≈ 0.266 ≈ 0.091
Fudenberg et al. (2012)
FRD12–29 48 1452 0.875 0.333 0.333 0.756 0.982 ≫ 0.4 ≈ 0.427 ≫ 0.066
Kagel and Schley (2013)
KS13–12 114 7600 0.75 1 0.5 0.573 0.935 ≫ 0.263 ≈ 0.295 ≫ 0.051
Sherstyuk et al. (2013)
STS13–13 56 3052 0.75 1 0.25 0.56 0.945 ≫ 0.328 ≈ 0.371 ≫ 0.117
Pooled 1734 65910 0.728 1.207 1.083 0.389 0.938 ≫ 0.304 ≈ 0.322 ≫ 0.065
(b) Second halves per session
Logistics Parameters Average cooperation rates
Treatment #Subj #Dec δ g l σˆ /0 σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009)
AF09–34 38 1400 0.9 0.333 0.111 0.873 0.958 ≫ 0.398 ≈ 0.517 ≈ 0.375
Blonski et al. (2011)
BOS11–9 20 300 0.5 2 2 0.233 0.917 > 0.062 ≈ 0.188 ≈ 0.007
BOS11–14 20 280 0.75 0.5 3.5 0.025 - 0.2 0.4 0.013
BOS11–15 20 640 0.75 1 8 0 - 0 0 0.002
BOS11–16 20 340 0.75 0.75 1.25 0.633 0.846 ≫ 0.2 ≈ 0.233 ≫ 0.024
BOS11–17 20 680 0.75 0.833 0.5 0.417 0.917 ≫ 0.182 ≈ 0.255 ≫ 0.026
BOS11–26 40 1100 0.75 2 2 0.283 0.959 ≫ 0.241 ≈ 0.203 ≫ 0.032
BOS11–27 20 800 0.75 1 1 0.308 0.875 ≫ 0.447 ≈ 0.318 ≫ 0.023
BOS11–30 20 560 0.875 0.5 3.5 0.3 0.8 ≈ 0.167 ≈ 0.139 ≈ 0.02
BOS11–31 20 760 0.875 2 2 0.338 1 ≫ 0.423 ≈ 0.173 > 0.021
BOS11–All 200 5460 0.766 1.282 2.554 0.279 0.923 ≫ 0.287 ≈ 0.231 ≫ 0.02
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012)
BK12–28 36 1632 0.8 1.167 0.833 0.447 0.947 ≫ 0.221 ≈ 0.297 ≫ 0.041
Dal Bó (2005)
D05–18 42 630 0.75 1.167 0.833 0.476 0.86 ≫ 0.274 < 0.476 ≫ 0.098
D05–19 60 1020 0.75 0.833 1.167 0.533 0.952 ≫ 0.21 ≈ 0.296 ≫ 0.046
D05–All 102 1650 0.75 0.961 1.039 0.297 0.92 ≫ 0.242 < 0.388 ≫ 0.064
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011)
DF11–6 44 2988 0.5 2.571 1.857 0.064 1 ≫ 0.352 ≈ 0.477 ≫ 0.022
DF11–7 50 3614 0.5 0.667 0.867 0.194 0.922 ≫ 0.377 ≈ 0.364 ≫ 0.078
DF11–8 46 3398 0.5 0.087 0.565 0.414 1 ≫ 0.409 > 0.189 ≫ 0.027
DF11–22 44 3606 0.75 2.571 1.857 0.264 0.96 ≫ 0.357 ≈ 0.408 ≫ 0.024
DF11–23 38 2524 0.75 0.667 0.867 0.708 0.974 ≫ 0.405 ≈ 0.5 ≫ 0.088
DF11–24 44 3140 0.75 0.087 0.565 0.957 0.984 ≫ 0.302 ≈ 0.372 ≫ 0.083
DF11–All 266 19270 0.62 1.122 1.103 0.355 0.979 ≫ 0.376 ≈ 0.362 ≫ 0.041
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015)
DF15–4 50 1638 0.5 2.571 1.857 0.101 0.833 > 0.067 < 0.267 > 0.017
DF15–5 140 4656 0.5 0.087 0.565 0.539 0.976 ≫ 0.27 ≈ 0.231 ≫ 0.038
DF15–20 114 4370 0.75 2.571 1.857 0.24 0.948 ≫ 0.305 ≈ 0.37 ≫ 0.03
DF15–21 164 6090 0.75 0.087 0.565 0.775 0.98 ≫ 0.313 ≈ 0.313 ≫ 0.062
DF15–33 168 9718 0.9 2.571 1.857 0.384 0.975 ≫ 0.314 ≪ 0.542 ≫ 0.032
DF15–35 36 3008 0.95 2.571 1.857 0.539 0.981 ≫ 0.478 ≈ 0.427 ≫ 0.039
DF15–All 672 29480 0.766 1.666 1.386 0.469 0.976 ≫ 0.315 < 0.402 ≫ 0.035
Dreber et al. (2008)
DRFN08–10 28 980 0.75 2 2 0.269 0.75 ≫ 0.121 < 0.276 ≫ 0.002
DRFN08–11 22 858 0.75 1 1 0.653 0.942 ≫ 0.133 ≪ 0.47 ≫ 0.028
DRFN08–All 50 1838 0.75 1.533 1.533 0.461 0.917 ≫ 0.128 ≪ 0.39 ≫ 0.009
Duffy and Ochs (2009)
DO09–32 102 6018 0.9 1 1 0.684 0.977 ≫ 0.367 ≈ 0.391 ≫ 0.082
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017)
FY17–25 50 1568 0.75 0.4 0.4 0.763 0.97 ≫ 0.233 ≈ 0.398 ≫ 0.069
Fudenberg et al. (2012)
FRD12–29 48 1800 0.875 0.333 0.333 0.829 0.971 ≫ 0.487 ≈ 0.412 ≫ 0.083
Kagel and Schley (2013)
KS13–12 114 7172 0.75 1 0.5 0.704 0.966 ≫ 0.262 ≈ 0.332 ≫ 0.025
Sherstyuk et al. (2013)
STS13–13 56 2604 0.75 1 0.25 0.646 0.973 ≫ 0.482 ≈ 0.437 ≫ 0.078
Pooled 1734 79892 0.744 1.271 1.172 0.404 0.971 ≫ 0.327 < 0.376 ≫ 0.039
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Appendix C: Robustness checks for Section 3
The tables in this section replicate the tables presented in the Section 3, provide a num-
ber of robustness checks and additionally present the results treatment-by-treatment.
• Table 9 compares the “best mixtures” analyzed in the main text to the models
allowing for all 1-memory types that correspond with those analyzed in the liter-
ature, e.g. Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011). Recall that the 2-memory strategies an-
alyzed in other strings of literature are examined in Section 4. This table clarifies
that focusing on the “best mixtures” for each treatment improves the goodness-
of-fit of these models substantially (i.e. by at least 100 likelihood points).
• Table 11 compares the best mixtures of pure and generalized pure strategies as
discussed in the main text.
• Table 13 is similar to Table 2 in the main text but focusing on the prototypical
strategies in their pure form.
• Table 15 is similar to Table 2 in the main text but focusing on the prototypical
strategies in their generalized form.
• Table 17 is equivalent to Table 2 in the main text.
• Table 19 examines a number of mixture models involving Semi-Grim strategies
to clarify that the mixtures analyzed in Table 2 do neither misrepresent the gen-
eral picture (these alternative models are not better in terms goodness-of-fit and
hence need not be discussed in detail in the main text) nor present a non-robust
part of the picture (these alternative models do not fit substantially worse than
simple Semi-Grim either, implying that the general results on the relation of
Semi-Grim to the prototypical strategies can be considered robust).
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Table 9: Pure, mixed, or switching strategies? (ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
Best w/o SG All but SG
No Random Markov No Random Markov
Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 16 16 82 5 5 30
# Parameters accounted for 3–5 3–5 12–30 5 5 30
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89
Blonski et al. (2011) 674.3 ≫ 626.71 ≪ 843 719.21 ≫ 678.16 ≪ 1230.45
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 590.68 ≈ 582.82 ≈ 601.83
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 412.2 ≫ 376.98 ≪ 472.2
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3847.44 ≈ 3775.96 ≈ 3802.38 3872.8 ≈ 3785.92 ≪ 3927.78
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5522.08 ≫ 5280.06 ≈ 5318.33 5549.01 ≫ 5332.22 ≪ 5531.46
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 462.48 ≈ 481.64 464.92 ≈ 466.28 ≪ 532.59
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1128.79 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1134.58
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 186.7 > 163.08 ≪ 199.13
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 359.72 > 333.38 ≪ 366.32
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1815.98 ≈ 1865.9 > 1790.48
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 928.91 ≈ 955.58 > 922.05
Pooled 16820.09 ≫ 16417.97 ≪ 17165.74 17001.48 ≫ 16601.15 ≪ 18601.02
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 478.46 > 451.68 ≈ 480.65 480.97 > 451.68 < 491.85
Blonski et al. (2011) 965.51 ≫ 914.28 ≪ 1140.5 1005.4 ≫ 956.4 ≪ 1503.15
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 342.17 ≈ 361.38 ≈ 348.88 343.97 ≈ 362.67 ≈ 368.05
Dal Bó (2005) 464.42 ≈ 446.63 ≪ 474.71 474.92 > 453.64 ≪ 555.44
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3052.84 ≈ 3081.92 ≈ 3092.35 3069.11 ≈ 3096.21 < 3203.86
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5571.71 > 5419.19 ≈ 5478.11 5587.96 > 5434.22 ≪ 5637.28
Dreber et al. (2008) 287.58 ≈ 285.34 < 303.79 295.44 ≈ 293.01 ≪ 370.54
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1628.02 ≈ 1628.89 ≈ 1609.73 1630.32 ≈ 1628.89 ≈ 1621.54
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 356.12 ≈ 332.38 < 344.23 362.94 > 333.17 ≪ 370.49
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 443.13 ≈ 439.28 ≈ 444.41 445.07 ≈ 441.4 ≈ 463.88
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1213.26 < 1301.76 ≫ 1203.05 1215.63 < 1303.97 > 1223.4
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 587.45 < 640.1 > 597.28 588.7 < 640.41 > 609.01
Pooled 15523.37 ≈ 15443.11 ≪ 16124.95 15682.79 ≈ 15578.03 ≪ 17512.74
Note: Relation signs are used as defined above (Table 7). “No Switching”, “Random Switching” and “Markov Switching” are as defined in the text, but
briefly: “No Switching” assumes that each subject randomly chooses a strategy prior to the first supergame and plays this strategy constantly for the entire
half session. “Random Switching” assumes that each subject randomly chooses a strategy prior to each supergame (by i.i.d. draws), and “Markov Switching”
allows that these switches follow a Markov process. “All but SG” allows subjects to play either AD, Grim, TFT, AC or WSLS, and “Best w/o SG” picks the
best mixture model after eliminating AC or WSLS, or both or none of these.
Table 10: Table 9 by treatments – Pure, mixed, or switching strategies?
(a) First halves per session
Best w/o SG All but SG
No Random Markov No Random Markov
Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 16 16 82 5 5 30
# Parameters accounted for 3–5 3–5 12–30 5 5 30
AF09–34 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89
BOS11–9 45.36 ≈ 43.78 ≪ 55.54 46.95 ≈ 47.98 ≪ 82.02
BOS11–14 61.42 ≈ 59.77 ≪ 72.93 64.41 ≈ 62.85 ≪ 99.82
BOS11–15 29.87 ≈ 29.93 ≪ 43.24 32.88 ≈ 33.11 ≪ 70.23
BOS11–16 106.92 ≈ 103.63 ≪ 118.03 108.38 ≈ 104.63 ≪ 139.03
BOS11–17 48.66 < 53.62 ≈ 57.44 54.66 ≈ 54.85 ≪ 82.08
BOS11–26 162.85 ≫ 140.64 ≪ 153.41 171.26 ≫ 142.95 ≪ 182.93
BOS11–27 65.77 > 52.93 ≪ 65.67 67.27 ≈ 67.14 ≪ 89.62
BOS11–30 30.38 ≈ 30.39 ≪ 43.76 33.4 ≈ 33.5 ≪ 70.72
BOS11–31 88.41 > 79.66 ≪ 103.59 89.91 > 81.06 ≪ 113.56
BK12–28 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 590.68 ≈ 582.82 ≈ 601.83
D05–18 153.77 ≫ 136.89 ≪ 151.01 158.41 ≫ 141.54 ≪ 182.66
D05–19 238.55 ≈ 226.34 ≈ 233.48 250.24 > 231.9 ≪ 268.27
DF11–6 379.95 > 357.02 ≈ 347.58 382.33 > 357.08 ≈ 359.31
DF11–7 549.14 > 513.5 ≈ 514.91 551.1 > 516.11 ≈ 528.46
DF11–8 581.17 ≈ 568.86 ≈ 552.52 583.54 ≈ 570.76 ≈ 562.3
DF11–22 758.46 ≈ 738.85 ≈ 742.48 763.64 ≈ 740.75 ≈ 757.73
DF11–23 715.77 ≈ 735.67 ≈ 706.54 717.59 ≈ 735.67 ≈ 718.8
DF11–24 843.2 ≈ 838.63 ≈ 830.64 847.67 ≈ 838.63 ≈ 839.63
DF15–4 170.82 ≈ 158.62 ≈ 164.65 175.88 ≈ 162.97 ≪ 198.4
DF15–5 761.26 ≈ 724.76 ≈ 696.32 765.29 ≈ 729.13 ≈ 717.94
DF15–20 1003.49 > 955.28 ≈ 958.24 1005.86 > 967.96 ≈ 973.01
DF15–21 1334.08 ≈ 1316.87 ≫ 1274.95 1336.6 ≈ 1333.38 ≫ 1296.16
DF15–33 1900.51 ≫ 1796.11 ≈ 1810.13 1904.58 ≫ 1800.3 < 1831.38
DF15–35 330.58 > 307.28 ≈ 319.5 331.62 > 309.31 ≪ 339.6
DRFN08–10 197.04 ≈ 195.4 ≈ 208.99 198.7 ≈ 197.07 ≪ 229.14
DRFN08–11 259.69 ≈ 264.28 ≈ 264.24 262.72 ≈ 265.71 ≈ 282.44
DO09–32 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1128.79 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1134.58
FY17–25 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 186.7 > 163.08 ≪ 199.13
FRD12–29 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 359.72 > 333.38 ≪ 366.32
KS13–12 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1815.98 ≈ 1865.9 > 1790.48
STS13–13 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 928.91 ≈ 955.58 > 922.05
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89
Blonski et al. (2011) 674.3 ≫ 626.71 ≪ 843 719.21 ≫ 678.16 ≪ 1230.45
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 590.68 ≈ 582.82 ≈ 601.83
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 412.2 ≫ 376.98 ≪ 472.2
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3847.44 ≈ 3775.96 ≈ 3802.38 3872.8 ≈ 3785.92 ≪ 3927.78
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5522.08 ≫ 5280.06 ≈ 5318.33 5549.01 ≫ 5332.22 ≪ 5531.46
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 462.48 ≈ 481.64 464.92 ≈ 466.28 ≪ 532.59
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1128.79 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1134.58
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 186.7 > 163.08 ≪ 199.13
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 359.72 > 333.38 ≪ 366.32
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1815.98 ≈ 1865.9 > 1790.48
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 928.91 ≈ 955.58 > 922.05
Pooled 16820.09 ≫ 16417.97 ≪ 17165.74 17001.48 ≫ 16601.15 ≪ 18601.02
(b) Second halves per session
Best w/o SG All but SG
No Random Markov No Random Markov
Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 16 16 82 5 5 30
# Parameters accounted for 3–5 3–5 12–30 5 5 30
AF09–34 1266.62 > 1217.36 ≈ 1251.36 1272.21 > 1217.36 ≈ 1270.79
BOS11–9 52.34 ≈ 53.6 < 61.92 55.33 ≈ 56.16 ≪ 85.57
BOS11–14 82.95 ≈ 79.69 ≪ 90.37 85.96 ≈ 82.73 ≪ 117.35
BOS11–15 39.65 ≈ 39.74 ≪ 53.06 42.65 ≈ 42.9 ≪ 80.05
BOS11–16 179.08 ≈ 184.91 ≈ 186.97 181.24 ≈ 185.93 ≈ 209.56
BOS11–17 191.8 ≈ 190.05 ≈ 189.58 195.82 ≈ 193.16 ≈ 209.79
BOS11–26 346.61 ≈ 334.88 ≈ 355.78 348.45 ≈ 336.72 ≪ 378.67
BOS11–27 213.5 ≈ 221.89 ≈ 224.59 215 ≈ 223.39 ≈ 235.7
BOS11–30 110.41 ≫ 100.79 ≈ 112.27 113.31 ≫ 107.3 ≪ 137.14
BOS11–31 182.25 ≈ 186.88 ≈ 197.57 183.75 ≈ 188.38 < 212.21
BK12–28 935.25 ≈ 944.39 ≈ 913.55 937.04 ≈ 946.17 ≈ 921.25
D05–18 364.67 ≈ 363.43 ≈ 366.23 366.54 ≈ 365.3 < 389.12
D05–19 440.24 ≈ 433.06 ≈ 437.46 448.35 ≈ 436.22 < 468.87
DF11–6 672.26 ≈ 619.89 ≈ 594.3 672.26 ≈ 621.7 ≈ 594.88
DF11–7 1162.27 ≈ 1211.18 ≫ 1107.1 1164.23 ≈ 1211.18 ≫ 1107.1
DF11–8 1037.38 ≈ 1024.9 > 942.13 1039.3 ≈ 1025.31 > 945.91
DF11–22 1465.66 ≈ 1451.97 ≈ 1393.15 1467.55 ≈ 1453.87 ≈ 1409.12
DF11–23 1242.36 ≈ 1255.79 ≈ 1201.41 1244.18 ≈ 1255.79 ≈ 1206.34
DF11–24 1266.48 ≈ 1253.11 ≈ 1226.17 1268.37 ≈ 1253.11 ≈ 1233.69
DF15–4 299.85 > 270.13 ≈ 272.31 306.35 > 271.7 ≪ 305.5
DF15–5 1390.3 ≈ 1349.58 > 1265.55 1392.77 ≈ 1352.38 > 1283.51
DF15–20 1786.19 ≈ 1792.19 > 1724.15 1786.19 ≈ 1792.19 > 1724.15
DF15–21 2403.79 ≈ 2403.31 ≫ 2310.93 2403.79 ≈ 2403.31 ≫ 2310.93
DF15–33 4039.13 > 3901.56 > 3804.27 4041.69 > 3902.53 ≈ 3818.02
DF15–35 978.44 ≈ 952.81 ≈ 958.36 980.23 ≈ 954.6 ≈ 976.03
DRFN08–10 308.43 ≈ 306.9 ≈ 313.42 310.09 ≈ 308.57 < 330.07
DRFN08–11 436.15 ≈ 432.7 ≈ 419.05 439.24 ≈ 434.24 ≈ 436.69
DO09–32 2784.68 ≈ 2745.23 ≈ 2702.02 2784.68 ≈ 2745.23 ≈ 2702.02
FY17–25 504.26 ≈ 486.46 ≈ 496.45 508.47 ≈ 486.46 < 514.21
FRD12–29 748.15 ≈ 750.98 ≈ 745.6 750.09 ≈ 752.91 ≈ 763.71
KS13–12 3057.93 ≈ 3175.78 ≫ 2929.77 3060.29 ≈ 3177.98 ≫ 2932.51
STS13–13 1500.42 < 1590.96 ≫ 1457.03 1502.43 < 1590.96 ≫ 1462.8
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 1266.62 > 1217.36 ≈ 1251.36 1272.21 > 1217.36 ≈ 1270.79
Blonski et al. (2011) 1431.75 ≈ 1426.73 ≪ 1610.7 1471.58 ≈ 1466.74 ≪ 1966.5
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 935.25 ≈ 944.39 ≈ 913.55 937.04 ≈ 946.17 ≈ 921.25
Dal Bó (2005) 807.48 ≈ 799.06 ≈ 812.2 818.44 ≈ 805.06 ≪ 879.27
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6868.86 ≈ 6841.08 ≫ 6580.33 6882.82 ≈ 6847.87 > 6658.59
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10921.32 > 10694.5 ≫ 10457.73 10940.18 > 10705.87 > 10593.11
Dreber et al. (2008) 746.97 ≈ 742.4 ≈ 743.19 752.84 ≈ 746.31 < 787.77
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2784.68 ≈ 2745.23 ≈ 2702.02 2784.68 ≈ 2745.23 ≈ 2702.02
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 504.26 ≈ 486.46 ≈ 496.45 508.47 ≈ 486.46 < 514.21
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 748.15 ≈ 750.98 ≈ 745.6 750.09 ≈ 752.91 ≈ 763.71
Kagel and Schley (2013) 3057.93 ≈ 3175.78 ≫ 2929.77 3060.29 ≈ 3177.98 ≫ 2932.51
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1500.42 < 1590.96 ≫ 1457.03 1502.43 < 1590.96 ≫ 1462.8
Pooled 31710.95 ≈ 31564.59 > 31347.14 31863.45 ≈ 31671.3 ≪ 32546.75
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 11: Pure, mixed, or switching strategies? Best mixtures without Semi-Grim
(ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
Best mixture of pure strategies Best mixture of generalized pure strategies
No Random Markov No Random Markov
Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching
Specification
# Models evaluated 432 432 432 432 432 432
# Pars estimated (by treatment) (by treatment) 16 16 82 32 32 98
# Parameters accounted for (by treatment) 3–5 3–5 12–30 6–10 6–10 15–35
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53
Blonski et al. (2011) 674.3 ≫ 626.71 ≪ 843 713.8 ≫ 670.62 ≪ 875.74
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 407.86 ≫ 378.95 < 404.78
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3847.44 ≈ 3775.96 ≈ 3802.38 3536.73 ≈ 3589.36 ≈ 3524.77
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5522.08 ≫ 5280.06 ≈ 5318.33 5259.64 ≫ 5037.82 ≈ 5057.54
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 462.48 ≈ 481.64 478.09 ≈ 466.13 ≈ 482.86
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 188.5 ≈ 183.48 ≈ 175.59
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65
Pooled 16820.09 ≫ 16417.97 ≪ 17165.74 16077.95 > 15853.82 ≪ 16335.33
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 478.46 > 451.68 ≈ 480.65 363.58 ≈ 368.23 ≈ 368.89
Blonski et al. (2011) 965.51 ≫ 914.28 ≪ 1140.5 992.44 ≈ 993.71 ≪ 1154.56
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 342.17 ≈ 361.38 ≈ 348.88 344.88 ≈ 358.12 ≈ 347.08
Dal Bó (2005) 464.42 ≈ 446.63 ≪ 474.71 475.11 ≈ 456.4 ≈ 469.98
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3052.84 ≈ 3081.92 ≈ 3092.35 2737.11 < 2875.64 > 2721.88
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5571.71 > 5419.19 ≈ 5478.11 5164.78 ≈ 5105.6 ≈ 5116.42
Dreber et al. (2008) 287.58 ≈ 285.34 < 303.79 295.06 ≈ 297.88 ≈ 303.03
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1628.02 ≈ 1628.89 ≈ 1609.73 1381.01 ≈ 1416.71 ≈ 1392.49
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 356.12 ≈ 332.38 < 344.23 309.63 ≈ 304.7 ≈ 308.78
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 443.13 ≈ 439.28 ≈ 444.41 373.44 ≈ 395.32 ≈ 376.62
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1213.26 < 1301.76 ≫ 1203.05 1170.12 ≈ 1224.37 > 1143.67
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 587.45 < 640.1 > 597.28 527.09 ≈ 590.16 ≈ 567.63
Pooled 15523.37 ≈ 15443.11 ≪ 16124.95 14387.48 < 14656.93 ≈ 14961.61
Note: Relation signs are used as defined above (Table 7). “No Switching”, “Random Switching” and “Markov Switching” are as defined in the text, but briefly: “No
Switching” assumes that each subject randomly chooses a strategy prior to the first supergame and plays this strategy constantly for the entire half session. “Random
Switching” assumes that each subject randomly chooses a strategy prior to each supergame (by i.i.d. draws), and “Markov Switching” allows that these switches follow
a Markov process. “Best mixture of pure strategies” starts with the general mixture model allowing subjects to play AD, Grim, TFT, AC or WSLS and picks the best-
fitting model after eliminating AC or WSLS, or both or none of these. The “Best mixture of generalized strategies” additionally allows for randomization based on these
proto-typical strategies as defined in the main text.
Table 12: Table 11 by treatments – Pure, mixed, or switching strategies? Best mixtures without Semi-Grim
(a) First halves per session
Best mixture of pure strategies Best mixture of generalized pure strategies
No Random Markov No Random Markov
Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching
Specification
# Models evaluated 432 432 432 432 432 432
# Pars estimated (by treatment) (by treatment) 16 16 82 32 32 98
# Parameters accounted for (by treatment) 3–5 3–5 12–30 6–10 6–10 15–35
AF09–34 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53
BOS11–9 45.36 ≈ 43.78 ≪ 55.54 39.68 ≈ 34.86 ≪ 47.44
BOS11–14 61.42 ≈ 59.77 ≪ 72.93 52.96 ≈ 51.25 ≪ 69.19
BOS11–15 29.87 ≈ 29.93 ≪ 43.24 31.14 ≫ 22.09 ≪ 45.44
BOS11–16 106.92 ≈ 103.63 ≪ 118.03 106.93 ≈ 109.67 ≈ 112.68
BOS11–17 48.66 < 53.62 ≈ 57.44 56.31 ≈ 57.46 ≈ 60.52
BOS11–26 162.85 ≫ 140.64 ≪ 153.41 162.52 > 139.66 < 158.95
BOS11–27 65.77 > 52.93 ≪ 65.67 64.41 ≫ 54.54 < 70.16
BOS11–30 30.38 ≈ 30.39 ≪ 43.76 42.87 ≈ 42.83 ≪ 56.32
BOS11–31 88.41 > 79.66 ≪ 103.59 88.38 ≈ 89.66 ≈ 94.45
BK12–28 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87
D05–18 153.77 ≫ 136.89 ≪ 151.01 154.75 ≫ 138.83 ≪ 151.81
D05–19 238.55 ≈ 226.34 ≈ 233.48 248.85 ≈ 235.87 ≈ 242.34
DF11–6 379.95 > 357.02 ≈ 347.58 339.47 ≈ 347.55 ≈ 316.5
DF11–7 549.14 > 513.5 ≈ 514.91 526.77 ≈ 523.18 > 492.09
DF11–8 581.17 ≈ 568.86 ≈ 552.52 563.75 ≈ 552.71 ≈ 523.57
DF11–22 758.46 ≈ 738.85 ≈ 742.48 707.53 ≈ 697.75 ≈ 694.38
DF11–23 715.77 ≈ 735.67 ≈ 706.54 619.29 < 667.99 ≈ 656.5
DF11–24 843.2 ≈ 838.63 ≈ 830.64 740.3 ≈ 758.9 ≈ 720.58
DF15–4 170.82 ≈ 158.62 ≈ 164.65 175.94 ≈ 180.54 > 168.75
DF15–5 761.26 ≈ 724.76 ≈ 696.32 737.26 ≈ 726.27 > 674.63
DF15–20 1003.49 > 955.28 ≈ 958.24 960.95 > 913.96 ≈ 900.5
DF15–21 1334.08 ≈ 1316.87 ≫ 1274.95 1234.63 ≈ 1210.32 ≈ 1218.06
DF15–33 1900.51 ≫ 1796.11 ≈ 1810.13 1800.02 ≫ 1671.27 ≈ 1691.77
DF15–35 330.58 > 307.28 ≈ 319.5 310.13 ≈ 293.31 ≈ 295.78
DRFN08–10 197.04 ≈ 195.4 ≈ 208.99 208.83 ≈ 197.36 ≈ 213.97
DRFN08–11 259.69 ≈ 264.28 ≈ 264.24 264.48 ≈ 263.16 ≈ 258.39
DO09–32 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79
FY17–25 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 188.5 ≈ 183.48 ≈ 175.59
FRD12–29 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55
KS13–12 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94
STS13–13 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53
Blonski et al. (2011) 674.3 ≫ 626.71 ≪ 843 713.8 ≫ 670.62 ≪ 875.74
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 407.86 ≫ 378.95 < 404.78
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3847.44 ≈ 3775.96 ≈ 3802.38 3536.73 ≈ 3589.36 ≈ 3524.77
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5522.08 ≫ 5280.06 ≈ 5318.33 5259.64 ≫ 5037.82 ≈ 5057.54
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 462.48 ≈ 481.64 478.09 ≈ 466.13 ≈ 482.86
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 188.5 ≈ 183.48 ≈ 175.59
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65
Pooled 16820.09 ≫ 16417.97 ≪ 17165.74 16077.95 > 15853.82 ≪ 16335.33
(b) Second halves per session
Best mixture of pure strategies Best mixture of generalized pure strategies
No Random Markov No Random Markov
Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching Switching
Specification
# Models evaluated 432 432 432 432 432 432
# Pars estimated (by treatment) (by treatment) 16 16 82 32 32 98
# Parameters accounted for (by treatment) 3–5 3–5 12–30 6–10 6–10 15–35
AF09–34 1266.62 > 1217.36 ≈ 1251.36 998.99 ≈ 1011.31 ≈ 989.06
BOS11–9 52.34 ≈ 53.6 < 61.92 56.83 < 67.33 ≈ 63.72
BOS11–14 82.95 ≈ 79.69 ≪ 90.37 75.9 ≈ 70.2 < 77.47
BOS11–15 39.65 ≈ 39.74 ≪ 53.06 43.38 ≫ 34.25 ≪ 55.25
BOS11–16 179.08 ≈ 184.91 ≈ 186.97 170.31 ≈ 187.28 ≈ 176.88
BOS11–17 191.8 ≈ 190.05 ≈ 189.58 191.55 ≈ 192.15 ≈ 194.05
BOS11–26 346.61 ≈ 334.88 ≈ 355.78 328.04 ≈ 330.67 ≈ 340.16
BOS11–27 213.5 ≈ 221.89 ≈ 224.59 214.12 ≈ 222.33 ≈ 218.59
BOS11–30 110.41 ≫ 100.79 ≈ 112.27 116.18 ≫ 109.21 ≈ 116.12
BOS11–31 182.25 ≈ 186.88 ≈ 197.57 183.27 ≈ 185.32 ≈ 188.11
BK12–28 935.25 ≈ 944.39 ≈ 913.55 915.48 ≈ 926.52 > 879.03
D05–18 364.67 ≈ 363.43 ≈ 366.23 360.73 ≈ 361.89 ≈ 355.8
D05–19 440.24 ≈ 433.06 ≈ 437.46 442.98 ≈ 435.7 ≈ 431.03
DF11–6 672.26 ≈ 619.89 ≈ 594.3 584.49 ≈ 615.02 ≈ 531.24
DF11–7 1162.27 ≈ 1211.18 ≫ 1107.1 1135.74 ≈ 1179.37 ≫ 996.23
DF11–8 1037.38 ≈ 1024.9 > 942.13 971.84 ≈ 971.32 > 874.03
DF11–22 1465.66 ≈ 1451.97 ≈ 1393.15 1348.86 ≈ 1333.85 > 1269.49
DF11–23 1242.36 ≈ 1255.79 ≈ 1201.41 1105.85 ≈ 1135.28 > 1043.89
DF11–24 1266.48 ≈ 1253.11 ≈ 1226.17 1076.38 ≈ 1105.99 ≈ 1038.16
DF15–4 299.85 > 270.13 ≈ 272.31 298.69 ≈ 283.7 ≈ 279.23
DF15–5 1390.3 ≈ 1349.58 > 1265.55 1343.25 ≈ 1361.6 ≫ 1240.17
DF15–20 1786.19 ≈ 1792.19 > 1724.15 1696.3 ≈ 1689.33 ≫ 1589.04
DF15–21 2403.79 ≈ 2403.31 ≫ 2310.93 2152.39 ≈ 2212.29 ≫ 2054.9
DF15–33 4039.13 > 3901.56 > 3804.27 3731.12 > 3591.79 ≈ 3531.59
DF15–35 978.44 ≈ 952.81 ≈ 958.36 910.07 > 854.66 ≈ 870.49
DRFN08–10 308.43 ≈ 306.9 ≈ 313.42 310.63 ≈ 308.06 ≈ 311.09
DRFN08–11 436.15 ≈ 432.7 ≈ 419.05 419.57 ≈ 427.47 > 404.08
DO09–32 2784.68 ≈ 2745.23 ≈ 2702.02 2401.04 ≈ 2451.43 ≫ 2321.8
FY17–25 504.26 ≈ 486.46 ≈ 496.45 475.52 ≈ 454.57 ≈ 459.64
FRD12–29 748.15 ≈ 750.98 ≈ 745.6 636.43 < 685.17 > 644.13
KS13–12 3057.93 ≈ 3175.78 ≫ 2929.77 2935.17 ≈ 3003.32 ≫ 2783.52
STS13–13 1500.42 < 1590.96 ≫ 1457.03 1358.57 < 1493.91 ≫ 1325.94
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 1266.62 > 1217.36 ≈ 1251.36 998.99 ≈ 1011.31 ≈ 989.06
Blonski et al. (2011) 1431.75 ≈ 1426.73 ≪ 1610.7 1450.51 ≈ 1471.96 ≪ 1608.54
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 935.25 ≈ 944.39 ≈ 913.55 915.48 ≈ 926.52 > 879.03
Dal Bó (2005) 807.48 ≈ 799.06 ≈ 812.2 807.96 ≈ 803.27 ≈ 797.46
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6868.86 ≈ 6841.08 ≫ 6580.33 6260.83 ≈ 6383.92 ≫ 5874.18
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10921.32 > 10694.5 ≫ 10457.73 10177.65 ≈ 10037.43 ≫ 9693.72
Dreber et al. (2008) 746.97 ≈ 742.4 ≈ 743.19 734.98 ≈ 740.32 ≈ 728.28
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2784.68 ≈ 2745.23 ≈ 2702.02 2401.04 ≈ 2451.43 ≫ 2321.8
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 504.26 ≈ 486.46 ≈ 496.45 475.52 ≈ 454.57 ≈ 459.64
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 748.15 ≈ 750.98 ≈ 745.6 636.43 < 685.17 > 644.13
Kagel and Schley (2013) 3057.93 ≈ 3175.78 ≫ 2929.77 2935.17 ≈ 3003.32 ≫ 2783.52
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1500.42 < 1590.96 ≫ 1457.03 1358.57 < 1493.91 ≫ 1325.94
Pooled 31710.95 ≈ 31564.59 > 31347.14 29421.33 ≈ 29743.95 ≫ 28851.02
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 13: Best mixtures of pure strategies in relation to a Semi-Grim behavior strategy
(ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
Best mixture of pure strategies
No Random Markov Best
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim AD + SG2
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 16 16 82 3 3
# Parameters accounted for 3–5 3–5 12–35 3 3
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 767.22 ≫ 694.72 ≈ 739.24
Blonski et al. (2011) 674.3 ≫ 626.71 ≪ 843 626.71 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 621.23
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 581 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 566
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 365.35 ≈ 358.51 < 374.94
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3847.44 ≈ 3775.96 ≈ 3802.38 3775.96 ≫ 3533.99 ≈ 3550.1
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5522.08 ≫ 5280.06 ≈ 5318.33 5280.06 ≫ 4991.74 ≈ 5014.35
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 462.48 ≈ 481.64 462.48 > 437.17 ≈ 449.12
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1111.23 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1086.17
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 161.75 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 162.3
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 331.44 > 291.43 ≈ 295.84
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1862.88 > 1782.82 > 1706.03
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 953.91 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 899.24
Pooled 16820.09 ≫ 16417.97 ≪ 17165.74 16417.97 ≫ 15481.59 ≈ 15573.98
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 478.46 > 451.68 ≈ 480.65 478.46 ≫ 389.24 < 429.54
Blonski et al. (2011) 965.51 ≫ 914.28 ≪ 1140.5 965.51 > 867.87 ≈ 892.86
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 342.17 ≈ 361.38 ≈ 348.88 342.17 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 345.74
Dal Bó (2005) 464.42 ≈ 446.63 ≪ 474.71 464.42 > 424.44 ≈ 430.13
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3052.84 ≈ 3081.92 ≈ 3092.35 3052.84 > 2817.31 ≈ 2764.96
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5571.71 > 5419.19 ≈ 5478.11 5571.71 ≫ 5043.81 ≈ 5118.03
Dreber et al. (2008) 287.58 ≈ 285.34 < 303.79 287.58 ≈ 264.94 < 288.98
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1628.02 ≈ 1628.89 ≈ 1609.73 1628.02 ≫ 1403.03 ≈ 1444.97
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 356.12 ≈ 332.38 < 344.23 356.12 > 313.5 ≈ 319.17
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 443.13 ≈ 439.28 ≈ 444.41 443.13 > 380.75 ≈ 370.44
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1213.26 < 1301.76 ≫ 1203.05 1213.26 ≈ 1211.37 > 1139.73
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 587.45 < 640.1 > 597.28 587.45 ≈ 586.72 ≈ 562.71
Pooled 15523.37 ≈ 15443.11 ≪ 16124.95 15523.37 ≫ 14159.8 ≈ 14216.67
Note: This table extends Table 9 by picking the best switching model per half-session, after picking the best-fitting mixture involving the pure forms of AD,
Grim, TFT, AC and WSLS (as above) for each treatment independently, and examining its goodness-of-fit in relation to Semi-Grim and mixtures involving
Semi-Grim.
Table 14: Table 13 by treatments – Best mixtures of pure strategies in relation to a Semi-Grim behavior strategy
(a) First halves per session
Best mixture of pure strategies
No Random Markov Best
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim AD + SG2
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 16 16 82 3 3
# Parameters accounted for 3–5 3–5 12–35 3 3
AF09–34 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 767.22 ≫ 694.72 ≈ 739.24
BOS11–9 45.36 ≈ 43.78 ≪ 55.54 43.78 ≫ 28.34 ≈ 29.99
BOS11–14 61.42 ≈ 59.77 ≪ 72.93 59.77 ≫ 43.74 ≪ 56.52
BOS11–15 29.87 ≈ 29.93 ≪ 43.24 29.93 ≫ 14.27 ≪ 27.48
BOS11–16 106.92 ≈ 103.63 ≪ 118.03 103.63 ≈ 102.31 ≈ 102.4
BOS11–17 48.66 < 53.62 ≈ 57.44 53.62 ≈ 48.33 ≈ 53.95
BOS11–26 162.85 ≫ 140.64 ≪ 153.41 140.64 ≈ 130.46 ≪ 146.7
BOS11–27 65.77 > 52.93 ≪ 65.67 52.93 ≈ 49.15 ≪ 57.95
BOS11–30 30.38 ≈ 30.39 ≪ 43.76 30.39 ≫ 15.97 ≪ 30.27
BOS11–31 88.41 > 79.66 ≪ 103.59 79.66 ≈ 86.84 ≈ 85.93
BK12–28 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 581 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 566
D05–18 153.77 ≫ 136.89 ≪ 151.01 136.89 ≈ 136.21 < 141.56
D05–19 238.55 ≈ 226.34 ≈ 233.48 226.34 ≈ 220.17 < 231.25
DF11–6 379.95 > 357.02 ≈ 347.58 357.02 > 333.68 ≈ 341.04
DF11–7 549.14 > 513.5 ≈ 514.91 513.5 ≈ 512.99 ≈ 525.32
DF11–8 581.17 ≈ 568.86 ≈ 552.52 568.86 ≈ 551.81 ≈ 549.33
DF11–22 758.46 ≈ 738.85 ≈ 742.48 738.85 ≈ 684.04 ≈ 689.12
DF11–23 715.77 ≈ 735.67 ≈ 706.54 735.67 ≫ 656.29 ≈ 643.12
DF11–24 843.2 ≈ 838.63 ≈ 830.64 838.63 > 779.03 ≈ 786.01
DF15–4 170.82 ≈ 158.62 ≈ 164.65 158.62 ≈ 149.71 ≪ 174.17
DF15–5 761.26 ≈ 724.76 ≈ 696.32 724.76 ≈ 716.51 ≈ 689.89
DF15–20 1003.49 > 955.28 ≈ 958.24 955.28 ≈ 914.2 ≈ 931.26
DF15–21 1334.08 ≈ 1316.87 ≫ 1274.95 1316.87 ≫ 1196.29 ≈ 1181.18
DF15–33 1900.51 ≫ 1796.11 ≈ 1810.13 1796.11 > 1714.32 ≈ 1735.23
DF15–35 330.58 > 307.28 ≈ 319.5 307.28 ≈ 283.21 ≈ 285.12
DRFN08–10 197.04 ≈ 195.4 ≈ 208.99 195.4 ≈ 180.96 ≈ 190.57
DRFN08–11 259.69 ≈ 264.28 ≈ 264.24 264.28 ≈ 254.11 ≈ 256.45
DO09–32 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1111.23 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1086.17
FY17–25 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 161.75 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 162.3
FRD12–29 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 331.44 > 291.43 ≈ 295.84
KS13–12 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1862.88 > 1782.82 > 1706.03
STS13–13 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 953.91 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 899.24
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 790.2 > 767.22 ≈ 797.89 767.22 ≫ 694.72 ≈ 739.24
Blonski et al. (2011) 674.3 ≫ 626.71 ≪ 843 626.71 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 621.23
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 590.68 ≈ 581 ≈ 592.44 581 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 566
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 365.35 ≈ 358.51 < 374.94
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3847.44 ≈ 3775.96 ≈ 3802.38 3775.96 ≫ 3533.99 ≈ 3550.1
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5522.08 ≫ 5280.06 ≈ 5318.33 5280.06 ≫ 4991.74 ≈ 5014.35
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 462.48 ≈ 481.64 462.48 > 437.17 ≈ 449.12
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1128.03 ≈ 1111.23 ≈ 1123.74 1111.23 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1086.17
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 176.5 161.75 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 162.3
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 356.73 > 331.44 < 347.07 331.44 > 291.43 ≈ 295.84
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1813.04 ≈ 1862.88 ≫ 1781.74 1862.88 > 1782.82 > 1706.03
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 926.9 ≈ 953.91 > 912.67 953.91 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 899.24
Pooled 16820.09 ≫ 16417.97 ≪ 17165.74 16417.97 ≫ 15481.59 ≈ 15573.98
(b) Second halves per session
Best mixture of pure strategies
No Random Markov Best
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim AD + SG2
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 16 16 82 3 3
# Parameters accounted for 3–5 3–5 12–35 3 3
AF09–34 1266.62 > 1217.36 ≈ 1251.36 1251.36 ≫ 1085.04 < 1178.07
BOS11–9 52.34 ≈ 53.6 < 61.92 61.92 > 50.83 ≈ 51.64
BOS11–14 82.95 ≈ 79.69 ≪ 90.37 90.37 ≫ 61.74 ≪ 69.39
BOS11–15 39.65 ≈ 39.74 ≪ 53.06 53.06 ≫ 21.88 ≪ 37.94
BOS11–16 179.08 ≈ 184.91 ≈ 186.97 186.97 ≈ 178.84 ≈ 174.16
BOS11–17 191.8 ≈ 190.05 ≈ 189.58 189.58 ≈ 183.03 ≈ 181.55
BOS11–26 346.61 ≈ 334.88 ≈ 355.78 355.78 ≈ 317.33 ≈ 317.2
BOS11–27 213.5 ≈ 221.89 ≈ 224.59 224.59 ≈ 231.72 ≈ 215.78
BOS11–30 110.41 ≫ 100.79 ≈ 112.27 112.27 ≫ 93.22 ≈ 99.81
BOS11–31 182.25 ≈ 186.88 ≈ 197.57 197.57 ≈ 200.87 ≈ 188.19
BK12–28 935.25 ≈ 944.39 ≈ 913.55 913.55 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 903.59
D05–18 364.67 ≈ 363.43 ≈ 366.23 366.23 ≈ 351.89 ≈ 353.01
D05–19 440.24 ≈ 433.06 ≈ 437.46 437.46 ≈ 418.28 ≈ 423.88
DF11–6 672.26 ≈ 619.89 ≈ 594.3 594.3 ≈ 599.29 ≈ 579.61
DF11–7 1162.27 ≈ 1211.18 ≫ 1107.1 1107.1 < 1199.27 ≈ 1168.14
DF11–8 1037.38 ≈ 1024.9 > 942.13 942.13 ≈ 985.67 ≈ 956.71
DF11–22 1465.66 ≈ 1451.97 ≈ 1393.15 1393.15 ≈ 1331.85 ≈ 1303.37
DF11–23 1242.36 ≈ 1255.79 ≈ 1201.41 1201.41 > 1113.94 ≈ 1113.42
DF11–24 1266.48 ≈ 1253.11 ≈ 1226.17 1226.17 > 1122.26 ≈ 1162.51
DF15–4 299.85 > 270.13 ≈ 272.31 272.31 ≈ 260.02 < 283.22
DF15–5 1390.3 ≈ 1349.58 > 1265.55 1265.55 ≈ 1331.49 ≈ 1291.93
DF15–20 1786.19 ≈ 1792.19 > 1724.15 1724.15 ≈ 1716.02 ≈ 1702.32
DF15–21 2403.79 ≈ 2403.31 ≫ 2310.93 2310.93 ≈ 2213.88 ≈ 2176.02
DF15–33 4039.13 > 3901.56 > 3804.27 3804.27 ≈ 3678.61 ≈ 3654.5
DF15–35 978.44 ≈ 952.81 ≈ 958.36 958.36 ≫ 856.78 ≈ 842.09
DRFN08–10 308.43 ≈ 306.9 ≈ 313.42 313.42 > 270.35 < 297.4
DRFN08–11 436.15 ≈ 432.7 ≈ 419.05 419.05 ≈ 425.89 ≈ 423.94
DO09–32 2784.68 ≈ 2745.23 ≈ 2702.02 2702.02 ≫ 2526.02 ≈ 2569.75
FY17–25 504.26 ≈ 486.46 ≈ 496.45 496.45 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 477.72
FRD12–29 748.15 ≈ 750.98 ≈ 745.6 745.6 > 668.18 ≈ 652.38
KS13–12 3057.93 ≈ 3175.78 ≫ 2929.77 2929.77 ≈ 3009.28 > 2831.74
STS13–13 1500.42 < 1590.96 ≫ 1457.03 1457.03 ≈ 1507.33 ≈ 1459.95
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 1266.62 > 1217.36 ≈ 1251.36 1251.36 ≫ 1085.04 < 1178.07
Blonski et al. (2011) 1431.75 ≈ 1426.73 ≪ 1610.7 1610.7 ≫ 1369.51 ≈ 1365.7
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 935.25 ≈ 944.39 ≈ 913.55 913.55 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 903.59
Dal Bó (2005) 807.48 ≈ 799.06 ≈ 812.2 812.2 ≈ 772.3 ≈ 779.01
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6868.86 ≈ 6841.08 ≫ 6580.33 6580.33 ≈ 6368.43 ≈ 6299.92
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10921.32 > 10694.5 ≫ 10457.73 10457.73 ≫ 10074.29 ≈ 9967.59
Dreber et al. (2008) 746.97 ≈ 742.4 ≈ 743.19 743.19 ≈ 698.35 ≈ 723.44
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2784.68 ≈ 2745.23 ≈ 2702.02 2702.02 ≫ 2526.02 ≈ 2569.75
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 504.26 ≈ 486.46 ≈ 496.45 496.45 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 477.72
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 748.15 ≈ 750.98 ≈ 745.6 745.6 > 668.18 ≈ 652.38
Kagel and Schley (2013) 3057.93 ≈ 3175.78 ≫ 2929.77 2929.77 ≈ 3009.28 > 2831.74
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1500.42 < 1590.96 ≫ 1457.03 1457.03 ≈ 1507.33 ≈ 1459.95
Pooled 31710.95 ≈ 31564.59 > 31347.14 31347.14 ≫ 29578.81 > 29318.3
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 15: Best mixtures of generalized strategies in relation to a Semi-Grim strategy
(ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
Best mixture of generalized strategies
No Random Markov Best
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim AD + SG2
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 32 32 98 3 3
# Parameters accounted for 6–10 6–10 15-35 3 3
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53 646.53 ≈ 694.72 ≈ 739.24
Blonski et al. (2011) 713.8 ≫ 670.62 ≪ 875.74 670.62 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 621.23
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87 570.56 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 566
Dal Bó (2005) 407.86 ≫ 378.95 < 404.78 378.95 > 358.51 < 374.94
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3536.73 ≈ 3589.36 ≈ 3524.77 3589.36 ≈ 3533.99 ≈ 3550.1
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5259.64 ≫ 5037.82 ≈ 5057.54 5037.82 ≈ 4991.74 ≈ 5014.35
Dreber et al. (2008) 478.09 ≈ 466.13 ≈ 482.86 466.13 ≫ 437.17 ≈ 449.12
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79 1053.04 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1086.17
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 188.5 ≈ 183.48 ≈ 175.59 183.48 ≫ 161.45 ≈ 162.3
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55 308.6 ≈ 291.43 ≈ 295.84
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94 1780.97 ≈ 1782.82 > 1706.03
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65 907.14 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 899.24
Pooled 16077.95 > 15853.82 ≪ 16335.33 15853.82 ≫ 15481.59 ≈ 15573.98
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 363.58 ≈ 368.23 ≈ 368.89 363.58 ≈ 389.24 < 429.54
Blonski et al. (2011) 992.44 ≈ 993.71 ≪ 1154.56 992.44 ≫ 867.87 ≈ 892.86
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 344.88 ≈ 358.12 ≈ 347.08 344.88 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 345.74
Dal Bó (2005) 475.11 ≈ 456.4 ≈ 469.98 475.11 ≫ 424.44 ≈ 430.13
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2737.11 < 2875.64 > 2721.88 2737.11 ≈ 2817.31 ≈ 2764.96
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5164.78 ≈ 5105.6 ≈ 5116.42 5164.78 ≈ 5043.81 ≈ 5118.03
Dreber et al. (2008) 295.06 ≈ 297.88 ≈ 303.03 295.06 ≈ 264.94 < 288.98
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1381.01 ≈ 1416.71 ≈ 1392.49 1381.01 ≈ 1403.03 ≈ 1444.97
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 309.63 ≈ 304.7 ≈ 308.78 309.63 ≈ 313.5 ≈ 319.17
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 373.44 ≈ 395.32 ≈ 376.62 373.44 ≈ 380.75 ≈ 370.44
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1170.12 ≈ 1224.37 > 1143.67 1170.12 ≈ 1211.37 > 1139.73
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 527.09 ≈ 590.16 ≈ 567.63 527.09 ≈ 586.72 ≈ 562.71
Pooled 14387.48 < 14656.93 ≈ 14961.61 14387.48 ≈ 14159.8 ≈ 14216.67
Note: This table extends Table 11 by picking the best switching model per half-session, after picking the best-fitting mixture involving the generalized forms
of AD, Grim, TFT, AC and WSLS (as above) for each treatment independently, and examining its goodness-of-fit in relation to Semi-Grim and mixtures
involving Semi-Grim.
Table 16: Table 15 by treatments – Best mixtures of generalized strategies in relation to a Semi-Grim strategy
(a) First halves per session
Best mixture of generalized strategies
No Random Markov Best
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim AD + SG2
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 32 32 98 3 3
# Parameters accounted for 6–10 6–10 15-35 3 3
AF09–34 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53 646.53 ≈ 694.72 ≈ 739.24
BOS11–9 39.68 ≈ 34.86 ≪ 47.44 34.86 ≫ 28.34 ≈ 29.99
BOS11–14 52.96 ≈ 51.25 ≪ 69.19 51.25 > 43.74 ≪ 56.52
BOS11–15 31.14 ≫ 22.09 ≪ 45.44 22.09 ≫ 14.27 ≪ 27.48
BOS11–16 106.93 ≈ 109.67 ≈ 112.68 109.67 ≈ 102.31 ≈ 102.4
BOS11–17 56.31 ≈ 57.46 ≈ 60.52 57.46 ≫ 48.33 ≈ 53.95
BOS11–26 162.52 > 139.66 < 158.95 139.66 ≈ 130.46 ≪ 146.7
BOS11–27 64.41 ≫ 54.54 < 70.16 54.54 > 49.15 ≪ 57.95
BOS11–30 42.87 ≈ 42.83 ≪ 56.32 42.83 ≫ 15.97 ≪ 30.27
BOS11–31 88.38 ≈ 89.66 ≈ 94.45 89.66 ≈ 86.84 ≈ 85.93
BK12–28 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87 570.56 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 566
D05–18 154.75 ≫ 138.83 ≪ 151.81 138.83 ≈ 136.21 < 141.56
D05–19 248.85 ≈ 235.87 ≈ 242.34 235.87 ≈ 220.17 < 231.25
DF11–6 339.47 ≈ 347.55 ≈ 316.5 347.55 ≈ 333.68 ≈ 341.04
DF11–7 526.77 ≈ 523.18 > 492.09 523.18 ≈ 512.99 ≈ 525.32
DF11–8 563.75 ≈ 552.71 ≈ 523.57 552.71 ≈ 551.81 ≈ 549.33
DF11–22 707.53 ≈ 697.75 ≈ 694.38 697.75 ≈ 684.04 ≈ 689.12
DF11–23 619.29 < 667.99 ≈ 656.5 667.99 ≈ 656.29 ≈ 643.12
DF11–24 740.3 ≈ 758.9 ≈ 720.58 758.9 ≈ 779.03 ≈ 786.01
DF15–4 175.94 ≈ 180.54 > 168.75 180.54 ≫ 149.71 ≪ 174.17
DF15–5 737.26 ≈ 726.27 > 674.63 726.27 ≈ 716.51 ≈ 689.89
DF15–20 960.95 > 913.96 ≈ 900.5 913.96 ≈ 914.2 ≈ 931.26
DF15–21 1234.63 ≈ 1210.32 ≈ 1218.06 1210.32 ≈ 1196.29 ≈ 1181.18
DF15–33 1800.02 ≫ 1671.27 ≈ 1691.77 1671.27 ≈ 1714.32 ≈ 1735.23
DF15–35 310.13 ≈ 293.31 ≈ 295.78 293.31 ≈ 283.21 ≈ 285.12
DRFN08–10 208.83 ≈ 197.36 ≈ 213.97 197.36 > 180.96 ≈ 190.57
DRFN08–11 264.48 ≈ 263.16 ≈ 258.39 263.16 ≈ 254.11 ≈ 256.45
DO09–32 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79 1053.04 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1086.17
FY17–25 188.5 ≈ 183.48 ≈ 175.59 183.48 ≫ 161.45 ≈ 162.3
FRD12–29 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55 308.6 ≈ 291.43 ≈ 295.84
KS13–12 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94 1780.97 ≈ 1782.82 > 1706.03
STS13–13 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65 907.14 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 899.24
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53 646.53 ≈ 694.72 ≈ 739.24
Blonski et al. (2011) 713.8 ≫ 670.62 ≪ 875.74 670.62 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 621.23
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87 570.56 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 566
Dal Bó (2005) 407.86 ≫ 378.95 < 404.78 378.95 > 358.51 < 374.94
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3536.73 ≈ 3589.36 ≈ 3524.77 3589.36 ≈ 3533.99 ≈ 3550.1
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5259.64 ≫ 5037.82 ≈ 5057.54 5037.82 ≈ 4991.74 ≈ 5014.35
Dreber et al. (2008) 478.09 ≈ 466.13 ≈ 482.86 466.13 ≫ 437.17 ≈ 449.12
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79 1053.04 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1086.17
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 188.5 ≈ 183.48 ≈ 175.59 183.48 ≫ 161.45 ≈ 162.3
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55 308.6 ≈ 291.43 ≈ 295.84
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94 1780.97 ≈ 1782.82 > 1706.03
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65 907.14 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 899.24
Pooled 16077.95 > 15853.82 ≪ 16335.33 15853.82 ≫ 15481.59 ≈ 15573.98
(b) Second halves per session
Best mixture of generalized strategies
No Random Markov Best
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim AD + SG2
Specification
# Models evaluated 4 4 4 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 32 32 98 3 3
# Parameters accounted for 6–10 6–10 15-35 3 3
AF09–34 998.99 ≈ 1011.31 ≈ 989.06 989.06 ≈ 1085.04 < 1178.07
BOS11–9 56.83 < 67.33 ≈ 63.72 63.72 > 50.83 ≈ 51.64
BOS11–14 75.9 ≈ 70.2 < 77.47 77.47 > 61.74 ≪ 69.39
BOS11–15 43.38 ≫ 34.25 ≪ 55.25 55.25 ≫ 21.88 ≪ 37.94
BOS11–16 170.31 ≈ 187.28 ≈ 176.88 176.88 ≈ 178.84 ≈ 174.16
BOS11–17 191.55 ≈ 192.15 ≈ 194.05 194.05 ≈ 183.03 ≈ 181.55
BOS11–26 328.04 ≈ 330.67 ≈ 340.16 340.16 ≈ 317.33 ≈ 317.2
BOS11–27 214.12 ≈ 222.33 ≈ 218.59 218.59 ≈ 231.72 ≈ 215.78
BOS11–30 116.18 ≫ 109.21 ≈ 116.12 116.12 ≫ 93.22 ≈ 99.81
BOS11–31 183.27 ≈ 185.32 ≈ 188.11 188.11 ≈ 200.87 ≈ 188.19
BK12–28 915.48 ≈ 926.52 > 879.03 879.03 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 903.59
D05–18 360.73 ≈ 361.89 ≈ 355.8 355.8 ≈ 351.89 ≈ 353.01
D05–19 442.98 ≈ 435.7 ≈ 431.03 431.03 ≈ 418.28 ≈ 423.88
DF11–6 584.49 ≈ 615.02 ≈ 531.24 531.24 ≈ 599.29 ≈ 579.61
DF11–7 1135.74 ≈ 1179.37 ≫ 996.23 996.23 ≪ 1199.27 ≈ 1168.14
DF11–8 971.84 ≈ 971.32 > 874.03 874.03 ≪ 985.67 ≈ 956.71
DF11–22 1348.86 ≈ 1333.85 > 1269.49 1269.49 ≈ 1331.85 ≈ 1303.37
DF11–23 1105.85 ≈ 1135.28 > 1043.89 1043.89 ≈ 1113.94 ≈ 1113.42
DF11–24 1076.38 ≈ 1105.99 ≈ 1038.16 1038.16 ≈ 1122.26 ≈ 1162.51
DF15–4 298.69 ≈ 283.7 ≈ 279.23 279.23 ≈ 260.02 < 283.22
DF15–5 1343.25 ≈ 1361.6 ≫ 1240.17 1240.17 < 1331.49 ≈ 1291.93
DF15–20 1696.3 ≈ 1689.33 ≫ 1589.04 1589.04 < 1716.02 ≈ 1702.32
DF15–21 2152.39 ≈ 2212.29 ≫ 2054.9 2054.9 < 2213.88 ≈ 2176.02
DF15–33 3731.12 > 3591.79 ≈ 3531.59 3531.59 < 3678.61 ≈ 3654.5
DF15–35 910.07 > 854.66 ≈ 870.49 870.49 ≈ 856.78 ≈ 842.09
DRFN08–10 310.63 ≈ 308.06 ≈ 311.09 311.09 > 270.35 < 297.4
DRFN08–11 419.57 ≈ 427.47 > 404.08 404.08 ≈ 425.89 ≈ 423.94
DO09–32 2401.04 ≈ 2451.43 ≫ 2321.8 2321.8 < 2526.02 ≈ 2569.75
FY17–25 475.52 ≈ 454.57 ≈ 459.64 459.64 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 477.72
FRD12–29 636.43 < 685.17 > 644.13 644.13 ≈ 668.18 ≈ 652.38
KS13–12 2935.17 ≈ 3003.32 ≫ 2783.52 2783.52 < 3009.28 > 2831.74
STS13–13 1358.57 < 1493.91 ≫ 1325.94 1325.94 < 1507.33 ≈ 1459.95
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 998.99 ≈ 1011.31 ≈ 989.06 989.06 ≈ 1085.04 < 1178.07
Blonski et al. (2011) 1450.51 ≈ 1471.96 ≪ 1608.54 1608.54 ≫ 1369.51 ≈ 1365.7
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 915.48 ≈ 926.52 > 879.03 879.03 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 903.59
Dal Bó (2005) 807.96 ≈ 803.27 ≈ 797.46 797.46 ≈ 772.3 ≈ 779.01
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6260.83 ≈ 6383.92 ≫ 5874.18 5874.18 ≪ 6368.43 ≈ 6299.92
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10177.65 ≈ 10037.43 ≫ 9693.72 9693.72 ≪ 10074.29 ≈ 9967.59
Dreber et al. (2008) 734.98 ≈ 740.32 ≈ 728.28 728.28 ≈ 698.35 ≈ 723.44
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2401.04 ≈ 2451.43 ≫ 2321.8 2321.8 < 2526.02 ≈ 2569.75
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 475.52 ≈ 454.57 ≈ 459.64 459.64 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 477.72
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 636.43 < 685.17 > 644.13 644.13 ≈ 668.18 ≈ 652.38
Kagel and Schley (2013) 2935.17 ≈ 3003.32 ≫ 2783.52 2783.52 < 3009.28 > 2831.74
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1358.57 < 1493.91 ≫ 1325.94 1325.94 < 1507.33 ≈ 1459.95
Pooled 29421.33 ≈ 29743.95 ≫ 28851.02 28851.02 ≪ 29578.81 > 29318.3
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 17: Best mixtures of pure or generalized strategies in relation to Semi-Grim
(ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
Best mixture of pure or generalized strategies Best Mixture
No Random Markov Best Best Switching
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim SG + Noise By Treatment
Specification
# Models evaluated 832 832 832 3×832 1 1 2432 ≈ 1044
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 48 48 180 276 3 4 276
# Parameters accounted for 3–10 3–10 12-35 3–10 3 4 3–10
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53 646.53 ≈ 694.72 > 646.73 ≈ 645.31
Blonski et al. (2011) 677.42 ≫ 619.43 ≪ 821.29 619.43 ≫ 549.45 ≈ 558.66 < 614.47
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87 570.56 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 559.05 ≈ 570.56
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 365.35 ≈ 358.51 ≈ 361.22 ≈ 365.35
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3536.73 ≈ 3576.34 ≈ 3524.77 3576.34 ≈ 3533.99 > 3416.54 ≈ 3471.98
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5250.62 ≫ 5006.33 ≈ 5049.55 5006.33 ≈ 4991.74 ≈ 4935.93 ≈ 4965.57
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 463.01 ≈ 477.02 463.01 > 437.17 ≈ 435.65 ≈ 461.11
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79 1053.04 ≈ 1090.22 > 1017.89 ≈ 1047.59
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 175.59 161.75 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 164.51 ≈ 161.75
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55 308.6 ≈ 291.43 ≈ 288.89 ≈ 308.6
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94 1780.97 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1726.06 ≈ 1694.94
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65 907.14 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 868.89 ≈ 858.65
Pooled 15951.95 ≫ 15675.49 ≪ 16214.1 15675.49 > 15481.59 ≫ 15125.92 ≪ 15535.6
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 363.58 ≈ 368.23 ≈ 368.89 363.58 ≈ 389.24 > 353.94 ≈ 363.58
Blonski et al. (2011) 946.2 > 912.16 ≪ 1107.23 946.2 > 867.87 ≈ 868.31 ≈ 908.25
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 342.17 ≈ 358.12 ≈ 347.08 342.17 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 342.6 ≈ 342.17
Dal Bó (2005) 461.23 ≈ 445.57 < 469.98 461.23 > 424.44 ≈ 429.06 ≈ 442.59
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2737.11 < 2865.45 > 2721.88 2737.11 ≈ 2817.31 ≈ 2694.4 ≈ 2700.09
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5153.82 ≈ 5067.01 ≈ 5106.57 5153.82 ≈ 5043.81 > 4902.82 ≈ 4998.09
Dreber et al. (2008) 287.49 ≈ 281.99 ≈ 299.36 287.49 ≈ 264.94 ≈ 268.86 ≈ 283.38
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1381.01 ≈ 1416.71 ≈ 1392.49 1381.01 ≈ 1403.03 > 1308.8 ≈ 1381.01
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 309.63 ≈ 304.7 ≈ 308.78 309.63 ≈ 313.5 ≈ 278.74 < 304.7
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 373.44 ≈ 395.32 ≈ 376.62 373.44 ≈ 380.75 ≈ 358.86 ≈ 373.44
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1170.12 ≈ 1224.37 > 1143.67 1170.12 ≈ 1211.37 ≈ 1153.04 ≈ 1143.67
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 527.09 ≈ 590.16 ≈ 567.63 527.09 ≈ 586.72 ≈ 564.5 ≈ 527.09
Pooled 14269.01 ≈ 14448.15 < 14877.81 14269.01 ≈ 14159.8 ≫ 13669.82 ≪ 14108.4
Note: This table extends Table 11 by picking the best switching model per half-session, after picking the best-fitting mixture involving either the pure or
generalized forms of AD, Grim, TFT, AC and WSLS (as above) for each treatment independently, and examining its goodness-of-fit in relation to Semi-Grim
and mixtures involving Semi-Grim.
Table 18: Table 17 by treatments – Best mixtures of pure or generalized strategies in relation to Semi-Grim
(a) First halves per session
Best mixture of pure or generalized strategies Best Mixture
No Random Markov Best Best Switching
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim SG + Noise By Treatment
Specification
# Models evaluated 832 832 832 3×832 1 1 2432 ≈ 1044
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 48 48 180 276 3 4 276
# Parameters accounted for 3–10 3–10 12-35 3–10 3 4 3–10
AF09–34 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53 646.53 ≈ 694.72 > 646.73 ≈ 645.31
BOS11–9 39.68 ≈ 34.86 ≪ 47.44 34.86 ≫ 28.34 ≈ 28.33 < 34.86
BOS11–14 52.96 ≈ 51.25 ≪ 69.19 51.25 > 43.74 ≈ 45.24 < 51.25
BOS11–15 29.87 ≫ 22.09 ≪ 43.24 22.09 ≫ 14.27 ≈ 15.77 ≪ 22.09
BOS11–16 106.92 ≈ 103.63 ≈ 112.68 103.63 ≈ 102.31 ≈ 93.04 ≈ 103.63
BOS11–17 48.66 < 53.62 ≈ 57.44 53.62 ≈ 48.33 ≪ 54.96 ≈ 48.66
BOS11–26 162.52 > 139.66 < 153.41 139.66 ≈ 130.46 ≈ 128.89 < 139.66
BOS11–27 64.41 > 52.93 ≪ 65.67 52.93 ≈ 49.15 ≈ 50.65 ≈ 52.93
BOS11–30 30.38 ≈ 30.39 ≪ 43.76 30.39 ≫ 15.97 ≈ 17.47 ≪ 30.38
BOS11–31 88.38 > 79.66 ≪ 94.45 79.66 ≈ 86.84 ≈ 84.25 ≈ 79.66
BK12–28 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87 570.56 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 559.05 ≈ 570.56
D05–18 153.77 ≫ 136.89 ≪ 151.01 136.89 ≈ 136.21 ≈ 139.6 ≈ 136.89
D05–19 238.55 ≈ 226.34 ≈ 233.48 226.34 ≈ 220.17 ≈ 218.78 ≈ 226.34
DF11–6 339.47 ≈ 347.55 ≈ 316.5 347.55 ≈ 333.68 ≈ 318.37 ≈ 316.5
DF11–7 526.77 ≈ 513.5 ≈ 492.09 513.5 ≈ 512.99 ≈ 501.16 ≈ 492.09
DF11–8 563.75 ≈ 552.71 ≈ 523.57 552.71 ≈ 551.81 ≈ 547.22 ≈ 523.57
DF11–22 707.53 ≈ 697.75 ≈ 694.38 697.75 ≈ 684.04 ≈ 655.17 < 694.38
DF11–23 619.29 < 667.99 ≈ 656.5 667.99 ≈ 656.29 ≈ 639.07 ≈ 619.29
DF11–24 740.3 ≈ 758.9 ≈ 720.58 758.9 ≈ 779.03 ≈ 734 ≈ 720.58
DF15–4 170.82 ≈ 158.62 ≈ 164.65 158.62 ≈ 149.71 ≈ 151.68 ≈ 158.62
DF15–5 737.26 ≈ 724.76 > 674.63 724.76 ≈ 716.51 ≈ 705.07 ≈ 674.63
DF15–20 960.95 > 913.96 ≈ 900.5 913.96 ≈ 914.2 ≈ 901.08 ≈ 900.5
DF15–21 1234.63 ≈ 1210.32 ≈ 1218.06 1210.32 ≈ 1196.29 > 1174.44 ≈ 1210.32
DF15–33 1800.02 ≫ 1671.27 ≈ 1691.77 1671.27 ≈ 1714.32 ≈ 1703.43 ≈ 1671.27
DF15–35 310.13 ≈ 293.31 ≈ 295.78 293.31 ≈ 283.21 ≈ 276.9 ≈ 293.31
DRFN08–10 197.04 ≈ 195.4 ≈ 208.99 195.4 ≈ 180.96 ≈ 182.62 ≈ 195.4
DRFN08–11 259.69 ≈ 263.16 ≈ 258.39 263.16 ≈ 254.11 ≈ 250.23 ≈ 258.39
DO09–32 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79 1053.04 ≈ 1090.22 > 1017.89 ≈ 1047.59
FY17–25 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 175.59 161.75 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 164.51 ≈ 161.75
FRD12–29 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55 308.6 ≈ 291.43 ≈ 288.89 ≈ 308.6
KS13–12 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94 1780.97 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1726.06 ≈ 1694.94
STS13–13 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65 907.14 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 868.89 ≈ 858.65
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 645.31 ≈ 646.53 ≈ 649.53 646.53 ≈ 694.72 > 646.73 ≈ 645.31
Blonski et al. (2011) 677.42 ≫ 619.43 ≪ 821.29 619.43 ≫ 549.45 ≈ 558.66 < 614.47
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 585.42 ≈ 570.56 ≈ 570.87 570.56 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 559.05 ≈ 570.56
Dal Bó (2005) 394.44 ≫ 365.35 ≪ 393 365.35 ≈ 358.51 ≈ 361.22 ≈ 365.35
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3536.73 ≈ 3576.34 ≈ 3524.77 3576.34 ≈ 3533.99 > 3416.54 ≈ 3471.98
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5250.62 ≫ 5006.33 ≈ 5049.55 5006.33 ≈ 4991.74 ≈ 4935.93 ≈ 4965.57
Dreber et al. (2008) 459.11 ≈ 463.01 ≈ 477.02 463.01 > 437.17 ≈ 435.65 ≈ 461.11
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1047.59 ≈ 1053.04 ≈ 1049.79 1053.04 ≈ 1090.22 > 1017.89 ≈ 1047.59
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 181.98 ≫ 161.75 < 175.59 161.75 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 164.51 ≈ 161.75
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 319.45 ≈ 308.6 ≈ 320.55 308.6 ≈ 291.43 ≈ 288.89 ≈ 308.6
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1761.98 ≈ 1780.97 > 1694.94 1780.97 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1726.06 ≈ 1694.94
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 865.67 ≈ 907.14 > 858.65 907.14 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 868.89 ≈ 858.65
Pooled 15951.95 ≫ 15675.49 ≪ 16214.1 15675.49 > 15481.59 ≫ 15125.92 ≪ 15535.6
(b) Second halves per session
Best mixture of pure or generalized strategies Best Mixture
No Random Markov Best Best Switching
Switching Switching Switching Switching Semi-Grim SG + Noise By Treatment
Specification
# Models evaluated 832 832 832 3×832 1 1 2432 ≈ 1044
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 48 48 180 276 3 4 276
# Parameters accounted for 3–10 3–10 12-35 3–10 3 4 3–10
AF09–34 998.99 ≈ 1011.31 ≈ 989.06 989.06 ≈ 1085.04 > 1002.44 ≈ 989.06
BOS11–9 52.34 ≈ 53.6 < 61.92 61.92 > 50.83 ≈ 52.33 ≈ 52.34
BOS11–14 75.9 ≈ 70.2 < 77.47 77.47 > 61.74 ≈ 63.23 < 70.2
BOS11–15 39.65 ≫ 34.25 ≪ 53.06 53.06 ≫ 21.88 ≈ 24.13 < 34.25
BOS11–16 170.31 ≈ 184.91 ≈ 176.88 176.88 ≈ 178.84 ≈ 159.07 ≈ 170.31
BOS11–17 191.55 ≈ 190.05 ≈ 189.58 189.58 ≈ 183.03 ≈ 184.58 ≈ 189.58
BOS11–26 328.04 ≈ 330.67 ≈ 340.16 340.16 ≈ 317.33 ≈ 315.97 ≈ 328.04
BOS11–27 213.5 ≈ 221.89 ≈ 218.59 218.59 ≈ 231.72 ≈ 229.23 ≈ 213.5
BOS11–30 110.41 ≫ 100.79 ≈ 112.27 112.27 ≫ 93.22 ≈ 94.72 ≈ 100.79
BOS11–31 182.25 ≈ 185.32 ≈ 188.11 188.11 ≈ 200.87 ≈ 188.4 ≈ 182.25
BK12–28 915.48 ≈ 926.52 > 879.03 879.03 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 902.34 ≈ 879.03
D05–18 360.73 ≈ 361.89 ≈ 355.8 355.8 ≈ 351.89 ≈ 352.95 ≈ 355.8
D05–19 440.24 ≈ 433.06 ≈ 431.03 431.03 ≈ 418.28 ≈ 409 ≈ 431.03
DF11–6 584.49 ≈ 615.02 ≈ 531.24 531.24 ≈ 599.29 ≈ 543.48 ≈ 531.24
DF11–7 1135.74 ≈ 1179.37 ≫ 996.23 996.23 ≪ 1199.27 > 1089.22 > 996.23
DF11–8 971.84 ≈ 971.32 > 874.03 874.03 ≪ 985.67 ≈ 985.55 > 874.03
DF11–22 1348.86 ≈ 1333.85 > 1269.49 1269.49 ≈ 1331.85 ≈ 1333.74 ≈ 1269.49
DF11–23 1105.85 ≈ 1135.28 > 1043.89 1043.89 ≈ 1113.94 ≈ 1098.69 ≈ 1043.89
DF11–24 1076.38 ≈ 1105.99 ≈ 1038.16 1038.16 ≈ 1122.26 ≈ 1088.71 ≈ 1038.16
DF15–4 298.69 ≫ 270.13 ≈ 272.31 272.31 ≈ 260.02 ≈ 262.05 ≈ 270.13
DF15–5 1343.25 ≈ 1349.58 ≫ 1240.17 1240.17 < 1331.49 ≈ 1325.96 > 1240.17
DF15–20 1696.3 ≈ 1689.33 ≫ 1589.04 1589.04 < 1716.02 ≈ 1677.48 > 1589.04
DF15–21 2152.39 ≈ 2212.29 ≫ 2054.9 2054.9 < 2213.88 > 2121.22 > 2054.9
DF15–33 3731.12 > 3591.79 ≈ 3531.59 3531.59 < 3678.61 ≈ 3633.99 ≈ 3531.59
DF15–35 910.07 > 854.66 ≈ 870.49 870.49 ≈ 856.78 ≈ 858.57 ≈ 854.66
DRFN08–10 308.43 ≈ 306.9 ≈ 311.09 311.09 > 270.35 ≈ 272.02 ≪ 306.9
DRFN08–11 419.57 ≈ 427.47 > 404.08 404.08 ≈ 425.89 ≈ 427.44 ≈ 404.08
DO09–32 2401.04 ≈ 2451.43 ≫ 2321.8 2321.8 < 2526.02 > 2344.75 ≈ 2321.8
FY17–25 475.52 ≈ 454.57 ≈ 459.64 459.64 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 451.38 ≈ 454.57
FRD12–29 636.43 < 685.17 > 644.13 644.13 ≈ 668.18 ≈ 632.09 ≈ 636.43
KS13–12 2935.17 ≈ 3003.32 ≫ 2783.52 2783.52 < 3009.28 ≈ 2904.04 > 2783.52
STS13–13 1358.57 < 1493.91 ≫ 1325.94 1325.94 < 1507.33 ≈ 1446.27 > 1325.94
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 998.99 ≈ 1011.31 ≈ 989.06 989.06 ≈ 1085.04 > 1002.44 ≈ 989.06
Blonski et al. (2011) 1413 ≈ 1425.33 ≪ 1572.06 1572.06 ≫ 1369.51 ≈ 1351.72 ≈ 1402.96
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 915.48 ≈ 926.52 > 879.03 879.03 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 902.34 ≈ 879.03
Dal Bó (2005) 804.43 ≈ 799.3 ≈ 797.46 797.46 ≈ 772.3 ≈ 764.79 < 797.46
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6260.83 ≈ 6383.92 ≫ 5874.18 5874.18 ≪ 6368.43 > 6160.93 > 5874.18
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10177.65 > 10006.1 ≫ 9682.9 9682.9 ≪ 10074.29 > 9902.6 ≫ 9631.07
Dreber et al. (2008) 731.63 ≈ 737.99 ≈ 728.28 728.28 ≈ 698.35 ≈ 702.26 ≈ 718.29
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2401.04 ≈ 2451.43 ≫ 2321.8 2321.8 < 2526.02 > 2344.75 ≈ 2321.8
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 475.52 ≈ 454.57 ≈ 459.64 459.64 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 451.38 ≈ 454.57
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 636.43 < 685.17 > 644.13 644.13 ≈ 668.18 ≈ 632.09 ≈ 636.43
Kagel and Schley (2013) 2935.17 ≈ 3003.32 ≫ 2783.52 2783.52 < 3009.28 ≈ 2904.04 > 2783.52
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1358.57 < 1493.91 ≫ 1325.94 1325.94 < 1507.33 ≈ 1446.27 > 1325.94
Pooled 29345.07 ≈ 29624.32 ≫ 28779.62 28779.62 ≪ 29578.81 ≫ 28711.49 > 28340.25
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 19: Is there a single “semi grim” type? Mixture models involving SG
SG + TFT SG + AD 3× SG 2× SG + Noise SG + SG SG + Noise Semi-Grim
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 5 11 8 7 4 3
# Parameters accounted for 5 5 11 8 7 4 3
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 698.37 ≈ 698.36 > 650.89 ≈ 647.47 ≈ 650.83 ≈ 646.73 ≈ 694.72
Blonski et al. (2011) 614.21 ≪ 663.28 ≪ 743.15 ≫ 667.95 ≫ 642.5 ≫ 558.66 ≈ 549.45
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 571.1 ≈ 567.84 ≈ 556.46 ≈ 554.86 ≈ 553.59 ≈ 559.05 ≈ 567.86
Dal Bó (2005) 386.98 ≈ 378.87 ≈ 401.23 ≫ 385.12 ≈ 379.63 > 361.22 ≈ 358.51
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3538.27 ≈ 3488.81 > 3327.75 ≈ 3325.99 ≈ 3335.4 < 3416.54 < 3533.99
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5047.74 ≈ 5024.63 ≈ 5004.06 > 4946.44 ≈ 4958.73 ≈ 4935.93 ≈ 4991.74
Dreber et al. (2008) 443.9 ≈ 442.47 ≈ 454.03 ≈ 442.03 ≈ 438.35 ≈ 435.65 ≈ 437.17
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1099.57 ≈ 1084.74 > 1019.33 ≈ 1018.29 ≈ 1016.91 ≈ 1017.89 < 1090.22
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 180.54 ≫ 165.94 ≪ 187.62 ≈ 183.63 ≈ 179.6 > 164.51 ≈ 161.45
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 297.99 ≈ 292.47 ≈ 290.04 ≈ 289.31 ≈ 287.31 ≈ 288.89 ≈ 291.43
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1777.58 > 1689.17 ≈ 1622.36 ≈ 1680.43 ≈ 1677.99 ≈ 1726.06 ≈ 1782.82
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 904.29 ≈ 887.79 ≈ 868.66 ≈ 870.16 ≈ 868.11 ≈ 868.89 ≈ 912.8
Pooled 15742.91 > 15566.74 ≈ 15526.79 ≫ 15303.48 ≈ 15244.28 ≈ 15125.92 ≪ 15481.59
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 397.94 ≈ 392.87 ≈ 363.39 > 360.1 ≈ 358.14 > 353.94 ≈ 389.24
Blonski et al. (2011) 940.75 ≈ 914.98 < 985.46 ≫ 927.39 ≫ 906.87 ≈ 868.31 ≈ 868.72
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 337.22 ≈ 349.32 ≫ 312.72 ≈ 316.23 ≈ 322.87 ≈ 342.6 ≈ 347.4
Dal Bó (2005) 444.73 ≈ 437.71 ≪ 476.01 > 458.8 ≈ 455.9 ≫ 429.06 ≈ 424.44
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2798.46 > 2640.88 ≈ 2554.16 ≈ 2556.55 ≈ 2545.23 ≪ 2694.4 < 2821.38
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5053.74 ≈ 5032.59 ≈ 4946.96 ≈ 4909.92 ≈ 4879.57 ≈ 4902.82 < 5043.81
Dreber et al. (2008) 262.93 ≈ 275.84 ≈ 283.45 > 272.19 ≈ 268.1 ≈ 268.86 ≈ 265.11
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1414.84 ≈ 1399.65 > 1288.79 ≈ 1284.98 ≈ 1284.59 ≈ 1308.8 < 1403.03
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 319.44 ≈ 319.78 ≈ 283.19 ≈ 278.98 ≈ 277.03 ≈ 278.74 < 313.5
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 388.9 > 366.79 ≈ 345.11 ≈ 345.11 ≈ 348.86 ≈ 358.86 ≈ 380.75
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1200.87 > 1126.89 ≈ 1065.1 ≈ 1070.99 ≈ 1111.19 ≈ 1153.04 ≈ 1211.37
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 567.48 ≈ 550.64 ≈ 518 ≈ 518.83 ≈ 544.85 ≈ 564.5 ≈ 586.72
Pooled 14309.69 ≫ 13990.32 ≈ 13823.56 ≫ 13591.86 ≈ 13558.53 ≈ 13669.82 ≪ 14164.9
Note: This table verifies a number of possible mixtures involving Semi-Grim types as a robustness check for the sufficiency of focusing on the mixtures
examined above. E.g. “3× SG refers to a model containing three different versions of memory-1 semi-grim with allowing for heterogeneity of randomization
parameters across subjects.
Table 20: Table 19 by treatments – Is there a single “semi grim” type? Mixture models involving SG
(a) First halves per session
SG + TFT SG + AD 3× SG 2× SG + Noise SG + SG SG + Noise Semi-Grim
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 5 11 8 7 4 3
# Parameters accounted for 5 5 11 8 7 4 3
AF09–34 698.37 ≈ 698.36 > 650.89 ≈ 647.47 ≈ 650.83 ≈ 646.73 ≈ 694.72
BOS11–9 37.72 ≈ 36.71 ≈ 36.42 ≫ 31.91 ≈ 30.41 ≈ 28.33 ≈ 28.34
BOS11–14 46.74 ≪ 59.53 ≈ 62.1 > 57.42 ≈ 55.89 ≫ 45.24 ≈ 43.74
BOS11–15 17.7 ≪ 30.49 ≪ 34.31 ≫ 29.77 > 28.27 ≫ 15.77 > 14.27
BOS11–16 105.34 ≈ 108.05 ≈ 102.21 > 97.29 ≈ 95.79 > 93.04 ≈ 102.31
BOS11–17 51.6 ≈ 54.39 < 62.12 ≈ 58.67 > 55.43 ≈ 54.96 > 48.33
BOS11–26 138.93 < 145.92 ≈ 143.32 > 135.62 ≈ 133.77 ≈ 128.89 ≈ 130.46
BOS11–27 57.08 ≈ 57.83 ≪ 66.2 ≫ 61.51 ≈ 60.21 > 50.65 ≈ 49.15
BOS11–30 19.19 ≪ 31.51 ≪ 42.82 ≫ 36.78 > 35.23 ≫ 17.47 ≫ 15.97
BOS11–31 89.84 ≈ 88.76 ≈ 83.49 ≈ 78.88 ≈ 77.39 ≈ 84.25 ≈ 86.84
BK12–28 571.1 ≈ 567.84 ≈ 556.46 ≈ 554.86 ≈ 553.59 ≈ 559.05 ≈ 567.86
D05–18 152.64 ≫ 140.51 ≈ 147.72 ≫ 137.32 ≈ 135.38 ≈ 139.6 ≈ 136.21
D05–19 230.8 ≈ 234.82 ≈ 245.71 ≈ 242.13 ≈ 239.28 > 218.78 ≈ 220.17
DF11–6 340.51 ≈ 342.93 ≈ 318 ≈ 315.22 ≈ 312.8 ≈ 318.37 ≈ 333.68
DF11–7 514.24 ≈ 510.31 ≈ 497 ≈ 493.05 ≈ 489.18 ≈ 501.16 ≈ 512.99
DF11–8 555.59 ≈ 521.04 ≈ 510.54 ≈ 513.57 ≈ 511.26 < 547.22 ≈ 551.81
DF11–22 683.89 ≈ 690.37 > 638.31 ≈ 641.64 ≈ 649.47 ≈ 655.17 ≈ 684.04
DF11–23 652.77 ≈ 625.94 ≈ 589.27 ≈ 588.49 ≈ 605.97 ≈ 639.07 ≈ 656.29
DF11–24 764.34 ≈ 771.29 ≈ 715.4 ≈ 730.93 ≈ 729.03 ≈ 734 ≈ 779.03
DF15–4 160.08 < 174.81 ≪ 190.8 > 179.18 ≈ 177.25 ≫ 151.68 ≈ 149.71
DF15–5 729.79 ≈ 693.23 ≈ 694.48 ≈ 688.23 ≈ 684.87 ≈ 705.07 ≈ 716.51
DF15–20 915.67 ≈ 936 ≈ 903.1 ≈ 898.57 ≈ 895.31 ≈ 901.08 ≈ 914.2
DF15–21 1214.46 ≫ 1167.96 ≈ 1149.36 ≈ 1139.86 ≈ 1173.16 ≈ 1174.44 ≈ 1196.29
DF15–33 1713.96 ≈ 1740.36 ≈ 1712.55 ≈ 1708.28 ≈ 1705.28 ≈ 1703.43 ≈ 1714.32
DF15–35 284.62 ≈ 283.12 ≈ 289.62 ≈ 285.66 ≈ 282.04 ≈ 276.9 ≈ 283.21
DRFN08–10 185.08 ≈ 185.52 ≈ 190.34 ≈ 185.08 ≈ 183.64 ≈ 182.62 ≈ 180.96
DRFN08–11 255.32 ≈ 253.45 ≈ 255.98 ≈ 251.35 ≈ 249.8 ≈ 250.23 ≈ 254.11
DO09–32 1099.57 ≈ 1084.74 > 1019.33 ≈ 1018.29 ≈ 1016.91 ≈ 1017.89 < 1090.22
FY17–25 180.54 ≫ 165.94 ≪ 187.62 ≈ 183.63 ≈ 179.6 > 164.51 ≈ 161.45
FRD12–29 297.99 ≈ 292.47 ≈ 290.04 ≈ 289.31 ≈ 287.31 ≈ 288.89 ≈ 291.43
KS13–12 1777.58 > 1689.17 ≈ 1622.36 ≈ 1680.43 ≈ 1677.99 ≈ 1726.06 ≈ 1782.82
STS13–13 904.29 ≈ 887.79 ≈ 868.66 ≈ 870.16 ≈ 868.11 ≈ 868.89 ≈ 912.8
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 698.37 ≈ 698.36 > 650.89 ≈ 647.47 ≈ 650.83 ≈ 646.73 ≈ 694.72
Blonski et al. (2011) 614.21 ≪ 663.28 ≪ 743.15 ≫ 667.95 ≫ 642.5 ≫ 558.66 ≈ 549.45
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 571.1 ≈ 567.84 ≈ 556.46 ≈ 554.86 ≈ 553.59 ≈ 559.05 ≈ 567.86
Dal Bó (2005) 386.98 ≈ 378.87 ≈ 401.23 ≫ 385.12 ≈ 379.63 > 361.22 ≈ 358.51
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3538.27 ≈ 3488.81 > 3327.75 ≈ 3325.99 ≈ 3335.4 < 3416.54 < 3533.99
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5047.74 ≈ 5024.63 ≈ 5004.06 > 4946.44 ≈ 4958.73 ≈ 4935.93 ≈ 4991.74
Dreber et al. (2008) 443.9 ≈ 442.47 ≈ 454.03 ≈ 442.03 ≈ 438.35 ≈ 435.65 ≈ 437.17
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1099.57 ≈ 1084.74 > 1019.33 ≈ 1018.29 ≈ 1016.91 ≈ 1017.89 < 1090.22
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 180.54 ≫ 165.94 ≪ 187.62 ≈ 183.63 ≈ 179.6 > 164.51 ≈ 161.45
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 297.99 ≈ 292.47 ≈ 290.04 ≈ 289.31 ≈ 287.31 ≈ 288.89 ≈ 291.43
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1777.58 > 1689.17 ≈ 1622.36 ≈ 1680.43 ≈ 1677.99 ≈ 1726.06 ≈ 1782.82
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 904.29 ≈ 887.79 ≈ 868.66 ≈ 870.16 ≈ 868.11 ≈ 868.89 ≈ 912.8
Pooled 15742.91 > 15566.74 ≈ 15526.79 ≫ 15303.48 ≈ 15244.28 ≈ 15125.92 ≪ 15481.59
(b) Second halves per session
SG + TFT SG + AD 3× SG 2× SG + Noise SG + SG SG + Noise Semi-Grim
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 5 11 8 7 4 3
# Parameters accounted for 5 5 11 8 7 4 3
AF09–34 1089.07 ≈ 1088.68 > 990.69 ≈ 991.1 ≈ 1004.14 ≈ 1002.44 ≈ 1085.04
BOS11–9 53.89 ≈ 53.88 < 64.12 > 59.61 ≈ 58.1 > 52.33 ≈ 50.83
BOS11–14 64.87 ≪ 72.35 ≪ 81.52 ≈ 76.99 ≈ 75.39 > 63.23 ≈ 61.74
BOS11–15 27.62 ≪ 40.96 > 39.5 ≫ 35 > 33.53 ≫ 24.13 > 22.64
BOS11–16 183.6 ≈ 177.15 ≈ 166.77 ≈ 162.08 ≈ 160.58 ≈ 159.07 ≈ 178.84
BOS11–17 180.21 ≈ 181.35 ≈ 190.99 ≈ 186.36 ≈ 184.86 ≈ 184.58 ≈ 183.03
BOS11–26 316.74 ≈ 303.4 ≈ 295.8 ≈ 303.64 ≈ 301.8 ≈ 315.97 ≈ 317.33
BOS11–27 236.3 ≈ 216.62 ≈ 206.64 ≈ 211.44 ≈ 211.81 ≈ 229.23 ≈ 231.72
BOS11–30 96.22 ≈ 102.16 ≈ 106.32 > 101.82 > 100.32 > 94.72 > 93.22
BOS11–31 205.18 ≈ 191.19 ≈ 173.37 ≈ 168.88 ≈ 167.41 ≈ 188.4 ≈ 200.87
BK12–28 908.74 ≈ 904.92 ≈ 865.47 ≈ 871.79 ≈ 884.68 ≈ 902.34 ≈ 916.81
D05–18 355.5 ≈ 357.75 ≈ 371.46 ≈ 365.36 ≈ 362.37 ≈ 352.95 ≈ 351.89
D05–19 424.87 ≈ 426.93 ≈ 429.94 ≈ 423.33 ≈ 420.68 ≈ 409 ≈ 418.28
DF11–6 592.73 ≈ 550.5 ≈ 505.61 ≈ 531.1 ≈ 529.38 ≈ 543.48 ≈ 599.29
DF11–7 1175.92 ≈ 1122.24 ≈ 1076.72 ≈ 1033.39 < 1080.6 ≈ 1089.22 < 1199.27
DF11–8 998.86 ≈ 925.57 ≈ 888.74 ≈ 883.02 ≈ 881.18 ≪ 985.55 ≈ 985.67
DF11–22 1299.41 ≈ 1280.15 ≈ 1252.38 ≈ 1259.53 ≈ 1257.63 < 1333.74 ≈ 1331.85
DF11–23 1107.01 ≈ 1076.91 ≈ 1018.94 ≈ 1017.54 ≈ 1030.94 ≈ 1098.69 ≈ 1113.94
DF11–24 1098.92 ≈ 1126.04 > 1031.22 ≈ 1031.12 ≈ 1029.26 ≈ 1088.71 ≈ 1122.26
DF15–4 260.03 < 276.63 ≈ 278.3 ≈ 271.52 ≈ 269.36 ≈ 262.05 ≈ 260.02
DF15–5 1343.78 ≈ 1288.52 ≈ 1263.24 ≈ 1261.59 ≈ 1261.3 < 1325.96 ≈ 1331.49
DF15–20 1685.68 ≈ 1666.64 ≈ 1638.48 ≈ 1641.52 ≈ 1658.8 ≈ 1677.48 ≈ 1716.02
DF15–21 2221.3 > 2133.97 ≈ 2092.08 ≈ 2094.42 ≈ 2097.89 ≈ 2121.22 ≈ 2213.88
DF15–33 3602.23 ≈ 3627.79 > 3508.8 ≈ 3550.24 ≈ 3547.85 < 3633.99 ≈ 3678.61
DF15–35 845.37 ≈ 823.8 ≈ 841.54 ≈ 836.16 ≈ 834.42 ≈ 858.57 ≈ 856.78
DRFN08–10 273.7 ≈ 274.83 ≈ 269.72 ≈ 264.73 ≈ 263.18 ≈ 272.02 ≈ 270.35
DRFN08–11 423.75 ≈ 425.89 ≈ 404.27 ≈ 405.55 ≈ 404 ≈ 427.44 ≈ 425.89
DO09–32 2524.24 ≈ 2510.62 > 2305.09 ≈ 2300.39 ≈ 2311.91 ≈ 2344.75 < 2526.02
FY17–25 476.73 ≈ 476.04 ≈ 444.24 ≈ 441.83 ≈ 443.06 ≈ 451.38 ≈ 473.84
FRD12–29 657.64 ≈ 645.3 > 589.46 ≈ 608.61 ≈ 613.78 ≈ 632.09 ≈ 668.18
KS13–12 2984.62 > 2795.09 > 2642.29 ≈ 2711.18 ≈ 2804.08 ≈ 2904.04 ≈ 3009.28
STS13–13 1461.59 ≈ 1429.53 ≈ 1368.44 ≈ 1411.21 ≈ 1430.92 ≈ 1446.27 ≈ 1507.33
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 1089.07 ≈ 1088.68 > 990.69 ≈ 991.1 ≈ 1004.14 ≈ 1002.44 ≈ 1085.04
Blonski et al. (2011) 1414.72 ≈ 1389.14 ≈ 1435.21 > 1385.94 > 1363.89 ≈ 1351.72 ≈ 1370.26
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 908.74 ≈ 904.92 ≈ 865.47 ≈ 871.79 ≈ 884.68 ≈ 902.34 ≈ 916.81
Dal Bó (2005) 783.92 ≈ 788.23 ≈ 809.2 ≈ 794.36 ≈ 788.01 ≈ 764.79 ≈ 772.3
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6299.78 ≈ 6108.34 > 5832.86 ≈ 5798.78 ≈ 5846.68 ≪ 6160.93 < 6368.43
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 9987.54 ≈ 9846.51 ≈ 9686.58 ≈ 9702.12 ≈ 9710.44 < 9902.6 ≈ 10074.29
Dreber et al. (2008) 700.95 ≈ 704.23 ≈ 681.69 ≈ 675.88 ≈ 672.08 ≈ 702.26 ≈ 698.35
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2524.24 ≈ 2510.62 > 2305.09 ≈ 2300.39 ≈ 2311.91 ≈ 2344.75 < 2526.02
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 476.73 ≈ 476.04 ≈ 444.24 ≈ 441.83 ≈ 443.06 ≈ 451.38 ≈ 473.84
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 657.64 ≈ 645.3 > 589.46 ≈ 608.61 ≈ 613.78 ≈ 632.09 ≈ 668.18
Kagel and Schley (2013) 2984.62 > 2795.09 > 2642.29 ≈ 2711.18 ≈ 2804.08 ≈ 2904.04 ≈ 3009.28
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1461.59 ≈ 1429.53 ≈ 1368.44 ≈ 1411.21 ≈ 1430.92 ≈ 1446.27 ≈ 1507.33
Pooled 29471.93 ≫ 28869 ≫ 28052.44 ≈ 27984.99 ≈ 28128.99 ≪ 28711.49 ≪ 29579.56
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Appendix D: Robustness checks for Section 4
The tables in this section replicate the tables presented in the Section 4, again provide
robustness checks and the results treatment-by-treatment.
• Table 21 shows aggregate state-wise cooperation rates for different lagged histo-
ries (cooperation or defection of the opponent in t−2) TFT-Scheme.
• Table 22 shows aggregate state-wise cooperation rates for different lagged histo-
ries (joint cooperation or not in t−2) Grim-Scheme.
• Table 24 compares different models containing semi-grim to models containing
pure strategies assuming no-switching behavior.
• Table 26 compares different models containing semi-grim to models containing
pure strategies assuming random-switching behavior.
• Table 28 compares different models containing modifications of semi-grim.
• Table 30 compares different models containing prototypical strategies derived
from strategies discussed in previous literature in a No-Switching model.
• Table 32 compares different two parameter versions of semi-grim with models
containing prototypical strategies. The memory-2 level follows a Grim-Scheme
if applicable
• Table 33 compares different two parameter versions of semi-grim with models
containing prototypical strategies. The memory-2 level follows a TFT-Scheme if
applicable
• Table 34 examines all mixtures of Semi-Grim with pure or generalized pure
strategies as secondary components (robustness check for Table 4).
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Table 21: Strategies as a function of behavior in t−2 (TFT scheme)
Cooperation after /0,(c,c),(d,c) in t−2 Cooperation after (c,d),(d,d) in t−2
Experiment σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 0.93 ≫ 0.439 ≈ 0.388 ≈ 0.434 0.789 ≫ 0.463 ≈ 0.44 > 0.291
Blonski et al. (2011) 0.901 ≫ 0.27 ≈ 0.146 ≫ 0.053 0.667 ≈ 0.296 ≈ 0.321 ≫ 0.027
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 0.908 ≫ 0.312 ≈ 0.218 ≈ 0.151 0.944 ≫ 0.247 ≈ 0.247 ≫ 0.063
Dal Bó (2005) 0.93 ≫ 0.232 ≈ 0.31 > 0.126 0.833 > 0.147 ≈ 0.413 ≫ 0.071
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 0.955 ≫ 0.352 ≈ 0.298 ≫ 0.086 0.885 ≫ 0.291 ≈ 0.41 ≫ 0.048
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 0.944 ≫ 0.301 ≈ 0.277 ≫ 0.098 0.847 ≫ 0.288 ≈ 0.44 ≫ 0.044
Dreber et al. (2008) 0.902 ≫ 0.213 ≈ 0.189 ≫ 0.061 1 > 0.233 ≈ 0.302 ≫ 0.025
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 0.927 ≫ 0.316 ≈ 0.304 ≈ 0.232 0.691 ≫ 0.277 ≈ 0.361 ≫ 0.08
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 0.943 ≫ 0.153 ≈ 0.241 ≈ 0.1 1 ≈ ≈ 0.4 ≈ 0.086
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 0.984 ≫ 0.394 ≈ 0.347 ≫ 0.05 0.895 ≫ 0.41 ≈ 0.579 ≫ 0.069
Kagel and Schley (2013) 0.94 ≫ 0.29 ≈ 0.25 ≫ 0.125 0.787 ≫ 0.196 ≈ 0.402 ≫ 0.032
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 0.951 ≫ 0.329 ≈ 0.341 > 0.186 0.844 ≫ 0.328 ≈ 0.424 ≫ 0.09
Pooled 0.944 ≫ 0.312 > 0.279 ≫ 0.106 0.826 ≫ 0.287 ≈ 0.41 ≫ 0.05
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 0.961 ≫ 0.408 ≈ 0.567 ≈ 0.447 0.867 ≫ 0.381 ≈ 0.451 ≈ 0.328
Blonski et al. (2011) 0.922 ≫ 0.224 ≈ 0.195 ≫ 0.029 0.944 ≫ 0.402 ≈ 0.324 ≫ 0.018
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 0.948 ≫ 0.239 ≈ 0.214 ≈ 0.118 0.923 > 0.167 ≈ 0.5 ≫ 0.018
Dal Bó (2005) 0.919 ≫ 0.264 ≈ 0.39 ≫ 0.113 0.938 ≫ 0.175 ≈ 0.383 ≫ 0.047
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 0.979 ≫ 0.391 ≈ 0.29 ≫ 0.075 0.975 ≫ 0.334 ≈ 0.547 ≫ 0.022
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 0.977 ≫ 0.304 ≈ 0.328 ≫ 0.064 0.927 ≫ 0.343 ≈ 0.532 ≫ 0.028
Dreber et al. (2008) 0.917 ≫ 0.111 < 0.311 ≫ 0.005 0.909 > 0.5 ≈ 0.629 ≫ 0.01
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 0.98 ≫ 0.408 ≈ 0.371 > 0.232 0.849 ≫ 0.316 ≈ 0.415 ≫ 0.058
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 0.973 ≫ 0.213 ≈ 0.286 ≈ 0.214 0.818 ≈ 0.286 ≈ 0.575 ≫ 0.038
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 0.974 ≫ 0.5 ≈ 0.41 ≫ 0.111 0.84 > 0.463 ≈ 0.417 ≫ 0.075
Kagel and Schley (2013) 0.967 ≫ 0.281 ≈ 0.263 ≫ 0.061 0.872 ≫ 0.188 ≈ 0.527 ≫ 0.018
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 0.973 ≫ 0.503 ≈ 0.417 ≫ 0.12 0.968 ≫ 0.431 ≈ 0.5 ≫ 0.062
Pooled 0.973 ≫ 0.325 ≈ 0.315 ≫ 0.076 0.917 ≫ 0.332 ≈ 0.499 ≫ 0.028
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above, see Table 1, with the obvious adaptation that the Holm-Bonferroni
correction now applies to all eight tests per data set.
Table 22: Strategies as a function of behavior in t−2 (Grim scheme)
Cooperation after /0,(c,c) in t−2 Cooperation after (c,d),(d,c),(d,d) in t−2
Experiment σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 0.939 ≫ 0.39 ≈ 0.439 ≈ 0.556 0.782 ≫ 0.485 ≈ 0.39 > 0.32
Blonski et al. (2011) 0.903 ≫ 0.248 ≈ 0.174 ≫ 0.045 0.714 > 0.318 ≈ 0.216 > 0.031
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 0.919 ≫ 0.296 ≈ 0.245 ≈ 0.179 0.833 ≫ 0.278 ≈ 0.213 ≫ 0.071
Dal Bó (2005) 0.926 ≫ 0.184 ≈ 0.31 ≈ 0.143 0.889 ≫ 0.254 ≈ 0.39 ≫ 0.074
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 0.961 ≫ 0.342 ≈ 0.307 ≫ 0.081 0.849 ≫ 0.324 ≈ 0.364 ≫ 0.054
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 0.95 ≫ 0.265 ≈ 0.301 ≫ 0.081 0.843 ≫ 0.328 ≈ 0.369 ≫ 0.052
Dreber et al. (2008) 0.901 ≫ 0.154 ≈ 0.217 ≫ 0.062 1 ≫ 0.359 ≈ 0.203 ≫ 0.031
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 0.932 ≫ 0.218 ≈ 0.301 ≈ 0.208 0.748 ≫ 0.361 ≈ 0.35 ≫ 0.102
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 0.942 ≫ 0.132 ≈ 0.245 ≫ 0 1 ≈ 0.182 ≈ 0.364 ≈ 0.111
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 0.985 ≫ 0.429 ≈ 0.408 ≫ 0 0.921 ≫ 0.377 ≈ 0.443 ≫ 0.068
Kagel and Schley (2013) 0.947 ≫ 0.236 ≈ 0.288 ≫ 0.133 0.763 ≫ 0.298 ≈ 0.305 ≫ 0.042
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 0.953 ≫ 0.312 ≈ 0.395 ≫ 0.172 0.875 ≫ 0.343 ≈ 0.349 ≫ 0.107
Pooled 0.949 ≫ 0.278 ≈ 0.3 ≫ 0.091 0.825 ≫ 0.333 ≈ 0.346 ≫ 0.059
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 0.965 ≫ 0.438 ≈ 0.625 ≈ 0.333 0.846 ≫ 0.371 < 0.443 ≈ 0.378
Blonski et al. (2011) 0.922 ≫ 0.157 ≈ 0.232 ≫ 0.027 0.941 ≫ 0.425 ≈ 0.23 ≫ 0.019
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 0.946 ≫ 0.156 ≈ 0.233 ≈ 0.173 0.958 ≫ 0.327 ≈ 0.4 ≫ 0.019
Dal Bó (2005) 0.918 ≫ 0.178 < 0.4 > 0.131 0.937 ≫ 0.32 ≈ 0.373 ≫ 0.052
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 0.981 ≫ 0.373 ≈ 0.323 ≫ 0.077 0.95 ≫ 0.38 ≈ 0.416 ≫ 0.025
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 0.98 ≫ 0.264 < 0.366 ≫ 0.058 0.904 ≫ 0.369 ≈ 0.44 ≫ 0.031
Dreber et al. (2008) 0.913 ≫ 0.029 ≪ 0.314 ≫ 0.007 0.955 ≫ 0.417 ≈ 0.611 ≫ 0.009
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 0.981 ≫ 0.362 ≈ 0.433 ≈ 0.226 0.889 ≫ 0.369 ≈ 0.368 ≫ 0.077
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 0.976 ≫ 0.173 ≈ 0.308 ≈ 0.222 0.75 > 0.294 ≈ 0.49 ≫ 0.06
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 0.976 ≫ 0.473 ≈ 0.509 ≈ 0.2 0.854 ≫ 0.5 ≈ 0.328 ≫ 0.077
Kagel and Schley (2013) 0.969 ≫ 0.218 ≈ 0.293 > 0.098 0.868 ≫ 0.332 ≈ 0.394 ≫ 0.02
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 0.974 ≫ 0.465 ≈ 0.486 ≫ 0.107 0.952 ≫ 0.505 ≈ 0.369 ≫ 0.072
Pooled 0.975 ≫ 0.282 ≪ 0.351 ≫ 0.07 0.908 ≫ 0.378 ≈ 0.404 ≫ 0.033
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above, see Table 1, with the obvious adaptation that the Holm-Bonferroni
correction now applies to all eight tests per data set.
Table 23: Table 22 by treatments – Strategies as a function of behavior in t−2 (Grim scheme)
(a) First halves per session
Equality Cooperation after (d,c),(c,d),(d,d) in t−2 Cooperation after ../tex/ext-grim-tab2.tex in t−2
Treatment p-value σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009)
AF09–34 0 0.939 ≫ 0.39 ≈ 0.439 ≈ 0.556 0.782 ≫ 0.485 ≈ 0.39 > 0.32
Blonski et al. (2011)
BOS11–9 0.23 - 0.182 0.182 0.031
BOS11–14 0.16 - 0.188 0.062 0.029
BOS11–15 0.04 - 0.167 0 0.005
BOS11–16 0 0.934 ≫ 0.136 ≈ 0.136 ≈ 0.056 0.667 ≈ 0.333 ≈ 0.333 > 0.076
BOS11–17 1 0.5 ≈ 0.231 ≈ 0.462 ≈ 0.115 NA ≈ 0.25 ≈ 0.5 ≈ 0.167
BOS11–26 0.005 0.857 > 0.258 ≈ 0.097 ≈ 0.07 0.5 ≈ 0.2 ≈ 0.35 ≫ 0.02
BOS11–27 0.18 0.875 ≈ 0.556 ≈ 0.333 ≈ 0.091 1 ≈ 0.1 ≈ 0.1 ≈ 0.044
BOS11–30 0.275 - 0 0 0.058
BOS11–31 0 0.983 ≫ 0.385 ≈ 0.231 ≈ 0.091 0.5 ≈ 0.577 ≈ 0.115 ≈ 0.015
BOS11–All 0 0.903 ≫ 0.248 ≈ 0.174 ≫ 0.045 0.714 > 0.318 ≈ 0.216 > 0.031
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012)
BK12–28 0 0.919 ≫ 0.296 ≈ 0.245 ≈ 0.179 0.833 ≫ 0.278 ≈ 0.213 ≫ 0.071
Dal Bó (2005)
D05–18 0 0.821 ≫ 0.208 ≈ 0.25 ≈ 0.091 0.75 ≈ 0.273 ≈ 0.364 ≈ 0.118
D05–19 0 0.954 ≫ 0.175 ≈ 0.333 ≈ 0.158 1 ≫ 0.243 ≈ 0.405 ≫ 0.044
D05–All 0 0.926 ≫ 0.184 ≈ 0.31 ≈ 0.143 0.889 ≫ 0.254 ≈ 0.39 ≫ 0.074
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011)
DF11–6 0.059 0.667 ≈ 0.294 ≈ 0.235 ≫ 0.038 0.917 ≫ 0.375 ≈ 0.35 ≫ 0.034
DF11–7 0.002 0.632 > 0.254 ≈ 0.254 ≫ 0.089 0.786 > 0.391 ≈ 0.266 ≫ 0.029
DF11–8 0 0.979 ≫ 0.446 ≈ 0.28 ≫ 0.105 0.923 ≫ 0.361 ≈ 0.222 ≫ 0.06
DF11–22 0 0.922 ≫ 0.34 ≈ 0.381 ≫ 0.06 0.833 ≫ 0.279 ≈ 0.338 ≫ 0.048
DF11–23 0 0.976 ≫ 0.448 ≈ 0.321 ≫ 0.16 0.859 ≫ 0.325 ≈ 0.462 ≫ 0.054
DF11–24 0 0.967 ≫ 0.228 ≈ 0.366 > 0.135 0.813 ≫ 0.308 ≈ 0.436 ≫ 0.107
DF11–All 0 0.961 ≫ 0.342 ≈ 0.307 ≫ 0.081 0.849 ≫ 0.324 ≈ 0.364 ≫ 0.054
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015)
DF15–4 0.017 0.571 > 0.073 ≈ 0.268 > 0.018 0.5 ≈ 0.429 ≈ 0.5 ≫ 0.044
DF15–5 0 0.92 ≫ 0.223 ≈ 0.219 ≫ 0.076 0.95 ≫ 0.369 ≈ 0.323 ≫ 0.086
DF15–20 0 0.933 ≫ 0.222 ≈ 0.335 ≫ 0.073 0.825 ≫ 0.225 ≈ 0.337 ≫ 0.046
DF15–21 0 0.959 ≫ 0.325 ≈ 0.329 ≫ 0.129 0.873 ≫ 0.455 > 0.411 ≫ 0.077
DF15–33 0 0.953 ≫ 0.313 ≈ 0.322 ≫ 0.111 0.802 ≫ 0.288 ≈ 0.356 ≫ 0.047
DF15–35 0 0.98 ≫ 0.276 ≈ 0.448 ≈ 0.214 0.882 ≫ 0.356 ≈ 0.422 ≫ 0.042
DF15–All 0 0.95 ≫ 0.265 ≈ 0.301 ≫ 0.081 0.843 ≫ 0.328 ≈ 0.369 ≫ 0.052
Dreber et al. (2008)
DRFN08–10 0 0.885 ≫ 0.143 ≈ 0.13 > 0.031 1 > 0.333 ≈ 0.167 > 0.018
DRFN08–11 0 0.914 ≫ 0.167 ≈ 0.318 > 0.091 1 > 0.375 ≈ 0.225 ≫ 0.043
DRFN08–All 0 0.901 ≫ 0.154 ≈ 0.217 ≫ 0.062 1 ≫ 0.359 ≈ 0.203 ≫ 0.031
Duffy and Ochs (2009)
DO09–32 0 0.932 ≫ 0.218 ≈ 0.301 ≈ 0.208 0.748 ≫ 0.361 ≈ 0.35 ≫ 0.102
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017)
FY17–25 0 0.942 ≫ 0.132 ≈ 0.245 ≫ 0 1 ≈ 0.182 ≈ 0.364 ≈ 0.111
Fudenberg et al. (2012)
FRD12–29 0 0.985 ≫ 0.429 ≈ 0.408 ≫ 0 0.921 ≫ 0.377 ≈ 0.443 ≫ 0.068
Kagel and Schley (2013)
KS13–12 0 0.947 ≫ 0.236 ≈ 0.288 ≫ 0.133 0.763 ≫ 0.298 ≈ 0.305 ≫ 0.042
Sherstyuk et al. (2013)
STS13–13 0 0.953 ≫ 0.312 ≈ 0.395 ≫ 0.172 0.875 ≫ 0.343 ≈ 0.349 ≫ 0.107
Pooled 0 0.949 ≫ 0.278 ≈ 0.3 ≫ 0.091 0.825 ≫ 0.333 ≈ 0.346 ≫ 0.059
(b) Second halves per session
Equality Cooperation after (d,c),(c,d),(d,d) in t−2 Cooperation after ../tex/ext-grim-tab3.tex in t−2
Treatment p-value σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd σˆcc σˆcd σˆdc σˆdd
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009)
AF09–34 0 0.965 ≫ 0.438 ≈ 0.625 ≈ 0.333 0.846 ≫ 0.371 ≈ 0.443 ≈ 0.378
Blonski et al. (2011)
BOS11–9 0.006 0.917 > 0 ≈ 0.154 ≈ 0.021 NA ≈ 0.333 ≈ 0.333 ≈ 0
BOS11–14 0.025 - 0.2 0.4 0.013
BOS11–15 0 - 0 0 0.002
BOS11–16 0 0.855 ≫ 0.12 ≈ 0.24 > 0 0.5 ≈ 0.6 ≈ 0.2 ≈ 0.03
BOS11–17 0 0.912 ≫ 0.161 ≈ 0.194 ≈ 0.048 1 ≈ 0.208 ≈ 0.333 ≫ 0.024
BOS11–26 0 0.955 ≫ 0.171 ≈ 0.195 ≫ 0.022 1 > 0.316 ≈ 0.211 ≫ 0.033
BOS11–27 0.01 0.867 > 0.31 ≈ 0.414 > 0.109 0.9 ≫ 0.518 ≈ 0.268 > 0.014
BOS11–30 0.099 0.75 ≈ 0.083 ≈ 0.083 ≈ 0 1 ≈ 0.333 ≈ 0.25 ≈ 0.022
BOS11–31 0.004 1 > 0.143 ≈ 0.286 ≈ 0.062 1 > 0.613 ≈ 0.097 > 0.018
BOS11–All 0 0.922 ≫ 0.157 ≈ 0.232 ≫ 0.027 0.941 ≫ 0.425 ≈ 0.23 ≫ 0.019
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012)
BK12–28 0 0.946 ≫ 0.156 ≈ 0.233 ≈ 0.173 0.958 ≫ 0.327 ≈ 0.4 ≫ 0.019
Dal Bó (2005)
D05–18 0 0.85 ≫ 0.227 < 0.523 ≈ 0.194 0.9 ≫ 0.325 ≈ 0.425 ≫ 0.076
D05–19 0 0.949 ≫ 0.13 ≈ 0.283 ≈ 0.083 1 ≫ 0.314 ≈ 0.314 ≫ 0.04
D05–All 0 0.918 ≫ 0.178 < 0.4 > 0.131 0.937 ≫ 0.32 ≈ 0.373 ≫ 0.052
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011)
DF11–6 0.006 1 > 0.267 ≈ 0.378 ≫ 0.031 1 ≫ 0.442 ≈ 0.581 ≫ 0.012
DF11–7 0 0.903 ≫ 0.36 ≈ 0.346 ≫ 0.12 0.95 ≫ 0.4 ≈ 0.389 ≫ 0.042
DF11–8 0 1 ≫ 0.395 > 0.163 ≫ 0.047 1 ≫ 0.453 ≈ 0.266 ≫ 0.02
DF11–22 0 0.971 ≫ 0.462 ≈ 0.387 ≫ 0.056 0.903 ≫ 0.265 ≈ 0.426 ≫ 0.018
DF11–23 0 0.974 ≫ 0.387 ≈ 0.6 ≈ 0.314 0.98 ≫ 0.425 ≈ 0.397 ≫ 0.036
DF11–24 0 0.984 ≫ 0.192 ≈ 0.25 ≈ 1 0.9 > 0.471 ≈ 0.559 ≫ 0.073
DF11–All 0 0.981 ≫ 0.373 ≈ 0.323 ≫ 0.077 0.95 ≫ 0.38 ≈ 0.416 ≫ 0.025
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015)
DF15–4 0.034 0.75 > 0.059 ≈ 0.176 ≈ 0.007 1 ≈ 0.091 ≈ 0.545 > 0.024
DF15–5 0 0.981 ≫ 0.226 ≈ 0.218 ≫ 0.031 0.846 ≫ 0.411 ≈ 0.274 ≫ 0.041
DF15–20 0 0.958 ≫ 0.348 ≈ 0.402 ≫ 0.069 0.889 ≫ 0.255 ≈ 0.333 ≫ 0.02
DF15–21 0 0.981 ≫ 0.234 ≈ 0.288 > 0.133 0.929 ≫ 0.424 ≈ 0.348 ≫ 0.058
DF15–33 0 0.981 ≫ 0.273 ≪ 0.517 ≫ 0.077 0.911 ≫ 0.34 < 0.557 ≫ 0.028
DF15–35 0 0.986 ≫ 0.362 ≈ 0.569 ≈ 0.375 0.887 ≫ 0.533 ≈ 0.358 ≫ 0.032
DF15–All 0 0.98 ≫ 0.264 < 0.366 ≫ 0.058 0.904 ≫ 0.369 ≈ 0.44 ≫ 0.031
Dreber et al. (2008)
DRFN08–10 0 0.667 ≫ 0.02 ≈ 0.18 ≈ 0 1 ≈ 0.75 ≈ 0.875 ≫ 0.002
DRFN08–11 0 0.943 ≫ 0.036 ≪ 0.436 > 0.031 0.929 ≫ 0.321 ≈ 0.536 ≫ 0.028
DRFN08–All 0 0.913 ≫ 0.029 ≪ 0.314 ≫ 0.007 0.955 ≫ 0.417 ≈ 0.611 ≫ 0.009
Duffy and Ochs (2009)
DO09–32 0 0.981 ≫ 0.362 ≈ 0.433 ≈ 0.226 0.889 ≫ 0.369 ≈ 0.368 ≫ 0.077
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017)
FY17–25 0 0.976 ≫ 0.173 ≈ 0.308 ≈ 0.222 0.75 > 0.294 ≈ 0.49 ≫ 0.06
Fudenberg et al. (2012)
FRD12–29 0 0.976 ≫ 0.473 ≈ 0.509 ≈ 0.2 0.854 ≫ 0.5 ≈ 0.328 ≫ 0.077
Kagel and Schley (2013)
KS13–12 0 0.969 ≫ 0.218 ≈ 0.293 > 0.098 0.868 ≫ 0.332 ≈ 0.394 ≫ 0.02
Sherstyuk et al. (2013)
STS13–13 0 0.974 ≫ 0.465 ≈ 0.486 ≫ 0.107 0.952 ≫ 0.505 ≈ 0.369 ≫ 0.072
Pooled 0 0.975 ≫ 0.282 ≪ 0.351 ≫ 0.07 0.908 ≫ 0.378 ≈ 0.404 ≫ 0.033
Table 24: 1- and 2-memory SG behavior strategies versus best mixtures (by treatment) of 1- and 2-memory pure strategies (No
switching) (ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
SG+ SG M2“General” SG M2“General” Semi-Grim Best Pure Pure M1+G2,T2 Pure M1
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 5 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 7 3 3 32 5 3
# Parameters accounted for 7 3 3 3-8 5 3
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 743.26 ≈ 742.13 ≫ 694.72 < 763.74 ≈ 791.34 ≈ 800.02
Blonski et al. (2011) 713.93 ≫ 585.39 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 681.8 < 741.88 ≫ 707.94
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 569.53 ≈ 570.41 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 588.53 ≈ 588.53 ≈ 603.31
Dal Bó (2005) 418.65 ≫ 364.64 ≈ 358.51 < 388.99 ≈ 393.09 ≈ 394.31
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3576.79 ≈ 3594.64 ≈ 3533.99 ≪ 3837.37 ≈ 3836.86 < 3934.11
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5259.51 ≫ 5006.42 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5531.56 ≈ 5552.56 ≈ 5595.28
Dreber et al. (2008) 455.42 ≈ 451.44 ≈ 437.17 ≈ 462.66 ≈ 470.47 ≈ 462.66
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1109.12 ≈ 1089.19 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1100.13 ≈ 1102.62 ≈ 1132.22
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 169.83 ≈ 164.74 ≈ 161.45 ≪ 181.95 ≈ 188.02 ≈ 181.95
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 313.22 ≈ 298.69 ≈ 291.43 ≪ 357.33 ≈ 366.77 ≈ 375.41
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1739.6 ≈ 1787.59 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1805.94 ≈ 1805.94 ≈ 1818.45
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 918.44 ≈ 924.56 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 941.91 ≈ 941.91 ≈ 960.82
Pooled 16242.61 ≫ 15762.21 ≫ 15481.59 ≪ 16803.32 < 16962.38 ≈ 17075.91
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 437.99 ≈ 433.04 ≫ 389.24 ≪ 476.75 ≈ 484.39 ≈ 487.15
Blonski et al. (2011) 988.68 ≫ 888.46 ≈ 867.87 ≪ 990.66 ≈ 1084.43 ≫ 1067.21
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 333.93 ≈ 342.01 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 316.34 ≈ 316.34 ≈ 343.43
Dal Bó (2005) 475.66 ≫ 422.93 ≈ 424.44 < 461.93 ≈ 470.29 ≈ 464.4
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2758.96 < 2842.94 ≈ 2817.31 ≈ 2881.22 ≈ 2886.16 ≪ 3251.04
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5109.07 > 5027.27 ≈ 5043.81 ≪ 5564.25 ≈ 5586.2 ≪ 5853.42
Dreber et al. (2008) 271.57 ≈ 271.55 ≈ 264.94 ≈ 287.56 < 293.87 ≈ 287.56
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1462.19 ≈ 1446.73 > 1403.03 ≪ 1617.75 ≈ 1617.75 ≈ 1661.55
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 348.73 ≫ 315.35 ≈ 313.5 < 356.1 ≈ 360.69 ≈ 356.1
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 386.55 ≈ 389.34 ≈ 380.75 < 445.16 ≈ 447.17 ≈ 476.66
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1161.5 ≈ 1208.7 ≈ 1211.37 ≈ 1169.29 ≈ 1169.29 < 1274.75
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 551.82 < 596.62 ≈ 586.72 ≈ 583.79 ≈ 583.79 ≪ 691.06
Pooled 14541.97 > 14367.31 ≫ 14159.8 ≪ 15319.22 ≈ 15482.74 ≪ 16323.75
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above, see Table 1. Pure M1 refers to TFT, Grim, and AD. G2 denotes Grim2.
For definitions of the strategies see Table 5.
Table 25: Table 24 by treatments – 1- and 2-memory SG behavior strategies versus best mixtures (by treatment) of 1- and 2-memory
pure strategies (No switching)
(a) First halves per session
SG+ SG M2“General” SG M2“General” Semi-Grim Best Pure Pure M1+G2,T2 Pure M1
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 5 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 7 3 3 32 5 3
# Parameters accounted for 7 3 3 3-8 5 3
AF09–34 743.26 ≈ 742.13 ≫ 694.72 < 763.74 ≈ 791.34 ≈ 800.02
BOS11–9 44.14 ≫ 29.54 ≈ 28.34 ≪ 47.65 ≈ 50.64 > 47.65
BOS11–14 51.96 > 45.65 ≈ 43.74 ≪ 61.4 < 64.39 ≈ 61.4
BOS11–15 33.17 ≫ 17.23 ≫ 14.27 ≪ 29.85 < 32.85 > 29.85
BOS11–16 114.83 ≫ 102.32 ≈ 102.31 ≈ 109.85 ≈ 112.82 ≈ 109.85
BOS11–17 71.23 ≫ 54.59 ≈ 48.33 ≈ 48.64 ≈ 51.05 ≈ 48.64
BOS11–26 158.29 ≫ 136.72 ≈ 130.46 ≪ 162.83 ≈ 163.62 ≈ 162.83
BOS11–27 55.81 ≫ 46.89 ≈ 49.15 < 59.82 ≈ 59.82 ≈ 67.15
BOS11–30 36.26 ≫ 19.4 ≫ 15.97 ≪ 30.37 < 33.37 ≫ 30.37
BOS11–31 78.14 ≈ 82.99 ≈ 86.84 ≈ 95.58 ≈ 123.24 ≈ 120.15
BK12–28 569.53 ≈ 570.41 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 588.53 ≈ 588.53 ≈ 603.31
D05–18 161.84 ≫ 140.24 ≈ 136.21 ≪ 153.73 ≈ 156.94 ≈ 153.73
D05–19 251.84 ≫ 220.85 ≈ 220.17 ≈ 232.61 ≈ 232.61 ≈ 238.46
DF11–6 346.27 ≈ 337.83 ≈ 333.68 ≈ 368.96 ≈ 368.96 ≈ 389.67
DF11–7 530.09 ≈ 525.23 ≈ 512.99 < 565.55 ≈ 565.55 ≈ 566.74
DF11–8 525.4 < 557.31 ≈ 551.81 ≈ 568.73 ≈ 568.73 < 613.19
DF11–22 693.26 ≈ 685.45 ≈ 684.04 < 755.98 ≈ 755.98 ≈ 758.43
DF11–23 653.3 ≈ 664.99 ≈ 656.29 ≈ 718.87 ≈ 718.87 ≈ 746.73
DF11–24 790.78 ≈ 796.91 ≈ 779.03 ≈ 831.47 ≈ 831.85 ≈ 843.2
DF15–4 189.61 ≫ 160.51 ≈ 149.71 < 170.74 ≈ 174.65 ≈ 170.74
DF15–5 785.26 ≫ 716.06 ≈ 716.51 ≈ 771.72 ≈ 772.27 ≈ 775.61
DF15–20 955.58 ≫ 916.66 ≈ 914.2 < 999.68 ≈ 999.68 ≈ 1005.75
DF15–21 1228.02 > 1201.29 ≈ 1196.29 ≪ 1335.2 ≈ 1335.42 ≈ 1389.42
DF15–33 1766.92 ≫ 1695.1 ≈ 1714.32 ≪ 1891.17 ≈ 1907.06 ≈ 1900.44
DF15–35 293.29 ≈ 287.64 ≈ 283.21 ≪ 334.32 ≈ 334.32 ≈ 335.83
DRFN08–10 195.66 ≈ 191.06 ≈ 180.96 < 200.91 ≈ 204.24 ≈ 200.91
DRFN08–11 254.85 ≈ 256.88 ≈ 254.11 ≈ 259.65 ≈ 262.72 ≈ 259.65
DO09–32 1109.12 ≈ 1089.19 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1100.13 ≈ 1102.62 ≈ 1132.22
FY17–25 169.83 ≈ 164.74 ≈ 161.45 ≪ 181.95 ≈ 188.02 ≈ 181.95
FRD12–29 313.22 ≈ 298.69 ≈ 291.43 ≪ 357.33 ≈ 366.77 ≈ 375.41
KS13–12 1739.6 ≈ 1787.59 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1805.94 ≈ 1805.94 ≈ 1818.45
STS13–13 918.44 ≈ 924.56 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 941.91 ≈ 941.91 ≈ 960.82
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 743.26 ≈ 742.13 ≫ 694.72 < 763.74 ≈ 791.34 ≈ 800.02
Blonski et al. (2011) 713.93 ≫ 585.39 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 681.8 < 741.88 ≫ 707.94
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 569.53 ≈ 570.41 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 588.53 ≈ 588.53 ≈ 603.31
Dal Bó (2005) 418.65 ≫ 364.64 ≈ 358.51 < 388.99 ≈ 393.09 ≈ 394.31
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3576.79 ≈ 3594.64 ≈ 3533.99 ≪ 3837.37 ≈ 3836.86 < 3934.11
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5259.51 ≫ 5006.42 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5531.56 ≈ 5552.56 ≈ 5595.28
Dreber et al. (2008) 455.42 ≈ 451.44 ≈ 437.17 ≈ 462.66 ≈ 470.47 ≈ 462.66
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1109.12 ≈ 1089.19 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1100.13 ≈ 1102.62 ≈ 1132.22
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 169.83 ≈ 164.74 ≈ 161.45 ≪ 181.95 ≈ 188.02 ≈ 181.95
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 313.22 ≈ 298.69 ≈ 291.43 ≪ 357.33 ≈ 366.77 ≈ 375.41
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1739.6 ≈ 1787.59 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1805.94 ≈ 1805.94 ≈ 1818.45
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 918.44 ≈ 924.56 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 941.91 ≈ 941.91 ≈ 960.82
Pooled 16242.61 ≫ 15762.21 ≫ 15481.59 ≪ 16803.32 < 16962.38 ≈ 17075.91
(b) Second halves per session
SG+ SG M2“General” SG M2“General” Semi-Grim Best Pure Pure M1+G2,T2 Pure M1
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 5 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 7 3 3 32 5 3
# Parameters accounted for 7 3 3 3-8 5 3
AF09–34 1181.22 ≈ 1181.85 ≫ 1085.04 < 1226.63 ≈ 1270.08 ≈ 1294.67
BOS11–9 62.29 > 51.41 ≈ 50.83 ≈ 52.32 ≈ 55.32 ≈ 52.32
BOS11–14 76.71 ≫ 63.05 ≈ 61.74 ≪ 82.94 ≈ 85.94 ≈ 82.94
BOS11–15 43.05 ≫ 27.05 ≫ 21.88 ≪ 39.63 < 42.63 > 39.63
BOS11–16 185.97 ≈ 180.95 ≈ 178.84 ≈ 179.08 ≈ 182.08 ≈ 179.08
BOS11–17 195.91 ≈ 192.93 ≈ 183.03 ≈ 191.79 ≈ 191.8 ≈ 191.79
BOS11–26 333.85 ≈ 319.54 ≈ 317.33 ≈ 356.49 ≈ 360.18 ≈ 356.49
BOS11–27 212.67 ≈ 214.41 ≈ 231.72 ≈ 227.96 ≈ 264.18 ≈ 274.26
BOS11–30 108.28 ≫ 94.64 ≈ 93.22 < 110.39 ≈ 113.38 > 110.39
BOS11–31 165.71 ≈ 185.95 ≈ 200.87 ≈ 200.12 ≈ 258.45 ≈ 264.92
BK12–28 891.89 ≈ 915.39 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 912.08 ≈ 912.08 ≈ 954.26
D05–18 368.35 > 356.04 ≈ 351.89 ≈ 365.9 ≈ 371.68 ≈ 365.9
D05–19 431.03 > 409.37 ≈ 418.28 ≈ 434.87 ≈ 434.87 ≈ 440.2
DF11–6 582.08 ≈ 590.39 ≈ 599.29 ≈ 633.64 ≈ 633.64 ≈ 699.58
DF11–7 1151.03 < 1197.17 ≈ 1199.27 ≈ 1202.39 ≈ 1202.39 ≈ 1242.46
DF11–8 924.45 ≪ 996.09 ≈ 985.67 ≈ 1062.54 ≈ 1076.28 < 1131.37
DF11–22 1294.96 ≈ 1327.01 ≈ 1331.85 < 1448.27 ≈ 1449.44 ≈ 1488.67
DF11–23 1099.92 ≈ 1135.01 ≈ 1113.94 ≈ 1185.1 ≈ 1191.64 ≈ 1294.05
DF11–24 1163.3 ≈ 1159.28 ≈ 1122.26 < 1260.31 ≈ 1260.31 ≈ 1296.29
DF15–4 298.7 ≫ 271.14 ≈ 260.02 < 299.84 ≈ 303.76 ≈ 299.84
DF15–5 1336.56 ≈ 1323.6 ≈ 1331.49 < 1424.58 ≈ 1428.82 ≈ 1445.66
DF15–20 1696.48 ≈ 1706.95 ≈ 1716.02 ≈ 1813.68 ≈ 1813.68 ≈ 1859.13
DF15–21 2186.41 ≈ 2233.11 ≈ 2213.88 ≪ 2409.31 ≈ 2420.98 < 2536.56
DF15–33 3618.5 ≈ 3612.75 < 3678.61 ≪ 4094.8 ≈ 4104.19 ≈ 4132.29
DF15–35 845.68 ≈ 858.27 ≈ 856.78 ≪ 1007.17 ≈ 1007.17 ≈ 1060.45
DRFN08–10 295.96 ≈ 289.36 ≈ 270.35 ≪ 313.54 ≈ 316.88 ≈ 313.54
DRFN08–11 413.33 ≈ 426.29 ≈ 425.89 ≈ 436.15 ≈ 439.24 ≈ 436.15
DO09–32 2559.15 ≈ 2571.83 ≈ 2526.02 ≪ 2779.15 ≈ 2782.83 ≈ 2823.45
FY17–25 497.71 ≈ 473.7 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 504.26 ≈ 508.97 ≈ 504.26
FRD12–29 658.78 ≈ 680.53 ≈ 668.18 < 765.61 ≈ 779.92 ≈ 826.75
KS13–12 2880.11 < 3005.9 ≈ 3009.28 ≈ 3032.91 ≈ 3032.91 ≈ 3114.31
STS13–13 1472.88 ≈ 1528.33 ≈ 1507.33 ≈ 1536.36 ≈ 1536.36 < 1624.89
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 1181.22 ≈ 1181.85 ≫ 1085.04 < 1226.63 ≈ 1270.08 ≈ 1294.67
Blonski et al. (2011) 1454.55 ≫ 1380.01 ≈ 1369.51 < 1478.83 ≈ 1604.02 ≫ 1581.88
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 891.89 ≈ 915.39 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 912.08 ≈ 912.08 ≈ 954.26
Dal Bó (2005) 804.34 ≫ 768.96 ≈ 772.3 ≈ 803.42 ≈ 810.09 ≈ 808.22
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6253.44 ≪ 6431.87 ≈ 6368.43 ≪ 6823.8 ≈ 6840.62 ≪ 7168.57
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10023.16 ≈ 10034.99 ≈ 10074.29 ≪ 11078.13 ≈ 11107.75 < 11351.42
Dreber et al. (2008) 714.19 ≈ 719.15 ≈ 698.35 < 751.8 ≈ 759.62 ≈ 751.8
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2559.15 ≈ 2571.83 ≈ 2526.02 ≪ 2779.15 ≈ 2782.83 ≈ 2823.45
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 497.71 ≈ 473.7 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 504.26 ≈ 508.97 ≈ 504.26
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 658.78 ≈ 680.53 ≈ 668.18 < 765.61 ≈ 779.92 ≈ 826.75
Kagel and Schley (2013) 2880.11 < 3005.9 ≈ 3009.28 ≈ 3032.91 ≈ 3032.91 ≈ 3114.31
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1472.88 ≈ 1528.33 ≈ 1507.33 ≈ 1536.36 ≈ 1536.36 < 1624.89
Pooled 29646.75 ≈ 29874.89 > 29578.81 ≪ 31865.03 ≈ 32127.63 ≪ 32913.9
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 26: 1- and 2-memory SG behavior strategies versus best mixtures (by treatment) of 1- and 2-memory pure strategies (Random
switching) (ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
SG+SG M2“General” SG M2“General” Semi-Grim Best Pure Pure 1+G2,T2 Pure 1
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 5 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 7 3 3 32 5 3
# Parameters accounted for 7 3 3 3-8 5 3
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 742.43 ≈ 742.13 ≫ 694.72 < 763.63 ≈ 763.63 ≈ 793.71
Blonski et al. (2011) 703.59 ≫ 585.39 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 652.22 ≪ 691.76 > 659.7
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 584.62 ≈ 570.41 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 577.25 ≈ 577.25 ≈ 594.09
Dal Bó (2005) 376.06 > 364.64 ≈ 358.51 ≈ 354.58 ≈ 356.82 ≈ 365.42
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3731.81 ≫ 3594.64 ≈ 3533.99 ≪ 3820.5 ≈ 3827.21 < 3954
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5276.54 ≫ 5006.42 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5270.22 ≈ 5273.98 ≪ 5396.28
Dreber et al. (2008) 466.07 > 451.44 ≈ 437.17 ≈ 452.15 ≈ 452.15 ≈ 467.69
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1109.16 ≈ 1089.19 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1100.74 ≈ 1100.74 ≈ 1119.78
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 201.85 ≫ 164.74 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 161.75 ≈ 164.76 ≈ 161.75
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 300.67 ≈ 298.69 ≈ 291.43 < 345.19 ≈ 345.19 < 371.76
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1805.7 ≈ 1787.59 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1788.69 ≈ 1788.69 < 1880.45
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 949.23 ≈ 924.56 ≈ 912.8 < 958.93 ≈ 958.93 ≈ 977.38
Pooled 16503.06 ≫ 15762.21 ≫ 15481.59 ≪ 16405.97 ≈ 16483.49 ≪ 16851.43
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 433.73 ≈ 433.04 ≫ 389.24 < 458.42 ≈ 472.12 ≈ 475.15
Blonski et al. (2011) 982.16 ≫ 888.46 ≈ 867.87 < 1007.94 ≈ 1030.01 > 1013.07
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 340.43 ≈ 342.01 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 340.21 ≈ 340.21 ≈ 365
Dal Bó (2005) 431.83 ≈ 422.93 ≈ 424.44 ≈ 442.7 ≈ 444.23 ≈ 450.36
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2882.8 ≈ 2842.94 ≈ 2817.31 ≪ 3124.7 ≈ 3124.9 ≪ 3340.71
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5132.38 ≫ 5027.27 ≈ 5043.81 ≪ 5527 ≈ 5539.56 ≪ 5794.56
Dreber et al. (2008) 278.6 ≈ 271.55 ≈ 264.94 ≈ 285.14 ≈ 285.14 ≈ 285.64
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1449.15 ≈ 1446.73 > 1403.03 ≪ 1587.69 ≈ 1587.69 < 1677.02
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 349.28 ≫ 315.35 ≈ 313.5 ≈ 334.45 ≈ 335.14 ≈ 334.45
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 394.42 ≈ 389.34 ≈ 380.75 ≪ 440.47 ≈ 440.47 < 488.69
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1204.73 ≈ 1208.7 ≈ 1211.37 ≈ 1240.91 ≈ 1240.91 < 1334.77
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 587.54 ≈ 596.62 ≈ 586.72 < 658.71 ≈ 658.71 < 740.5
Pooled 14722.38 ≫ 14367.31 ≫ 14159.8 ≪ 15620.2 ≈ 15681.45 ≪ 16409.35
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above, see Table 1. Pure M1 refers to TFT, Grim, and AD. G2 denotes Grim2.
For definitions of the strategies see Table 5.
Table 27: Table 26 by treatments – 1- and 2-memory SG behavior strategies versus best mixtures (by treatment) of 1- and 2-memory
pure strategies (Random switching)
(a) First halves per session
SG+SG M2“General” SG M2“General” Semi-Grim Best Pure Pure 1+G2,T2 Pure 1
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 5 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 7 3 3 32 5 3
# Parameters accounted for 7 3 3 3-8 5 3
AF09–34 742.43 ≈ 742.13 ≫ 694.72 < 763.63 ≈ 763.63 ≈ 793.71
BOS11–9 41.44 ≫ 29.54 ≈ 28.34 ≪ 43.78 ≈ 46.75 > 43.78
BOS11–14 46.79 ≈ 45.65 ≈ 43.74 ≪ 59.77 < 62.77 ≈ 59.77
BOS11–15 33.54 ≫ 17.23 ≫ 14.27 ≪ 29.95 ≈ 32.3 ≈ 29.95
BOS11–16 114.61 ≫ 102.32 ≈ 102.31 ≈ 105.02 ≈ 107.37 ≈ 105.02
BOS11–17 70.92 ≫ 54.59 ≈ 48.33 ≈ 53.64 ≈ 54.86 ≈ 53.64
BOS11–26 161.48 ≫ 136.72 ≈ 130.46 ≈ 131.55 ≈ 131.55 ≈ 140.64
BOS11–27 50.18 > 46.89 ≈ 49.15 ≈ 52.96 ≈ 57.74 ≈ 52.96
BOS11–30 36.26 ≫ 19.4 ≫ 15.97 ≪ 30.42 < 33.41 ≫ 30.42
BOS11–31 78.27 ≈ 82.99 ≈ 86.84 ≈ 113.47 ≈ 114.93 ≈ 113.47
BK12–28 584.62 ≈ 570.41 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 577.25 ≈ 577.25 ≈ 594.09
D05–18 145.45 ≈ 140.24 ≈ 136.21 ≈ 136.92 ≈ 138.27 ≈ 136.92
D05–19 225.65 ≈ 220.85 ≈ 220.17 ≈ 215.01 ≈ 215.01 ≈ 226.37
DF11–6 368.33 ≫ 337.83 ≈ 333.68 < 379.86 ≈ 383.44 ≈ 379.86
DF11–7 542.28 ≈ 525.23 ≈ 512.99 ≈ 543.64 ≈ 543.64 ≈ 562.91
DF11–8 565.18 ≈ 557.31 ≈ 551.81 < 602.66 ≈ 602.66 ≈ 628.99
DF11–22 706.17 ≈ 685.45 ≈ 684.04 < 736.15 ≈ 736.15 ≈ 748.98
DF11–23 684.75 ≈ 664.99 ≈ 656.29 ≈ 708.88 ≈ 709.16 ≈ 763.57
DF11–24 827.4 ≈ 796.91 ≈ 779.03 < 820.51 ≈ 825.22 ≈ 853.54
DF15–4 192.68 ≫ 160.51 ≈ 149.71 ≈ 158.61 ≈ 160.16 ≈ 158.61
DF15–5 792.08 ≫ 716.06 ≈ 716.51 ≈ 740.15 ≈ 740.15 ≈ 749.96
DF15–20 973.74 ≫ 916.66 ≈ 914.2 ≈ 933.92 ≈ 934.42 ≈ 956.21
DF15–21 1200.7 ≈ 1201.29 ≈ 1196.29 ≪ 1292.16 ≈ 1292.16 < 1355.35
DF15–33 1775.61 ≫ 1695.1 ≈ 1714.32 < 1807.19 ≈ 1807.19 < 1837.61
DF15–35 300.91 ≈ 287.64 ≈ 283.21 < 310.74 ≈ 310.74 ≈ 321.04
DRFN08–10 205.38 > 191.06 ≈ 180.96 ≈ 193.27 ≈ 193.27 ≈ 198.76
DRFN08–11 255.78 ≈ 256.88 ≈ 254.11 ≈ 255.38 ≈ 255.38 ≈ 266.82
DO09–32 1109.16 ≈ 1089.19 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1100.74 ≈ 1100.74 ≈ 1119.78
FY17–25 201.85 ≫ 164.74 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 161.75 ≈ 164.76 ≈ 161.75
FRD12–29 300.67 ≈ 298.69 ≈ 291.43 < 345.19 ≈ 345.19 < 371.76
KS13–12 1805.7 ≈ 1787.59 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1788.69 ≈ 1788.69 < 1880.45
STS13–13 949.23 ≈ 924.56 ≈ 912.8 < 958.93 ≈ 958.93 ≈ 977.38
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 742.43 ≈ 742.13 ≫ 694.72 < 763.63 ≈ 763.63 ≈ 793.71
Blonski et al. (2011) 703.59 ≫ 585.39 ≫ 549.45 ≪ 652.22 ≪ 691.76 > 659.7
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 584.62 ≈ 570.41 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 577.25 ≈ 577.25 ≈ 594.09
Dal Bó (2005) 376.06 > 364.64 ≈ 358.51 ≈ 354.58 ≈ 356.82 ≈ 365.42
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3731.81 ≫ 3594.64 ≈ 3533.99 ≪ 3820.5 ≈ 3827.21 < 3954
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5276.54 ≫ 5006.42 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5270.22 ≈ 5273.98 ≪ 5396.28
Dreber et al. (2008) 466.07 > 451.44 ≈ 437.17 ≈ 452.15 ≈ 452.15 ≈ 467.69
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1109.16 ≈ 1089.19 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1100.74 ≈ 1100.74 ≈ 1119.78
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 201.85 ≫ 164.74 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 161.75 ≈ 164.76 ≈ 161.75
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 300.67 ≈ 298.69 ≈ 291.43 < 345.19 ≈ 345.19 < 371.76
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1805.7 ≈ 1787.59 ≈ 1782.82 ≈ 1788.69 ≈ 1788.69 < 1880.45
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 949.23 ≈ 924.56 ≈ 912.8 < 958.93 ≈ 958.93 ≈ 977.38
Pooled 16503.06 ≫ 15762.21 ≫ 15481.59 ≪ 16405.97 ≈ 16483.49 ≪ 16851.43
(b) Second halves per session
SG+SG M2“General” SG M2“General” Semi-Grim Best Pure Pure 1+G2,T2 Pure 1
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 5 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 7 3 3 32 5 3
# Parameters accounted for 7 3 3 3-8 5 3
AF09–34 1179.28 ≈ 1181.85 ≫ 1085.04 < 1181.51 ≈ 1224.68 ≈ 1285.37
BOS11–9 63.01 ≫ 51.41 ≈ 50.83 ≈ 53.75 ≈ 56.08 ≈ 53.75
BOS11–14 64.89 ≈ 63.05 ≈ 61.74 ≪ 79.69 ≈ 82.68 ≈ 79.69
BOS11–15 43.35 ≫ 27.05 ≫ 21.88 ≪ 39.83 < 42.83 > 39.83
BOS11–16 191.76 > 180.95 ≈ 178.84 ≈ 185.23 ≈ 187.04 ≈ 185.23
BOS11–17 204.42 > 192.93 ≈ 183.03 ≈ 182.96 ≈ 182.96 ≈ 190.04
BOS11–26 325.24 ≈ 319.54 ≈ 317.33 ≈ 333.23 ≈ 333.23 ≈ 346.08
BOS11–27 211.62 ≈ 214.41 ≈ 231.72 ≈ 231.87 ≈ 273.97 ≈ 278.86
BOS11–30 97.9 > 94.64 ≈ 93.22 ≈ 100.92 ≈ 103.29 > 100.92
BOS11–31 182.3 ≈ 185.95 ≈ 200.87 ≈ 200.12 ≈ 257.66 ≈ 262.92
BK12–28 917.97 ≈ 915.39 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 925.14 ≈ 925.14 ≈ 965.14
D05–18 358.5 ≈ 356.04 ≈ 351.89 ≈ 360.79 ≈ 360.99 ≈ 363.86
D05–19 413.11 ≈ 409.37 ≈ 418.28 ≈ 408.94 ≈ 408.94 < 433.08
DF11–6 600.01 ≈ 590.39 ≈ 599.29 < 679.08 ≈ 683.84 ≈ 688.5
DF11–7 1198.54 ≈ 1197.17 ≈ 1199.27 ≈ 1254.39 ≈ 1265.17 ≈ 1283.74
DF11–8 998.29 ≈ 996.09 ≈ 985.67 ≪ 1081.5 ≈ 1101.14 ≪ 1188.89
DF11–22 1338.1 ≈ 1327.01 ≈ 1331.85 ≈ 1428.96 ≈ 1435.69 < 1505.29
DF11–23 1152.49 ≈ 1135.01 ≈ 1113.94 ≈ 1195.43 ≈ 1199.3 < 1328.31
DF11–24 1160.83 ≈ 1159.28 ≈ 1122.26 < 1184.99 ≈ 1228.87 ≈ 1292.35
DF15–4 290.61 ≫ 271.14 ≈ 260.02 ≈ 279.04 ≈ 286.23 ≈ 279.04
DF15–5 1374.54 ≫ 1323.6 ≈ 1331.49 < 1387.72 ≈ 1406.13 ≈ 1436.3
DF15–20 1711.95 ≈ 1706.95 ≈ 1716.02 ≈ 1774.86 ≈ 1775.13 ≈ 1843.19
DF15–21 2224.28 ≈ 2233.11 ≈ 2213.88 ≪ 2351.46 ≈ 2398.7 ≪ 2559.42
DF15–33 3596.04 ≈ 3612.75 < 3678.61 < 3913.78 ≈ 3938.37 < 4057.14
DF15–35 857.8 ≈ 858.27 ≈ 856.78 < 972.61 ≈ 976.66 ≈ 1044.55
DRFN08–10 287.54 ≈ 289.36 ≈ 270.35 < 300.31 ≈ 303.13 ≈ 312.98
DRFN08–11 424.73 ≈ 426.29 ≈ 425.89 ≈ 422.42 ≈ 422.42 ≈ 435.07
DO09–32 2572.48 ≈ 2571.83 ≈ 2526.02 < 2671.36 ≈ 2708.22 < 2812.9
FY17–25 499.9 > 473.7 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 489.74 ≈ 489.74 ≈ 489.83
FRD12–29 688.96 ≈ 680.53 ≈ 668.18 < 745.36 ≈ 766.51 < 837.05
KS13–12 3006.47 ≈ 3005.9 ≈ 3009.28 ≈ 3034.78 ≈ 3037.65 < 3227.41
STS13–13 1532.56 ≈ 1528.33 ≈ 1507.33 < 1606.75 ≈ 1620.49 < 1703.85
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 1179.28 ≈ 1181.85 ≫ 1085.04 < 1181.51 ≈ 1224.68 ≈ 1285.37
Blonski et al. (2011) 1454.6 ≫ 1380.01 ≈ 1369.51 < 1448.45 ≈ 1569.81 ≈ 1567.35
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 917.97 ≈ 915.39 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 925.14 ≈ 925.14 ≈ 965.14
Dal Bó (2005) 776.57 ≈ 768.96 ≈ 772.3 ≈ 773.72 ≈ 773.48 < 799.07
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6485.95 ≈ 6431.87 ≈ 6368.43 ≪ 6859.43 ≈ 6940.94 ≪ 7303.24
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10096.04 ≈ 10034.99 ≈ 10074.29 ≪ 10710.57 ≈ 10810.38 ≪ 11237.13
Dreber et al. (2008) 717.17 ≈ 719.15 ≈ 698.35 ≈ 726.52 ≈ 729.05 ≈ 750.15
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2572.48 ≈ 2571.83 ≈ 2526.02 < 2671.36 ≈ 2708.22 < 2812.9
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 499.9 > 473.7 ≈ 473.84 ≈ 489.74 ≈ 489.74 ≈ 489.83
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 688.96 ≈ 680.53 ≈ 668.18 < 745.36 ≈ 766.51 < 837.05
Kagel and Schley (2013) 3006.47 ≈ 3005.9 ≈ 3009.28 ≈ 3034.78 ≈ 3037.65 < 3227.41
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1532.56 ≈ 1528.33 ≈ 1507.33 < 1606.75 ≈ 1620.49 < 1703.85
Pooled 30183.29 ≫ 29874.89 > 29578.81 ≪ 31380.44 < 31778.47 ≪ 33087.89
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 28: 1-memory or 2-memory Semi-Grim strategies, complexity of memory, mixtures of 1-memory and 2-memory SG (no
switching) (ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
SG M2“General” SG M2“Semi-Grim” SG M2“Grim” Semi-Grim SG M1 + M2“Grim” SG M1 + M2“General”
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 4 3 3 5 7
# Parameters accounted for 5 4 3 3 5 7
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 742.13 ≈ 740.41 ≈ 738.78 ≫ 694.72 ≈ 740.47 ≈ 743.27
Blonski et al. (2011) 585.39 ≈ 570.96 ≫ 551.67 ≈ 549.45 ≪ 681.49 ≪ 714.05
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 570.41 ≈ 568.94 ≈ 567.81 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 569.25 ≈ 569.55
Dal Bó (2005) 364.64 ≈ 360.06 ≈ 359.02 ≈ 358.51 ≪ 395.42 ≪ 418.7
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3594.64 ≈ 3588.23 ≈ 3577.91 ≈ 3533.99 ≈ 3557.12 ≈ 3576.96
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5006.42 ≈ 5011.68 ≈ 5002.07 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5225.84 ≈ 5259.73
Dreber et al. (2008) 451.44 ≈ 447.65 ≈ 444.6 ≈ 437.17 ≈ 454.47 ≈ 455.41
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1089.19 ≈ 1088.56 ≈ 1087.11 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1109.13 ≈ 1109.16
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 164.74 ≈ 162.94 ≈ 161.74 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 165.9 ≈ 169.85
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 298.69 ≈ 300.14 ≈ 298.27 ≈ 291.43 < 310.29 ≈ 313.25
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1787.59 ≈ 1785.44 ≈ 1783.73 ≈ 1782.82 > 1736.56 ≈ 1739.6
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 924.56 ≈ 925.17 ≈ 923.27 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 916.4 ≈ 918.43
Pooled 15762.21 ≈ 15696.08 > 15605.39 > 15481.59 ≪ 16044.72 ≪ 16243.29
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 433.04 ≈ 431.24 ≈ 430.13 > 389.24 < 436.18 ≈ 438.02
Blonski et al. (2011) 888.46 ≈ 889.64 > 879.23 > 867.87 < 962.97 ≈ 990.65
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 342.01 ≈ 340.72 ≈ 342.71 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 335.98 ≈ 333.93
Dal Bó (2005) 422.93 ≈ 419.05 ≈ 423.8 ≈ 424.44 ≪ 479.26 ≈ 475.76
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2842.94 ≈ 2844.4 ≈ 2835.16 ≈ 2817.31 ≈ 2745.37 ≈ 2759
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5027.27 ≈ 5059.55 ≈ 5058.67 ≈ 5043.81 ≈ 5128.18 ≈ 5109.14
Dreber et al. (2008) 271.55 ≈ 269.42 ≈ 266.02 ≈ 264.94 ≈ 267.81 ≈ 271.58
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1446.73 ≈ 1444.42 ≈ 1442.23 ≈ 1403.03 ≈ 1461.69 ≈ 1462.25
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 315.35 ≈ 316.49 ≈ 314.7 ≈ 313.5 ≪ 333.42 < 348.67
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 389.34 ≈ 387.59 ≈ 385.81 ≈ 380.75 ≈ 384.43 ≈ 386.55
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1208.7 ≈ 1207.68 ≈ 1206.72 ≈ 1211.37 > 1156.83 ≈ 1161.49
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 596.62 ≈ 596.25 ≈ 595.17 ≈ 586.72 ≈ 554.97 ≈ 551.82
Pooled 14367.31 ≈ 14352.35 ≈ 14289.77 > 14159.8 < 14429.45 ≈ 14544.19
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above.
Table 29: Table 28 by treatments – 1-memory or 2-memory Semi-Grim strategies, complexity of memory, mixtures of 1-memory
and 2-memory SG (no switching)
(a) First halves per session
SG M2“General” SG M2“Semi-Grim” SG M2“Grim” Semi-Grim SG M1 + M2“Grim” SG M1 + M2“General”
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 4 3 3 5 7
# Parameters accounted for 5 4 3 3 5 7
AF09–34 742.13 ≈ 740.41 ≈ 738.78 ≫ 694.72 ≈ 740.47 ≈ 743.27
BOS11–9 29.54 ≈ 28.04 ≈ 28.15 ≈ 28.34 ≪ 43.69 ≈ 44.2
BOS11–14 45.65 ≈ 44.8 ≈ 43.39 ≈ 43.74 ≪ 56.61 ≈ 51.98
BOS11–15 17.23 > 15.73 > 14.23 ≈ 14.27 ≪ 30.2 ≪ 33.19
BOS11–16 102.32 ≈ 101.02 ≈ 100.59 ≈ 102.31 < 113.78 ≈ 114.86
BOS11–17 54.59 ≈ 53.09 ≈ 51.86 ≈ 48.33 ≪ 68.7 ≈ 71.21
BOS11–26 136.72 ≈ 135.26 ≈ 133.94 ≈ 130.46 ≪ 157.04 ≈ 158.29
BOS11–27 46.89 ≈ 46.76 ≈ 46.18 ≈ 49.15 ≈ 53.4 ≈ 55.81
BOS11–30 19.4 ≫ 17.9 ≫ 16.4 ≈ 15.97 ≪ 33.26 < 36.25
BOS11–31 82.99 ≈ 88.31 ≈ 86.87 ≈ 86.84 ≈ 74.74 ≈ 78.15
BK12–28 570.41 ≈ 568.94 ≈ 567.81 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 569.25 ≈ 569.55
D05–18 140.24 ≈ 138.37 ≈ 136.52 ≈ 136.21 ≪ 165.24 ≈ 161.88
D05–19 220.85 ≈ 218.85 ≈ 220.37 ≈ 220.17 ≈ 226.64 ≪ 251.86
DF11–6 337.83 ≈ 339.19 ≈ 337.3 ≈ 333.68 ≈ 339.43 ≈ 346.41
DF11–7 525.23 ≈ 528.44 ≈ 527.32 ≈ 512.99 ≈ 526.64 ≈ 530.12
DF11–8 557.31 ≈ 557.06 ≈ 555.25 ≈ 551.81 ≈ 524.93 ≈ 525.4
DF11–22 685.45 ≈ 683.66 ≈ 686.66 ≈ 684.04 ≈ 691.45 ≈ 693.27
DF11–23 664.99 ≈ 663.28 ≈ 661.46 ≈ 656.29 ≈ 657.42 ≈ 653.29
DF11–24 796.91 ≈ 795.06 ≈ 793.78 ≈ 779.03 ≈ 790.32 ≈ 790.78
DF15–4 160.51 ≈ 158.66 ≈ 157.78 ≈ 149.71 ≪ 186.25 ≈ 189.64
DF15–5 716.06 ≈ 714.63 ≈ 712.46 ≈ 716.51 ≪ 780.89 ≈ 785.3
DF15–20 916.66 ≈ 917.24 ≈ 916.3 ≈ 914.2 ≪ 963.41 ≈ 955.65
DF15–21 1201.29 ≈ 1198.83 ≈ 1196.6 ≈ 1196.29 ≈ 1211.55 ≈ 1228.04
DF15–33 1695.1 ≈ 1711.9 ≈ 1716.1 ≈ 1714.32 < 1763.72 ≈ 1766.98
DF15–35 287.64 ≈ 287.1 ≈ 285.35 ≈ 283.21 ≈ 290.86 ≈ 293.3
DRFN08–10 191.06 ≈ 189.47 ≈ 187.8 ≈ 180.96 < 198.75 ≈ 195.66
DRFN08–11 256.88 ≈ 255.38 ≈ 254.69 ≈ 254.11 ≈ 252.22 ≈ 254.85
DO09–32 1089.19 ≈ 1088.56 ≈ 1087.11 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1109.13 ≈ 1109.16
FY17–25 164.74 ≈ 162.94 ≈ 161.74 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 165.9 ≈ 169.85
FRD12–29 298.69 ≈ 300.14 ≈ 298.27 ≈ 291.43 < 310.29 ≈ 313.25
KS13–12 1787.59 ≈ 1785.44 ≈ 1783.73 ≈ 1782.82 > 1736.56 ≈ 1739.6
STS13–13 924.56 ≈ 925.17 ≈ 923.27 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 916.4 ≈ 918.43
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 742.13 ≈ 740.41 ≈ 738.78 ≫ 694.72 ≈ 740.47 ≈ 743.27
Blonski et al. (2011) 585.39 ≈ 570.96 ≫ 551.67 ≈ 549.45 ≪ 681.49 ≪ 714.05
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 570.41 ≈ 568.94 ≈ 567.81 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 569.25 ≈ 569.55
Dal Bó (2005) 364.64 ≈ 360.06 ≈ 359.02 ≈ 358.51 ≪ 395.42 ≪ 418.7
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3594.64 ≈ 3588.23 ≈ 3577.91 ≈ 3533.99 ≈ 3557.12 ≈ 3576.96
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5006.42 ≈ 5011.68 ≈ 5002.07 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5225.84 ≈ 5259.73
Dreber et al. (2008) 451.44 ≈ 447.65 ≈ 444.6 ≈ 437.17 ≈ 454.47 ≈ 455.41
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1089.19 ≈ 1088.56 ≈ 1087.11 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1109.13 ≈ 1109.16
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 164.74 ≈ 162.94 ≈ 161.74 ≈ 161.45 ≈ 165.9 ≈ 169.85
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 298.69 ≈ 300.14 ≈ 298.27 ≈ 291.43 < 310.29 ≈ 313.25
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1787.59 ≈ 1785.44 ≈ 1783.73 ≈ 1782.82 > 1736.56 ≈ 1739.6
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 924.56 ≈ 925.17 ≈ 923.27 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 916.4 ≈ 918.43
Pooled 15762.21 ≈ 15696.08 > 15605.39 > 15481.59 ≪ 16044.72 ≪ 16243.29
(b) Second halves per session
SG M2“General” SG M2“Semi-Grim” SG M2“Grim” Semi-Grim SG M1 + M2“Grim” SG M1 + M2“General”
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 4 3 3 5 7
# Parameters accounted for 5 4 3 3 5 7
AF09–34 1181.85 ≈ 1180.06 ≈ 1178.95 ≫ 1085.04 < 1179.77 ≈ 1181.23
BOS11–9 51.41 ≈ 50.6 ≈ 50.3 ≈ 50.83 ≪ 64.15 ≈ 62.29
BOS11–14 63.05 ≈ 62.16 ≈ 61.57 ≈ 61.74 ≪ 78.27 ≈ 76.73
BOS11–15 27.05 > 25.55 > 24.05 > 21.88 ≪ 40.08 < 43.07
BOS11–16 180.95 ≈ 179.45 ≈ 178.66 ≈ 178.84 ≈ 185.48 ≈ 185.96
BOS11–17 192.93 ≈ 191.5 ≈ 190 ≈ 183.03 < 205.05 ≈ 195.93
BOS11–26 319.54 ≈ 317.83 ≈ 318.19 ≈ 317.33 ≈ 331.68 ≈ 333.84
BOS11–27 214.41 ≈ 229.34 ≈ 235.12 ≈ 231.72 ≈ 217.95 ≈ 212.66
BOS11–30 94.64 > 93.32 ≈ 93.07 ≈ 93.22 ≈ 105.76 ≈ 108.3
BOS11–31 185.95 ≈ 198.29 ≈ 200.1 ≈ 200.87 ≈ 166.11 ≈ 165.7
BK12–28 915.39 ≈ 914.36 ≈ 915.95 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 895.53 ≈ 891.9
D05–18 356.04 ≈ 354.4 ≈ 352.82 ≈ 351.89 ≪ 378.37 ≈ 368.38
D05–19 409.37 ≈ 407.41 ≈ 417.01 ≈ 418.28 ≈ 420.37 ≈ 431.08
DF11–6 590.39 ≈ 596.23 ≈ 595.49 ≈ 599.29 ≈ 579.49 ≈ 582.07
DF11–7 1197.17 ≈ 1205.8 ≈ 1204.41 ≈ 1199.27 ≈ 1153.19 ≈ 1151.03
DF11–8 996.09 ≈ 999.9 ≈ 998.05 ≈ 985.67 ≈ 915.18 ≈ 924.46
DF11–22 1327.01 ≈ 1326.07 ≈ 1332.1 ≈ 1331.85 ≈ 1293.25 ≈ 1294.96
DF11–23 1135.01 ≈ 1133.45 ≈ 1131.71 ≈ 1113.94 ≈ 1099.02 ≈ 1099.93
DF11–24 1159.28 ≈ 1157.61 ≈ 1156.21 ≈ 1122.26 ≈ 1161.89 ≈ 1163.33
DF15–4 271.14 ≈ 269.69 ≈ 269.21 ≈ 260.02 ≪ 296.55 ≈ 297.48
DF15–5 1323.6 ≈ 1324.74 ≈ 1323.34 ≈ 1331.49 ≈ 1332.32 ≈ 1336.61
DF15–20 1706.95 ≈ 1714.68 ≈ 1717.74 ≈ 1716.02 ≈ 1691.17 ≈ 1696.55
DF15–21 2233.11 ≈ 2231.36 ≈ 2229.41 ≈ 2213.88 ≈ 2182.89 ≈ 2186.44
DF15–33 3612.75 ≈ 3661.3 ≈ 3679 ≈ 3678.61 ≈ 3682.31 ≈ 3618.49
DF15–35 858.27 ≈ 862.75 ≈ 863.47 ≈ 856.78 ≈ 845.23 ≈ 845.69
DRFN08–10 289.36 ≈ 287.86 ≈ 286.23 ≈ 270.35 ≈ 292.64 ≈ 295.95
DRFN08–11 426.29 ≈ 425.3 ≈ 424.52 ≈ 425.89 ≈ 411.22 ≈ 413.33
DO09–32 2571.83 ≈ 2570.1 ≈ 2568.54 ≈ 2526.02 ≈ 2557.19 ≈ 2559.18
FY17–25 473.7 ≈ 474.86 ≈ 473.42 ≈ 473.84 < 490.2 ≈ 497.64
FRD12–29 680.53 ≈ 681.05 ≈ 679.32 ≈ 668.18 ≈ 656.01 ≈ 658.77
KS13–12 3005.9 ≈ 3004.83 ≈ 3004.85 ≈ 3009.28 ≫ 2876.28 ≈ 2880.12
STS13–13 1528.33 ≈ 1530.53 ≈ 1529.48 ≈ 1507.33 ≈ 1469.2 ≈ 1472.88
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 1181.85 ≈ 1180.06 ≈ 1178.95 ≫ 1085.04 < 1179.77 ≈ 1181.23
Blonski et al. (2011) 1380.01 ≈ 1388.1 ≈ 1381.12 ≈ 1369.51 ≈ 1444.6 ≈ 1454.59
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 915.39 ≈ 914.36 ≈ 915.95 ≈ 916.81 ≈ 895.53 ≈ 891.9
Dal Bó (2005) 768.96 ≈ 764.65 ≈ 771.96 ≈ 772.3 < 802.29 ≈ 804.41
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6431.87 ≈ 6440.62 ≈ 6434.12 ≈ 6368.43 ≈ 6228.94 ≈ 6253.48
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10034.99 ≈ 10087.85 ≈ 10099.67 ≈ 10074.29 ≈ 10059.64 ≈ 10022.08
Dreber et al. (2008) 719.15 ≈ 715.96 ≈ 712.86 ≈ 698.35 ≈ 707.36 ≈ 714.18
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2571.83 ≈ 2570.1 ≈ 2568.54 ≈ 2526.02 ≈ 2557.19 ≈ 2559.18
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 473.7 ≈ 474.86 ≈ 473.42 ≈ 473.84 < 490.2 ≈ 497.64
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 680.53 ≈ 681.05 ≈ 679.32 ≈ 668.18 ≈ 656.01 ≈ 658.77
Kagel and Schley (2013) 3005.9 ≈ 3004.83 ≈ 3004.85 ≈ 3009.28 ≫ 2876.28 ≈ 2880.12
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1528.33 ≈ 1530.53 ≈ 1529.48 ≈ 1507.33 ≈ 1469.2 ≈ 1472.88
Pooled 29874.89 ≈ 29898.86 ≈ 29859.67 ≫ 29578.81 ≈ 29549.38 ≈ 29645.79
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 30: Mixtures of 1- and 2-memory pure and generalized strategies (no switching)
(ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
Gen M2 Gen M1 Best Pure M2 Pure M1 + G2, TFT2, T2 + 2TFT
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 5 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 9 6 32 3 6 7
# Parameters accounted for 9 6 3–8 3 6 7
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 649.81 ≈ 645.32 ≪ 791.39 ≈ 800.02 ≈ 797.53 ≈ 799.33
Blonski et al. (2011) 767.03 ≈ 748.97 ≈ 705.79 ≈ 708.13 ≪ 764.55 ≪ 795.15
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 581.45 ≈ 617.33 ≈ 588.54 ≈ 603.32 ≈ 590.34 ≈ 592.12
Dal Bó (2005) 402.78 ≈ 407.86 ≈ 389.07 ≈ 394.44 ≈ 398.94 ≪ 414.37
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3577.56 ≈ 3624.47 ≪ 3835.49 < 3934.17 ≈ 3848.71 ≈ 3866.15
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5349.43 ≈ 5355.13 ≪ 5538.04 ≈ 5595.6 ≈ 5573.66 ≈ 5609.72
Dreber et al. (2008) 487.89 ≈ 479.28 > 462.71 ≈ 462.71 ≈ 473.97 ≈ 479.06
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1059.59 ≈ 1056.99 ≈ 1102.65 ≈ 1132.23 ≈ 1106.99 ≈ 1116.34
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 188.15 ≈ 188.5 ≈ 181.98 ≈ 181.98 ≪ 195.97 < 202.98
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 322.89 ≈ 324.36 < 366.75 ≈ 375.41 ≈ 368.71 ≈ 370.66
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1684.63 < 1779.94 ≈ 1805.95 ≈ 1818.46 ≈ 1808.32 ≈ 1812.67
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 896.24 ≈ 903.93 ≈ 941.92 ≈ 960.83 ≈ 943.92 ≈ 946.88
Pooled 16295.72 ≈ 16350.93 ≪ 16862.01 < 17076.73 ≈ 17090.45 < 17260.76
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 365.6 ≈ 363.58 ≪ 484.4 ≈ 487.16 ≈ 490.13 ≈ 488.8
Blonski et al. (2011) 1022.73 ≈ 1094.17 ≈ 1056 ≈ 1067.5 ≈ 1108.59 ≈ 1147.6
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 340.71 ≈ 348.23 ≈ 316.38 ≈ 343.47 ≈ 318.17 ≈ 319.93
Dal Bó (2005) 471.65 ≈ 475.11 ≈ 463.52 ≈ 464.42 ≈ 476.02 ≈ 483.87
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2706.97 ≪ 2988.87 ≈ 2880.23 ≪ 3251.2 ≫ 2903.67 ≈ 2914.93
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5227.69 < 5448.95 ≈ 5577.08 ≪ 5853.69 ≫ 5603.14 ≈ 5635.29
Dreber et al. (2008) 288.95 ≈ 295.06 ≈ 287.58 ≈ 287.58 < 298.37 ≈ 301.17
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1370.98 ≈ 1409.56 ≪ 1617.77 ≈ 1661.56 ≈ 1620.05 ≈ 1622.69
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 311.99 ≈ 309.63 ≪ 356.11 ≈ 356.11 ≈ 362.81 ≈ 364.77
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 364.47 ≈ 373.44 < 447.19 ≈ 476.66 > 449.08 ≈ 449.92
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1128.24 ≈ 1211.25 ≈ 1169.31 < 1274.78 > 1171.67 ≈ 1172
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 551.88 < 616.19 ≈ 583.8 ≪ 691.06 ≫ 585.8 ≈ 587.81
Pooled 14480.14 ≪ 15152.88 ≈ 15396.72 ≪ 16324.6 ≫ 15606.38 ≈ 15744.12
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above, see Table 1. Pure M1 refers to TFT, Grim, and AD. G2 denotes Grim2.
For definitions of pure strategies see Table 5. Gen M1 refers to generalized versions of TFT, Grim, and AD with memory-1. “+ G2, TFT2, T2” adds those
strategies to the set of “Pure M1”. “+2TFT” adds this strategy on top of the former.
Table 31: Table 30 by treatments – Mixtures of 1- and 2-memory pure and generalized strategies (no switching)
(a) First halves per session
Gen M2 Gen M1 Best Pure M2 Pure M1 + G2, TFT2, T2 + 2TFT
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 5 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 9 6 32 3 6 7
# Parameters accounted for 9 6 3–8 3 6 7
AF09–34 649.81 ≈ 645.32 ≪ 791.39 ≈ 800.02 ≈ 797.53 ≈ 799.33
BOS11–9 42.83 ≈ 39.68 ≪ 47.66 ≈ 47.66 ≪ 52.51 ≈ 54.13
BOS11–14 68.28 ≈ 72.3 ≫ 61.41 ≈ 61.41 < 65.9 ≈ 67.38
BOS11–15 45.19 ≈ 42.36 ≫ 29.87 ≈ 29.87 ≪ 34.37 ≈ 35.93
BOS11–16 110.81 ≈ 106.93 ≈ 109.88 ≈ 109.88 ≈ 114.37 ≈ 118.13
BOS11–17 56.33 ≈ 56.31 ≫ 48.65 ≈ 48.65 ≈ 52.5 ≈ 53.99
BOS11–26 164.22 ≈ 168.38 ≈ 162.85 ≈ 162.85 ≈ 163.53 < 167.5
BOS11–27 57.51 < 71.67 > 61.4 ≈ 67.19 ≈ 61.4 ≈ 62.62
BOS11–30 47.12 ≫ 42.87 ≫ 30.39 ≈ 30.39 ≪ 35.13 ≈ 36.68
BOS11–31 84.61 ≈ 88.38 ≈ 120.17 ≈ 120.17 ≈ 124.75 ≈ 128.69
BK12–28 581.45 ≈ 617.33 ≈ 588.54 ≈ 603.32 ≈ 590.34 ≈ 592.12
D05–18 161.9 ≈ 154.75 ≈ 153.78 ≈ 153.78 ≈ 159.8 < 165.13
D05–19 234.5 ≈ 248.85 > 232.63 ≈ 238.53 ≈ 234.88 < 244.28
DF11–6 335.02 ≈ 339.47 ≈ 368.99 ≈ 389.67 ≈ 370.93 ≈ 372.82
DF11–7 535.47 ≈ 526.77 < 565.34 ≈ 566.75 ≈ 567.52 ≈ 569.45
DF11–8 553.44 < 619.1 ≈ 568.74 < 613.19 ≈ 569.64 ≈ 569.91
DF11–22 693.74 ≈ 707.69 < 756.01 ≈ 758.47 ≈ 757.9 ≈ 761.76
DF11–23 641.88 ≈ 658.75 < 718.87 ≈ 746.74 ≈ 720.7 ≈ 722.73
DF11–24 769.56 ≈ 740.38 < 829.71 ≈ 843.2 ≈ 829.71 ≈ 831.79
DF15–4 177.53 ≈ 175.94 ≈ 170.85 ≈ 170.85 < 176.64 < 183.07
DF15–5 738.21 ≈ 737.26 ≈ 772.27 ≈ 775.66 ≈ 774.65 ≈ 777.35
DF15–20 952.67 ≈ 960.95 ≈ 999.39 ≈ 1005.78 ≈ 1002.08 ≈ 1012.09
DF15–21 1268.05 ≈ 1269 < 1335.48 ≈ 1389.45 > 1337.99 ≈ 1341.36
DF15–33 1857.19 ≈ 1865.4 ≈ 1900.52 ≈ 1900.52 ≈ 1909.83 ≈ 1915.81
DF15–35 303.29 ≈ 311.6 ≈ 334.35 ≈ 335.83 ≈ 337.48 ≈ 339.22
DRFN08–10 215.08 ≈ 210.6 > 200.93 ≈ 200.93 ≈ 205.93 ≈ 207.6
DRFN08–11 266.5 ≈ 264.48 ≈ 259.68 ≈ 259.68 ≈ 263.84 ≈ 266.56
DO09–32 1059.59 ≈ 1056.99 ≈ 1102.65 ≈ 1132.23 ≈ 1106.99 ≈ 1116.34
FY17–25 188.15 ≈ 188.5 ≈ 181.98 ≈ 181.98 ≪ 195.97 < 202.98
FRD12–29 322.89 ≈ 324.36 < 366.75 ≈ 375.41 ≈ 368.71 ≈ 370.66
KS13–12 1684.63 < 1779.94 ≈ 1805.95 ≈ 1818.46 ≈ 1808.32 ≈ 1812.67
STS13–13 896.24 ≈ 903.93 ≈ 941.92 ≈ 960.83 ≈ 943.92 ≈ 946.88
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 649.81 ≈ 645.32 ≪ 791.39 ≈ 800.02 ≈ 797.53 ≈ 799.33
Blonski et al. (2011) 767.03 ≈ 748.97 ≈ 705.79 ≈ 708.13 ≪ 764.55 ≪ 795.15
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 581.45 ≈ 617.33 ≈ 588.54 ≈ 603.32 ≈ 590.34 ≈ 592.12
Dal Bó (2005) 402.78 ≈ 407.86 ≈ 389.07 ≈ 394.44 ≈ 398.94 ≪ 414.37
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3577.56 ≈ 3624.47 ≪ 3835.49 < 3934.17 ≈ 3848.71 ≈ 3866.15
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5349.43 ≈ 5355.13 ≪ 5538.04 ≈ 5595.6 ≈ 5573.66 ≈ 5609.72
Dreber et al. (2008) 487.89 ≈ 479.28 > 462.71 ≈ 462.71 ≈ 473.97 ≈ 479.06
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1059.59 ≈ 1056.99 ≈ 1102.65 ≈ 1132.23 ≈ 1106.99 ≈ 1116.34
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 188.15 ≈ 188.5 ≈ 181.98 ≈ 181.98 ≪ 195.97 < 202.98
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 322.89 ≈ 324.36 < 366.75 ≈ 375.41 ≈ 368.71 ≈ 370.66
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1684.63 < 1779.94 ≈ 1805.95 ≈ 1818.46 ≈ 1808.32 ≈ 1812.67
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 896.24 ≈ 903.93 ≈ 941.92 ≈ 960.83 ≈ 943.92 ≈ 946.88
Pooled 16295.72 ≈ 16350.93 ≪ 16862.01 < 17076.73 ≈ 17090.45 < 17260.76
(b) Second halves per session
Gen M2 Gen M1 Best Pure M2 Pure M1 + G2, TFT2, T2 + 2TFT
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 5 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 9 6 32 3 6 7
# Parameters accounted for 9 6 3–8 3 6 7
AF09–34 1002.43 ≈ 999.39 ≪ 1257.49 ≈ 1294.67 > 1258.18 ≈ 1257.49
BOS11–9 65.74 ≈ 56.83 > 52.33 ≈ 52.33 < 56.83 ≈ 58.33
BOS11–14 76.34 ≈ 75.9 ≈ 82.94 ≈ 82.94 < 87.44 ≈ 88.94
BOS11–15 54.87 > 52.15 ≫ 39.65 ≈ 39.65 ≪ 44.14 ≈ 45.76
BOS11–16 176.37 ≈ 170.31 ≈ 179.09 ≈ 179.09 ≈ 183.58 ≈ 185.1
BOS11–17 198.2 ≈ 194.51 ≈ 191.8 ≈ 191.8 ≈ 193.3 ≈ 194.79
BOS11–26 336.31 < 366.5 ≈ 356.53 ≈ 356.53 ≈ 362.07 ≈ 366.54
BOS11–27 220.67 ≈ 276.32 ≈ 264.28 ≈ 274.29 ≈ 265.78 ≈ 267.39
BOS11–30 105.65 ≈ 116.18 > 110.41 ≈ 110.41 ≈ 114.91 ≈ 116.4
BOS11–31 183.03 ≈ 268.96 ≈ 258.45 ≈ 264.93 ≈ 259.95 ≈ 261.45
BK12–28 911.92 ≈ 948.27 ≈ 912.09 ≈ 954.26 ≈ 913.88 ≈ 915.75
D05–18 359.61 ≈ 360.73 ≈ 365.93 ≈ 365.93 ≈ 373.59 ≈ 378.69
D05–19 423.98 ≈ 442.98 ≈ 434.95 ≈ 440.25 ≈ 437.41 ≈ 441.34
DF11–6 556.98 ≈ 584.49 ≈ 633.71 ≈ 699.65 ≈ 635.6 ≈ 637.42
DF11–7 1126.45 ≈ 1135.74 ≈ 1202.27 ≈ 1242.47 ≈ 1204.37 ≈ 1206.28
DF11–8 986.17 ≈ 1007.13 ≈ 1076.28 < 1131.38 ≈ 1078.2 ≈ 1079.16
DF11–22 1355.57 < 1469.16 ≈ 1448.29 ≈ 1488.69 ≈ 1451.35 ≈ 1448.29
DF11–23 1068.94 ≈ 1105.85 ≈ 1185.24 ≈ 1294.05 > 1193.61 ≈ 1185.24
DF11–24 1080.01 ≈ 1083.47 < 1259 ≈ 1296.29 ≈ 1259 ≈ 1261.46
DF15–4 286.93 ≈ 298.69 ≈ 299.85 ≈ 299.85 ≈ 305.71 ≈ 309.31
DF15–5 1350.25 ≈ 1350.84 < 1428.84 ≈ 1445.69 ≈ 1431.31 ≈ 1441.57
DF15–20 1720.89 ≈ 1770.03 ≈ 1813.65 ≈ 1859.17 ≈ 1816.08 ≈ 1823.16
DF15–21 2240.55 < 2345.14 ≈ 2421.02 < 2536.56 > 2423.58 ≈ 2432.56
DF15–33 3798.6 ≪ 3964.95 < 4103.22 ≈ 4132.33 ≈ 4103.22 ≈ 4106.97
DF15–35 907.25 ≈ 1020.65 ≈ 1007.18 ≈ 1060.46 > 1008.97 ≈ 1010.76
DRFN08–10 315.81 ≈ 314.76 ≈ 313.57 ≈ 313.57 ≈ 318.57 ≈ 320.24
DRFN08–11 425.55 ≈ 419.57 ≈ 436.15 ≈ 436.15 ≈ 440.79 ≈ 436.94
DO09–32 2428.38 ≈ 2440.62 ≪ 2780.93 ≈ 2823.45 ≈ 2787.08 ≈ 2783.33
FY17–25 480.44 ≈ 475.52 ≈ 504.26 ≈ 504.26 ≈ 510.95 ≈ 512.88
FRD12–29 664.6 ≈ 683.14 < 779.91 ≈ 826.75 > 781.86 ≈ 786.16
KS13–12 2871.48 < 3030.1 ≈ 3032.91 ≈ 3114.32 ≈ 3035.28 ≈ 3040.47
STS13–13 1426.09 ≈ 1514.33 ≈ 1536.36 < 1624.89 ≈ 1538.37 ≈ 1540.4
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 1002.43 ≈ 999.39 ≪ 1257.49 ≈ 1294.67 > 1258.18 ≈ 1257.49
Blonski et al. (2011) 1507.31 ≈ 1637.77 > 1570.14 ≈ 1582.03 ≈ 1628.08 ≈ 1654.79
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 911.92 ≈ 948.27 ≈ 912.09 ≈ 954.26 ≈ 913.88 ≈ 915.75
Dal Bó (2005) 789.96 ≈ 807.96 ≈ 803.54 ≈ 808.31 ≈ 815.25 ≈ 824.99
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 6222.59 < 6418.15 ≪ 6836.38 ≪ 7168.69 > 6854.44 ≈ 6855.56
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 10356.95 ≪ 10785.28 < 11101 < 11351.56 ≫ 11123.87 ≈ 11165.17
Dreber et al. (2008) 747.66 ≈ 738.54 ≈ 751.82 ≈ 751.82 ≈ 763.56 ≈ 762.08
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 2428.38 ≈ 2440.62 ≪ 2780.93 ≈ 2823.45 ≈ 2787.08 ≈ 2783.33
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 480.44 ≈ 475.52 ≈ 504.26 ≈ 504.26 ≈ 510.95 ≈ 512.88
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 664.6 ≈ 683.14 < 779.91 ≈ 826.75 > 781.86 ≈ 786.16
Kagel and Schley (2013) 2871.48 < 3030.1 ≈ 3032.91 ≈ 3114.32 ≈ 3035.28 ≈ 3040.47
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 1426.09 ≈ 1514.33 ≈ 1536.36 < 1624.89 ≈ 1538.37 ≈ 1540.4
Pooled 29738.08 ≪ 30697.93 ≪ 32032.91 ≪ 32914.44 ≫ 32229.66 ≈ 32354.4
Note: Notation of treatments and meaning of relation signs are all as defined above, see Table 7.
Table 32: Comparison of 1- and 2-memory Semi-Grim with two and three parameters, pure and generalized strategies (no switching,
Grim scheme)
(ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
SGs M2“General” SGs M2 “Grim” Semi-Grim Gen M2“Grim” Gen M1 Best Pure M2
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 5
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 3 3 9 6 32
# Parameters accounted for 5 3 3 9 6 3–8
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 742.13 ≈ 738.78 ≫ 694.72 > 649.81 ≈ 645.32 ≪ 791.39
Blonski et al. (2011) 585.39 ≫ 551.67 ≈ 549.45 ≪ 767.03 ≈ 748.97 ≈ 705.79
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 570.41 ≈ 567.81 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 581.45 ≈ 617.33 ≈ 588.54
Dal Bó (2005) 364.64 ≈ 359.02 ≈ 358.51 < 402.78 ≈ 407.86 ≈ 389.07
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3594.64 ≈ 3577.91 ≈ 3533.99 ≈ 3577.56 ≈ 3624.47 ≪ 3835.49
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5006.42 ≈ 5002.07 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5349.43 ≈ 5355.13 ≪ 5538.04
Dreber et al. (2008) 451.44 ≈ 444.6 ≈ 437.17 < 487.89 ≈ 479.28 > 462.71
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1089.19 ≈ 1087.11 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1059.59 ≈ 1056.99 ≈ 1102.65
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 164.74 ≈ 161.74 ≈ 161.45 ≪ 188.15 ≈ 188.5 ≈ 181.98
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 298.69 ≈ 298.27 ≈ 291.43 < 322.89 ≈ 324.36 < 366.75
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1787.59 ≈ 1783.73 ≈ 1782.82 > 1684.63 < 1779.94 ≈ 1805.95
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 924.56 ≈ 923.27 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 896.24 ≈ 903.93 ≈ 941.92
Pooled 15762.21 ≫ 15605.39 > 15481.59 ≪ 16295.72 ≈ 16350.93 ≪ 16862.01
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 433.04 ≈ 430.13 > 389.24 ≈ 365.6 ≈ 363.58 ≪ 484.4
Blonski et al. (2011) 888.46 ≈ 879.23 > 867.87 ≪ 1022.73 ≈ 1094.17 ≈ 1056
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 342.01 ≈ 342.71 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 340.71 ≈ 348.23 ≈ 316.38
Dal Bó (2005) 422.93 ≈ 423.8 ≈ 424.44 ≪ 471.65 ≈ 475.11 ≈ 463.52
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2842.94 ≈ 2835.16 ≈ 2817.31 ≈ 2706.97 ≪ 2988.87 ≈ 2880.23
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5027.27 ≈ 5058.67 ≈ 5043.81 < 5227.69 < 5448.95 ≈ 5577.08
Dreber et al. (2008) 271.55 ≈ 266.02 ≈ 264.94 ≈ 288.95 ≈ 295.06 ≈ 287.58
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1446.73 ≈ 1442.23 ≈ 1403.03 ≈ 1370.98 ≈ 1409.56 ≪ 1617.77
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 315.35 ≈ 314.7 ≈ 313.5 ≈ 311.99 ≈ 309.63 ≪ 356.11
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 389.34 ≈ 385.81 ≈ 380.75 ≈ 364.47 ≈ 373.44 < 447.19
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1208.7 ≈ 1206.72 ≈ 1211.37 > 1128.24 ≈ 1211.25 ≈ 1169.31
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 596.62 ≈ 595.17 ≈ 586.72 ≈ 551.88 < 616.19 ≈ 583.8
Pooled 14367.31 ≈ 14289.77 > 14159.8 ≈ 14480.14 ≪ 15152.88 ≈ 15396.72
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above, see Table 1. Pure M1 refers to TFT, Grim, and AD. For definitions
of pure strategies see Table 5. Gen M1 refers to generalized versions of TFT, Grim, and AD with memory-1. SGs refers to a two parameter version of SG
(1−θ1,θ2,θ2,θ1). “Gen M2” refers to memory-2 versions of the generalized strategies that allow parameters to depend on the prevalence of joint cooperation
in t−2 (Grim Scheme).
Table 33: Comparison of 1- and 2-memory Semi-Grim, pure and generalized strategies (no switching, TFT scheme)
(ICL-BIC of the models, less is better and relation signs point toward better models)
SGs M2“General” SGs M2 “TFT” Semi-Grim Gen M2“TFT” Gen M1 Best Pure M2
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 5
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 3 3 9 6 32
# Parameters accounted for 5 3 3 9 6 3–8
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 742.13 ≈ 738.55 ≫ 694.72 > 649.37 ≈ 645.32 ≪ 791.38
Blonski et al. (2011) 585.39 ≫ 550.9 ≈ 549.45 ≪ 760.49 ≈ 748.97 ≈ 703.1
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 570.41 ≈ 567.91 ≈ 567.86 ≈ 580.92 ≈ 617.33 ≈ 588.55
Dal Bó (2005) 364.64 ≈ 359.74 ≈ 358.51 ≪ 405.83 ≈ 407.86 ≈ 389.08
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3594.64 ≈ 3573.88 ≈ 3533.99 ≈ 3524.12 < 3624.47 ≪ 3835.75
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5006.42 ≈ 5004.6 ≈ 4991.74 ≪ 5276.75 ≈ 5355.13 ≪ 5538.37
Dreber et al. (2008) 451.44 ≈ 445.38 ≈ 437.17 < 482.83 ≈ 479.28 > 462.71
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1089.19 ≈ 1090.75 ≈ 1090.22 ≈ 1039.25 ≈ 1056.99 ≈ 1102.64
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 164.74 ≈ 161.91 ≈ 161.45 ≪ 182.81 ≈ 188.5 ≈ 181.98
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 298.69 ≈ 296.73 ≈ 291.43 < 319.76 ≈ 324.36 < 366.78
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1787.59 ≈ 1784.29 ≈ 1782.82 > 1651.6 ≪ 1779.94 ≈ 1805.95
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 924.56 ≈ 922.74 ≈ 912.8 ≈ 890.54 ≈ 903.93 ≈ 941.91
Pooled 15762.21 ≫ 15606.79 > 15481.59 ≪ 16092.54 < 16350.93 ≪ 16858.86
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 433.04 ≈ 431.45 ≫ 389.24 ≈ 368.09 ≈ 363.58 ≪ 484.41
Blonski et al. (2011) 888.46 ≈ 874.57 ≈ 867.87 ≪ 1013.57 ≈ 1094.17 ≈ 1055.95
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 342.01 ≈ 345.65 ≈ 347.4 ≈ 324.09 ≈ 348.23 ≈ 316.38
Dal Bó (2005) 422.93 ≈ 424.63 ≈ 424.44 < 451.34 < 475.11 ≈ 463.54
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2842.94 ≈ 2833.79 ≈ 2817.31 ≈ 2679.96 ≪ 2988.87 ≈ 2885.43
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5027.27 ≈ 5048.25 ≈ 5043.81 ≈ 5144.02 ≪ 5448.95 ≈ 5577.55
Dreber et al. (2008) 271.55 ≈ 270.81 ≈ 264.94 ≈ 287.55 ≈ 295.06 ≈ 287.58
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1446.73 ≈ 1442.34 ≈ 1403.03 ≈ 1349.18 < 1409.56 ≪ 1617.77
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 315.35 ≈ 312.94 ≈ 313.5 ≈ 311.04 ≈ 309.63 ≪ 356.11
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 389.34 ≈ 386.5 ≈ 380.75 ≈ 367.2 ≈ 373.44 < 447.19
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1208.7 ≈ 1208.4 ≈ 1211.37 > 1100.94 ≈ 1211.25 ≈ 1169.31
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 596.62 ≈ 595.53 ≈ 586.72 > 541.54 < 616.19 ≈ 583.8
Pooled 14367.31 ≈ 14284.29 > 14159.8 ≈ 14266.78 ≪ 15152.88 ≈ 15402.36
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above, see Table 1. Pure M1 refers to TFT, Grim, and AD. For definitions of
pure strategies see Table 5. “Gen M1” refers to generalized versions of TFT, Grim, and AD with memory-1. SGs refers to a two parameter version of SG
(1−θ1,θ2,θ2,θ1). “Gen M2” refers to memory-2 versions of the generalized strategies that allow parameters to depend on opponent’s behavior in t−2 (TFT
Scheme).
Table 34: Examining all mixtures of Semi-Grim with pure or generalized pure strategies as secondary components (robustness
check for Table 4)
Component 1 First component is always Semi-Grim
Component 2 Gen WSLS Gen TFT Gen Grim Gen AD/AC AD Grim TFT WSLS
Specification
# Models evaluated 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
# Pars estimated (by treatment) 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
# Parameters accounted for 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
First halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 684.3 ≈ 689.91 ≈ 688.17 ≈ 649.86 ≈ 698.36 ≈ 681.99 ≈ 698.37 ≈ 698.36
Blonski et al. (2011) 635.26 ≈ 648.6 ≈ 645.78 ≫ 614.35 ≪ 663.28 ≈ 658.75 > 614.21 > 594.32
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 572.36 ≈ 559.64 ≈ 571.61 ≈ 562.11 ≈ 567.84 ≈ 562.35 ≈ 571.1 ≈ 566.52
Dal Bó (2005) 393.92 ≈ 372.81 ≈ 384.74 ≈ 372.89 ≈ 378.87 ≈ 389.65 ≈ 386.98 > 368.21
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 3538.98 ≈ 3532.69 ≈ 3475.81 ≈ 3416.01 ≈ 3488.81 ≈ 3434.87 < 3538.27 ≈ 3577.29
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5164.89 ≫ 5070.81 ≈ 5052.96 ≫ 4941.84 ≈ 5024.63 ≈ 5107.87 > 5047.74 ≈ 5033.06
Dreber et al. (2008) 454.45 ≈ 453.19 ≈ 440.94 ≈ 443.12 ≈ 442.47 ≈ 440.24 ≈ 443.9 ≈ 444.99
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1084.07 ≈ 1062.36 ≈ 1074.19 > 1017.65 < 1084.74 ≈ 1074.22 ≈ 1099.57 ≈ 1084.81
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 180.17 ≈ 190.03 ≈ 188.6 ≫ 167.94 ≈ 165.94 < 178.18 ≈ 180.54 ≫ 165.36
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 296.17 ≈ 299.94 ≈ 299.98 ≈ 291.68 ≈ 292.47 ≈ 295.53 ≈ 297.99 ≈ 295.46
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1785.45 ≈ 1780 ≈ 1777.41 > 1690.55 ≈ 1689.17 ≈ 1685.56 < 1777.58 ≈ 1787.56
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 910.79 ≈ 901.32 ≈ 911 > 866.46 ≈ 887.79 ≈ 889.32 ≈ 904.29 ≈ 916.83
Pooled 15919.66 > 15780.15 ≈ 15730.04 ≫ 15253.3 ≪ 15566.74 ≈ 15580.91 ≈ 15742.91 ≈ 15715.14
Second halves per session
Aoyagi and Frechette (2009) 395.39 ≈ 380.72 ≈ 403.19 > 357.21 ≈ 392.87 ≈ 398.09 ≈ 397.94 ≈ 393.02
Blonski et al. (2011) 921.84 ≈ 946.43 < 1157.9 ≫ 881.73 ≈ 914.98 ≈ 915.1 ≈ 940.75 > 919.01
Bruttel and Kamecke (2012) 323.04 ≈ 339 ≈ 337.37 ≈ 346.24 ≈ 349.32 ≈ 336.68 ≈ 337.22 ≈ 350.98
Dal Bó (2005) 471.52 ≈ 461.35 ≈ 444.45 ≈ 437.05 ≈ 437.71 < 457.32 ≈ 444.73 ≈ 433.69
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011) 2729.84 ≈ 2742.23 ≪ 3652.93 ≫ 2620.29 ≈ 2640.88 ≈ 2615.25 < 2798.46 ≈ 2845.99
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2015) 5043.7 ≈ 5080.21 ≈ 5025.85 > 4925.77 ≈ 5032.59 ≈ 5077.82 ≈ 5053.74 ≈ 5042.75
Dreber et al. (2008) 279.59 ≈ 258.73 ≈ 276.69 ≈ 279.28 ≈ 275.84 ≈ 277.77 ≈ 262.93 ≈ 275.37
Duffy and Ochs (2009) 1407.13 ≈ 1378.8 ≈ 1365.2 > 1294.4 < 1399.65 ≈ 1379.73 ≈ 1414.84 ≈ 1447.23
Fréchette and Yuksel (2017) 313.59 ≈ 324.17 ≈ 323.61 > 283.31 < 319.78 ≈ 311.64 ≈ 319.44 ≈ 317.41
Fudenberg et al. (2012) 381.7 ≈ 387.98 ≈ 385.9 ≈ 364.37 ≈ 366.79 ≈ 379.95 ≈ 388.9 ≈ 384.62
Kagel and Schley (2013) 1156.16 ≈ 1202.31 ≈ 1202.28 ≈ 1154.97 ≈ 1126.89 ≈ 1153.79 ≈ 1200.87 ≈ 1216.1
Sherstyuk et al. (2013) 588.67 ≈ 569.49 ≈ 583.54 ≈ 565.48 ≈ 550.64 ≈ 539.35 ≈ 567.48 ≈ 594.92
Pooled 14231.02 ≈ 14290.27 ≪ 15377.76 ≫ 13728.94 < 13990.32 ≈ 14024.87 < 14309.69 ≈ 14403.47
Note: Relation signs, bootstrap procedure, and derived p-values are exactly as above, see Table 1. For definitions of pure strategies see Table 5. For definitions
of generalized strategies see Section 3 main text.
